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Abstract		What	Would	I	Do	and	Why?:	Adolescents’	Moral	Reasoning,	Social	Perspective-Taking	Competence,	and	Intended	Action	in	Response	to	Witnessed	Bullying		by			Emily	Jean	Campbell		Doctor	of	Philosophy	in	Education		University	of	California,	Berkeley		Professor	Larry	Nucci,	Co-Chair		Professor	Susan	Holloway,	Co-Chair			Why	do	people’s	moral	judgments—what	they	decide	is	right	or	wrong—often	fail	to	predict	their	actions?	One	prevalent	example	is	the	phenomenon	of	bullying:	though	the	vast	majority	of	young	people	judge	bullying	as	wrong,	a	significant	percentage	of	adolescents	report	having	perpetrated	bullying	behavior,	and	even	more	have	acted	as	bystanders,	i.e.,	have	witnessed	bullying	without	intervening	to	stop	it.	Social	domain	theory	(SDT)	provides	a	framework	for	analyzing	the	reasoning	behind	such	judgments,	based	on	evidence	that	people	distinguish	between	different	domains	of	social	knowledge—moral,	conventional,	personal,	and	prudential—when	reasoning	about	social	situations.	More	research	is	needed	to	investigate	the	relationships	between	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning,	social-emotional	competencies	such	as	perspective-taking,	and	intended	action	choices,	especially	among	youth.			In	this	dissertation	study,	a	secondary	analysis	using	data	from	the	larger	National	Professional	Development	and	Evaluation	Project,	1402	adolescent	students	(grades	9	and	10)	drawn	from	61	different	high	schools	in	8	regions	across	the	United	States	were	asked	to	respond	to	a	hypothetical	bullying	situation.	In	written	survey-based	responses,	participating	students	rated	potential	reasons	for	a	bystander	to	intervene	in	the	situation	and	choices	for	how	they	could	respond	if	they	were	to	witness	the	situation	themselves.	Next,	students	were	asked	to	select	the	single	choice	of	action	that	they	would	be	most	likely	to	take,	and	then	to	explain	in	their	own	words	why	they	would	make	that	choice.	The	students	also	completed	a	measure	of	social	perspective-taking	competence.	Using	an	SDT	framework	to	examine	the	data,	this	study	focused	on	three	major	research	questions.		For	the	first	research	question,	multilevel	regression	modeling,	with	students	nested	in	schools,	was	used	to	relate	students’	reasoning	and	personal/contextual	factors	(gender,	age,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence)	to	their	action	choice	ratings,	and	logistic	regression	was	used	to	predict	their	selection	of	a	“best”	action	choice.	Results	indicated	that	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	was	consistently	positively	related	to	the	choice	to	
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directly	intervene	to	stop	the	bullying	and	negatively	related	to	the	choice	to	bystand,	while	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	was	positively	related	to	the	choice	to	intervene	indirectly	(i.e.,	tell	a	teacher).	Both	males	and	students	who	perceived	a	greater	prevalence	of	bullying	at	their	school	were	significantly	less	likely	to	endorse/select	either	kind	of	intervention	and	significantly	more	likely	to	endorse/select	bystanding	and	perpetration.	The	second	research	question	involved	coding	students’	free-response	explanations	for	SDT	domains	cited	and	relating	these	to	their	action	choices.	Associations	between	moral/conventional	reasoning	and	action	choices	mirrored	those	found	in	the	first	research	question;	additionally,	students	who	chose	bystanding	often	cited	personal	and	prudential	considerations,	and	some	students	mentioned	relational	and	emotional	concerns	as	well.	Finally,	the	third	research	question	used	mediation	analyses	to	test	for	indirect	effects	of	moral	reasoning	on	action	choices	through	social	perspective-taking	competence,	which	was	positively	associated	with	moral	reasoning	and	with	the	positive	action	choices,	while	negatively	associated	with	the	negative	action	choices.	Significant	indirect	effects	were	found	for	three	of	the	four	action	choices,	supporting	the	idea	that	socio-moral	reasoning	and	social-emotional	competence	work	together	to	produce	moral	functioning.		Findings	are	discussed	in	terms	of	theoretical	and	methodological	implications	for	research	as	well	as	potential	implications	for	practice,	such	as	for	anti-bullying	efforts	in	educational	settings.
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	
	
1.1	Problem	and	Purpose	For	everyone	involved	in	the	world	of	education--or,	really,	for	anyone	who	cares	about	the	future	of	human	society--questions	of	socio-moral	development	loom	large.	We	all	have	a	stake	in	how	people	treat	each	other,	but	especially	for	educators,	parents,	or	any	other	adults	involved	in	the	development	of	youth,	it	is	critical	to	try	to	understand	how	young	people	think	about	what	is	right	versus	wrong	and	how	these	thoughts	relate	to	how	they	choose	to	act.		One	central	question	is	why,	even	when	people	are	able	to	make	judgments	about	right	and	wrong,	their	judgments	often	fail	to	predict	their	actions.	This	phenomenon,	often	referred	to	as	the	judgment-action	gap,	is	a	perennial	issue	in	the	field	of	moral	development	(Blasi,	1980).	One	prevalent	example	in	educational	contexts	is	bullying:	though	the	vast	majority	of	young	people	judge	bullying	as	“wrong”	(Gini,	Pozzoli,	Borghi,	&	Franzoni,	2008;	Thornberg,	2014),	meta-analyses	show	that	about	35%	of	adolescents	report	having	perpetrated	bullying	behavior	(Modecki,	Minchin,	Harbaugh,	Guerra,	&	Runions,	2014),	and	even	more	have	acted	as	bystanders,	i.e.,	have	witnessed	bullying	without	intervening	to	stop	it	(Trach,	Hymel,	Waterhouse,	&	Neale,	2010).	Although	judgments	of	right	vs.	wrong,	taken	simply	at	face	value,	may	not	always	correspond	well	to	social	decisions,	examining	the	reasoning	behind	a	given	judgment	may	shed	some	light	on	the	issue.	Social-cognitive	domain	theory	(SDT)	provides	a	framework	for	analyzing	such	reasoning,	based	on	evidence	that	people	distinguish	between	different	domains	of	social	knowledge—namely,	morality	(i.e.,	principles	concerning	welfare/harm,	justice/fairness,	and	rights),	social	convention	(i.e.,	rules	and	expectations	that	help	society	run	smoothly),	matters	of	personal	choice	(viewed	as	outside	of	the	legitimate	realm	of	moral	or	conventional	regulation),	and	matters	of	personal	safety/practicality	(i.e.,	prudence)—when	reasoning	about	real	and	hypothetical	social	situations	(Nucci,	2001;	Smetana,	1999;	Turiel,	1983).	For	instance,	research	has	shown	that	children	and	adults	consistently	treat	moral	principles	as	more	universal	and	less	mutable	as	compared	with	social-conventional	rules,	which	are	seen	as	relatively	arbitrary	and	changeable,	contingent	on	factors	such	as	context,	consensus,	and/or	the	dictates	of	authority;	similarly,	moral	transgressions	(i.e.,	transgressions	of	moral	principles)	are	reliably	considered	to	be	more	serious	than	conventional	transgressions	(i.e.,	transgressions	of	social-conventional	rules;	Smetana	et	al.	,	2012).		These	findings	do	not	imply,	however,	that	morality	is	the	only	factor	in	deciding	whether	and	how	to	act.	SDT	posits	that,	in	social	decision-making,	considerations	from	all	the	domains	are	coordinated	and	weighed	in	different	ways	depending	on	personal	and	contextual	factors	(Turiel,	2015).	Theoretically,	this	variance	can	lead	to	different	action	decisions	even	when	moral	judgments,	per	se,	are	similar.	For	instance,	in	a	potentially	risky	situation,	one	person	may	choose	to	prioritize	personal	safety	(prudential	domain)	over	what	they	would	judge	as	“the	right	thing	to	do”	(moral	domain),	whereas	another	person—or	the	same	person,	in	a	different	context—might	prioritize	the	moral	aspect	of	the	same	situation.	Others	might	weigh	the	conventional	implications	of	potential	behavior	
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(conventional	domain)	more	heavily	or	give	a	larger	role	to	their	own	personal	preferences	(personal	domain).		However,	most	studies	in	SDT	are	principally	concerned	not	with	individual	differences,	but	with	“universal”	processes	of	socio-moral	reasoning,	i.e.,	the	trends	of	how	most	people	tend	to	think	in	certain	social	situations.	More	research	is	needed	to	investigate	how	different	personal	and	contextual	factors	(i.e.,	factors	beyond	the	details	of	the	immediate	situation)	may	influence	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning,	as	well	as	on	the	relationship	between	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning	and	action	choices	in	morally-relevant	situations,	especially	among	youth.	Moreover,	studies	in	SDT	rarely	include	any	information	about	participants’	social-emotional	competencies,	such	as	how	able	and	inclined	they	are	to	perceive	and	understand	their	own	and	others’	feelings,	manage	their	own	emotions	and	behaviors	in	productive	ways,	and	navigate	social	relationships.	Because,	according	to	SDT,	knowledge	in	each	of	the	domains	develops	through	social	experience	and	is	informed	by	emotions	(e.g.,	emotions	can	serve	to	highlight	an	event’s	relevance	to	oneself	and	one’s	important	goals;	Turiel	&	Killen,	2010),	it	seems	likely	that	different	levels	of	social-emotional	competencies	would	influence	how	young	people	think	about	right	and	wrong	in	social	situations	and	how	they	intend	to	behave	when	they	encounter	such	situations.	Therefore,	further	research	is	also	needed	on	the	connections	between	social-emotional	competencies,	socio-moral	reasoning,	and	behavior	(or	at	least	behavioral	intentions).	These	relationships	may	be	especially	important	to	investigate	among	adolescents,	who	are	in	the	midst	of	significant	developmental	shifts	in	cognitive,	social-emotional,	and	behavioral	competencies	that	will	set	the	stage	for	their	adult	identities	and	well-being	(Blakemore	&	Choudhury,	2006;	Steinberg,	2005;	Yeager,	2017).		Thus,	the	main	aim	of	this	dissertation	was	to	explore	how	adolescents	reason	about	the	social	and	moral	aspects	of	a	morally-relevant	situation,	how	this	reasoning	may	relate	to	what	they	might	choose	to	do	in	response	to	the	situation,	and	how	personal/contextual	factors	and	social-emotional	competence	may	play	a	role	in	their	reasoning	and	the	actions	they	intend	to	take.	Specifically,	I	set	out	to	examine	these	questions	with	regards	to	bullying,	which	is	both	a	common	situation	for	adolescents	to	encounter	and	one	that	can	result	in	significant	psychosocial	harm	(Nansel	et	al.,	2001).		In	addition	to	this	primary	theoretical	aim,	there	was	also	a	secondary	methodological	aim,	which	was	to	investigate	written	survey-based	measures	as	a	potential	alternative	method	to	semi-structured	interviews	for	assessing	socio-moral	reasoning	and	related	variables.	Though	survey-based	measures	are	more	limited	in	terms	of	depth	and	clarification	compared	to	the	semi-structured	interviews	that	are	most	often	used	in	SDT	research,	they	are	more	accessible	and	scalable;	therefore,	it	may	be	useful	to	determine	to	what	extent	differences	in	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning,	as	well	as	theorized	relations	between	such	reasoning	and	other	variables	and	outcomes,	can	be	detected	through	such	measures.		In	the	following	sections,	I	will	first	present	a	brief	overview	of	moral	and	social-emotional	development	in	education.	Then,	I	will	describe	Nucci’s	(2019)	model	of	character	as	a	relational	developmental	system,	which	integrates	the	individual’s	socio-moral	reasoning,	social-emotional	competencies,	and	context,	and	which	serves	as	a	theoretical	framework	for	this	dissertation	study.	Next,	I	will	review	research	on	bullying	among	youth,	specifically	as	it	results	to	components	of	interest	from	the	character	model	
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that	will	be	addressed	in	this	study.	Finally,	I	will	list	the	major	research	questions	guiding	the	study.			
1.2	Moral	and	Social-Emotional	Development	in	Education		Historically,	particularly	in	the	United	States,	what	is	now	often	referred	to	as	moral,	ethical,	or	character	development	was	one	of	the	most	important	goals	of	education,	if	not	the	single	most	important	goal	(McClellan,	1999).	These	days,	although	it	is	a	controversial	topic,	most	people	still	agree	that	helping	students	develop	into	good	people	is	a	crucial	part	of	what	education	should	do	(Nucci,	2001).	The	controversy	arises,	in	part,	with	the	question	of	what	exactly	it	means	to	be	a	“good	person.”	Is	a	good	person	simply	someone	who	follows	externally-imposed	rules,	someone	who	is	able	to	get	along	with	others	and	function	in	society?	Or	is	there	more	to	it	than	that	(Nucci,	2009)?	And,	most	controversially,	who	gets	to	decide	what	counts	as	right	or	good?	Some	do	not	feel	that	it	is	the	place	of	schools	to	address	morality—though,	of	course,	schools	and	those	who	work	in	them	do	promote	social	and	moral	values,	whether	this	is	explicitly	recognized	or	not	(e.g.,	Hunter	&	Olson,	2018).		Partially	due	to	such	controversies	with	regards	to	moral	development	and	education,	the	trend	in	recent	years	has	been	for	schools	to	focus	instead	on	the	development	of	social	and	emotional	competence.	The	concept	of	social-emotional	learning	(SEL)—defined	as	the	building	of	social	and	emotional	knowledge,	skills,	and	attitudes,	such	as	those	needed	to	recognize	and	manage	one’s	own	emotions,	understand	and	show	concern	for	others,	develop	and	maintain	positive	relationships,	and	make	responsible	decisions—has	expanded	beyond	its	roots	in	prevention	science	(i.e.,	efforts	to	prevent	specific	emotional	and	behavioral	problems)	to	become	a	widely	used	type	of	school-based	intervention	intended	to	improve	school	and	life	outcomes	for	all	young	people	(Schonert-Reichl	&	O’Brien,	2012).	Meta-analyses	of	universal	SEL	programs	have	indeed	shown	benefits	for	youth	overall	in	terms	of	psychological,	social,	behavioral,	and	academic	outcomes	(Durlak	et	al,	2011;	Taylor	et	al.,	2017).		Though	SEL	and	moral	development	are	often	treated	as	completely	separate	fields	of	study	and	intervention,	in	actuality	they	have	many	conceptual	and	practical	areas	of	overlap	(Elias,	Parker,	Kash,	Weissberg,	&	O’Brien,	2008).	SEL	programs,	and	studies	of	their	effectiveness,	rarely	focus	on	moral	reasoning	explicitly,	but	often	address	morally-relevant	outcomes	such	as	aggression	and	prosocial	behavior	(e.g.,	Conduct	Problems	Prevention	Research	Group,	2010).	On	the	other	hand,	as	mentioned,	socio-moral	reasoning	development	in	SDT	is	considered	to	be	dependent	on	social	and	emotional	experiences	(Turiel,	2015),	but	studies	of	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning	rarely	integrate	explicit	assessment	of	social-emotional	competencies.	It	should	be	noted	that	studies	based	on	other	theories	of	moral	development	seem	to	be	more	likely	to	consider	relationships	between	certain	social-emotional	competencies	(e.g.,	empathy)	and	moral	reasoning,	as	they	define	it	(e.g.,	with	moral	development	defined	as	reflecting	a	progression	from	egocentric	to	other-oriented	motives;	see	Eisenberg,	2009).		
1.3	Character	as	a	Relational	Developmental	System	
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	 In	contrast	to	the	above-mentioned	separation	in	most	research	of	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning	from	social-emotional	competence,	Nucci	(2019)	has	proposed	a	model	of	character	as	a	relational	developmental	system	that	combines	multiple	dimensions	of	social,	emotional,	and	moral	functioning.	Building	off	of	and	transcending	the	definition	of	character	as	“the	set	of	psychological	characteristics	that	motivate	and	enable	the	individual	to	function	as	a	competent	moral	agent,	that	is,	to	do	‘good’	in	the	world”	(Berkowitz,	2011,	p.	153),	this	model	conceptualizes	character	not	as	a	static	set	of	characteristics,	but	as	a	dynamic	system	constantly	interacting	within	itself,	with	other	aspects	of	the	larger	self-system,	and	with	context	to	produce	moral	functioning.	As	this	model	provides	an	overarching	theoretical	framework	for	this	dissertation,	in	the	following	pages	I	will	describe	each	component	of	the	model,	how	they	fit	together,	and	what	role	each	plays	in	the	study.	
Social-emotional	competencies.	In	this	model,	social-emotional	competencies	are	seen	as	part	of	“moral	wellness,”	basic	social-cognitive	and	social-emotional	skills—both	self-directed	and	other-directed—that	everyone	needs	to	possess	in	order	to	live	a	successful	and	ethical	life	in	society	(Nucci,	2019).	Examples	of	self-directed	social-emotional	competencies	include	awareness	and	regulation	of	one’s	own	emotions,	while	other-directed	social-emotional	competencies	include	recognition	of	others’	emotions,	affective	empathy	(the	propensity	to	feel	for	others),	and	cognitive	empathy	or	perspective-taking	(the	ability	to	understand/predict	how	others	may	be	thinking	and	feeling).	Though	such	social-emotional	competencies	are	necessary	for	recognizing	the	moral	features	of	situations	and	for	translating	moral	convictions	into	appropriate,	effective	action,	they	are	not	sufficient	for	moral	functioning	on	their	own.	Without	a	sense	of	morality	to	anchor	and	guide	social-emotional	skills,	such	skills	could	be	used	to	manipulate	people	or	otherwise	cause	harm.	As	stated	by	Elias,	Nayman,	and	Duffell	(2018),	the	idea	is	that	“social	and	emotional	proficiencies	are	an	engine	for	accomplishment	in	many	realms	of	life,	and	that	a	constructive	guidance	mechanism	is	necessary	to	steer	them	in	positive	directions”	(p.	324).	For	example,	if	a	young	person	perceived	harm	due	to	a	certain	social	issue	(e.g.,	homelessness	or	child	hunger)	and	wanted	to	raise	money	to	help	address	it,	but	did	not	possess	the	social-emotional	competence	necessary	to	create	a	structured	campaign	and	appeal	to	potential	donors,	the	fundraiser	would	not	go	far.	On	the	other	hand,	if	that	young	person	were	very	competent	at	understanding	what	would	move	others	and	convince	them	to	donate	but	did	not	give	any	thought	to	the	moral	consequences	of	their	actions,	they	might	run	a	successful	fundraiser	and	pocket	the	money	themselves.	Thus,	both	socio-moral	reasoning	and	social-emotional	competencies	are	necessary	component	parts	of	a	well-functioning	character	system.	In	this	study,	I	focus	on	social	perspective-taking	competence—the	ability	and	propensity	to	consider	others’	perspectives	along	with	one’s	own—as	an	other-regarding	social-emotional	skill	that	may	play	an	important	role	in	how	students	think	about	bullying	and	how	to	respond	to	it.		
Socio-moral	reasoning:	Social	Domain	Theory	(SDT).	Nucci’s	(2019)	model	of	character	also	incorporates	the	essential	role	of	socio-moral	reasoning,	based	on	research	in	social	domain	theory	(SDT).	In	the	model,	socio-moral	reasoning,	also	referred	to	as	moral	cognition,	is	considered	a	basic	component	of	the	character	system,	possessed	by	all	typically-developing	people.	Evidence	from	SDT-based	studies	indicates	that	people	from	cultures	around	the	world,	including	adults	and	children	as	young	as	2.5	years	old,	are	able	
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to	distinguish	between	different	domains	of	social	knowledge,	particularly	between	the	moral	domain	and	others	(Smetana,	Jambon,	Conry-Murray,	&	Sturge-Apple,	2012).	Below,	I	will	describe	the	main	features	of	SDT	and	how	each	is	applied	in	this	dissertation.	
Domain	distinctions.	In	research	using	SDT,	either	three	or	four	domains	of	social	knowledge	are	commonly	described.	The	moral	domain	involves	considerations	of	harm/welfare,	fairness/justice,	and	rights,	which	are	perceived	as	obligatory	and	universal	due	to	their	inherent,	non-arbitrary	effects	on	people.	The	conventional	domain,	in	contrast,	concerns	issues	of	rules,	expectations,	and	traditions	that	serve	to	help	groups/societies	function	smoothly,	but	that	are	fundamentally	arbitrary	and	can	be	changed	by	consensus,	commands	of	authority,	etc.	In	addition	to	these,	the	personal	domain	refers	to	areas	of	identity	and	behavior	that	are	considered	to	be	in	the	realm	of	personal	choice,	autonomy,	and	privacy,	outside	the	bounds	of	legitimate	regulation	by	moral	principles	or	conventional	rules.	Finally,	the	prudential	domain	covers	issues	of	personal	safety,	welfare,	and	practicality;	in	this	sense,	it	is	less	socially-oriented	than	the	other	three	domains.	Some	scholars	combine	the	personal	and	prudential	domains	into	a	superordinate	domain	called	the	psychological	domain,	referring	to	the	focus	of	both	the	personal	and	prudential	domains	on	the	individual	self	(e.g.,	Smetana,	Rote,	et	al.,	2012),	but,	for	the	purposes	of	this	research	project,	they	are	conceptualized	as	separate.	In	this	study,	I	categorize	and	examine	students’	reasoning	using	a	domain-based	frame	and	look	for	associations	between	domain	distinctions	and	action	choices.	
Domain	coordination.	Domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning—the	ability	to	distinguish	and	balance	considerations	from	different	domains	when	making	social	judgments—is	necessary	for	moral	functioning,	but	SDT	itself	does	not	make	predictions	about	individual	differences	in	judgments	or	how	judgments	relate	to	subsequent	actions.	SDT	simply	asserts	that	action	decisions	are	made	by	coordinating	considerations	from	different	domains,	and	that	this	coordination	can	be	influenced	by	informational	assumptions	about	the	nature	of	the	world	or	reality	as	well	as	personal	and	contextual	factors,	including	sociocultural	influences	(Turiel,	2015).	Among	SDT	researchers,	the	role	of	this	type	of	coordination	is	recognized	both	as	critical	and	as	needing	further	research.	Although	this	study	does	not	explicitly	investigate	coordination	between	different	SDT	domains,	it	does	incorporate	certain	potentially-relevant	personal	and	contextual	factors	and	how	they	may	relate	to	reasoning	and	decision	outcomes.	
Development	of	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning.	SDT	holds	that	moral	reasoning	is	developed	through	everyday	social	interactions,	as	children	experience	the	consequences	of	others’	behavior	and,	with	increasing	sophistication	as	they	age,	observe	the	consequences	of	their	own	behavior	on	others.	This	contention	has	been	supported	by	findings	from	studies	with	preschool	children,	in	which	more	advanced	understanding	of	morality	has	been	related	to	higher	levels	of	both	extraversion	(i.e.,	greater	tendency	to	engage	in	interpersonal	interactions,	both	positive	and	aggressive;	Smetana,	Rote,	et	al.,	2012)	and	theory	of	mind	(i.e.,	more	advanced	ability	to	understand	that	others’	minds	and	perspectives	are	different	than	one’s	own;	Smetana,	Jambon,	et	al.,	2012).		Of	relevance	to	this	study,	research	in	the	SDT	framework	has	also	found	a	distinctive	pattern	in	how	socio-moral	reasoning	develops	through	adolescence.	Coordination	propensity	tends	to	form	a	J-curve,	in	that	younger	children	often	focus	solely	on	one	domain	(often	the	moral	domain)	in	morally-relevant	situations,	subordinating	considerations	relevant	to	other	domains,	and	older	adolescents,	by	around	age	16,	are	
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usually	better	able	to	coordinate	considerations	from	multiple	domains;	early-	and	mid-adolescents	(around	ages	10-14),	however,	with	advancing	social-cognitive	abilities	such	as	perspective-taking,	are	starting	to	try	to	coordinate	between	domains,	but	in	the	process	may	subvert	moral	concerns	to	personal	choice	and/or	other	factors	(Nucci,	Turiel,	&	Roded,	2017).	Because	of	the	central	role	of	development	in	SDT	and	potential	developmental	shifts	in	domain-based	reasoning	in	adolescence,	age,	as	a	proxy	for	development,	is	included	as	a	potentially	influential	factor	in	this	study.	
Other	aspects	of	social	judgments	not	separately	addressed	in	SDT.	Though	the	SDT	domains	are	intended	to	cover	most	concerns	that	arise	with	regards	to	making	judgments	and	decisions	in	social	situations,	they	are	not	necessarily	exhaustive.	In	other	words,	though	SDT	theorists	contend	that	individuals	arrive	at	most	social	decisions	by	coordinating	moral,	social-conventional,	personal,	and	prudential	considerations,	people	also	may	include	other	types	of	considerations	beyond	these	four.	Two	examples	of	categories	of	social	reasoning	that	are	not	explicitly	addressed	in	the	definitions	of	SDT	domains	(and	thus	are	also	not	explicitly	addressed	in	Nucci’s	model,	which	is	based	on	SDT),	but	which	frequently	come	up	when	people	discuss	their	reasoning	about	social	situations	are	relational	considerations	(i.e.,	how	one’s	obligations,	rights,	preferences,	etc.	change	when	interacting	with	a	close	other,	such	as	a	family	member	or	good	friend,	vs.	a	stranger)	and	emotional	considerations	(i.e.,	how	one’s	own	emotional	state	affects	one’s	judgments	and/or	behavior).	Both	of	these	could,	in	some	circumstances,	be	included	in	or	subsumed	by	SDT	domains;	but	in	other	cases,	as	I	will	argue	below,	it	seems	plausible	that	they	could	stand	alone.	Especially	in	a	situation	such	as	responding	to	bullying	at	school,	which	could	involve	complex	calculations	of	personal	and	social	risks	and	rewards	(Pozzoli	&	Gini,	2010),	the	roles	of	social/relational	and	emotional	considerations	in	decision-making	seem	worthy	of	attention.		
Emotional	considerations.	In	SDT,	the	role	of	emotions	in	social	judgments	is	not	denied;	one’s	own	emotions	are	typically	viewed	as	sources	of	information	that	can	be	taken	into	consideration	along	with	all	other	elements	of	reasoning.	For	instance,	one’s	emotion	about	a	situation	could	serve	as	a	source	of	information	about	personal	preference,	and	thus	could	be	categorized	in	the	personal	domain;	an	emotion	could	also	serve	as	an	alert	to	possible	risk	or	harm	to	oneself,	thus	falling	under	the	prudential	domain.	However,	it	also	seems	possible	that	emotion,	especially	strong	emotion,	could	be	experienced	and	referenced	as	a	justification	in	itself,	without	necessarily	implicating	any	of	the	SDT	domains	or	even	any	reasoning	at	all.	If	so,	this	could	potentially	align	with	Haidt’s	(2001)	social	intuitionist	theory	of	moral	judgment	(which	claims	that	most	moral	judgments	are	based	on	automatic	intuitive/emotional	reactions,	with	reasoning	being	post-hoc	justification)	or	Greene’s	(2007)	dual-process	theory	of	moral	judgment	(which	argues	that,	although	certain	impersonal	moral	judgments	may	be	arrived	at	through	a	more	deliberative,	“cool”	reasoning	process,	other	more	personal	or	immediate	moral	judgments	are	made	through	a	quick	or	even	automatic,	emotionally-driven,	“hot”	process).		As	an	alternative	to	the	aforementioned	models,	which	tend	to	frame	reasoning	and	emotions	as	nearly	mutually	exclusive	(e.g.,	a	decision	can	either	be	either	rational	or	emotional,	cool	or	hot,	but	not	both),	Arsenio	and	Lemerise	(2004)	have	argued	that,	while	reasoning-based	theories	like	SDT	may	not	give	sufficient	attention	to	the	role	of	emotions,	there	is	no	need	for	conflict	between	SDT	and	greater	consideration	of	emotional	processes.	These	scholars	have	posited	an	integrated	model	in	which	domain-based	socio-
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moral	reasoning	serves	to	develop	and	describe	underlying	mental	structures,	while	in-the-moment	decisions	and	behavior	(e.g.,	in	peer	interactions)	are	guided	by	a	version	of	social	information	processing	(SIP)	that	they	revised	to	incorporate	the	role	of	emotions	at	every	step	that	occurs	when	an	individual	makes	a	social	decision	(Lemerise	&	Arsenio,	2000;	Arsenio	&	Lemerise,	2004).	Specifically,	Arsenio	and	Lemerise’s	model	includes	emotional	processes	in	all	the	components	of	SIP:	how	people	encode	internal	and	external	cues	in	a	social	environment,	interpret	and	attribute	the	cues	they	perceive,	clarify	their	own	goals	in	the	situation,	access	or	construct	response	options,	decide	on	a	response,	and	enact	the	intended	behavior	(Arsenio	&	Lemerise,	2004).	According	to	this	model,	many	apparent	discrepancies	between	moral	judgments	and	behavior,	as	well	as	differences	between	individuals,	could	be	explained	with	reference	to	these	components	of	SIP,	including	the	emotional	processes	inherent	to	each.		To	clarify	these	possibilities,	further	research	is	needed	to	investigate	to	what	extent	emotions	are	mentioned	in	conjunction	with	SDT	domains	versus	separate	from	or	even	opposed	to	them.	For	instance,	do	people	tend	to	mention	strong	emotions	(e.g.,	anger,	sadness,	fear)	as	a	reaction	to	a	perceived	moral	harm	and/or	as	a	source	of	motivation	to	rectify	the	harm?		Or	do	they	seem	to	experience	emotions	as	a	force	acting	outside	their	reasoning,	possibly	even	working	against	what	they	have	reasoned	is	the	best	course	of	action	to	take	(e.g.,	they	have	perceived	a	harm	and	think	they	should	address	it,	but	strong	emotions	compel	them	to	lash	out	or	run	away	instead)?	To	this	end,	in	this	study,	participants’	references	to	their	own	emotion(s)	as	justifications	for	behavior	are	considered	separately	from	the	categorization	of	reasoning	into	SDT	domains.		
Relational	considerations.	With	regards	to	relational	concerns,	what	are	the	implications	for	the	SDT	framework	of	the	very	common	impulse	to	treat	people	whom	we	are	close	to	(family,	friends,	etc.)	differently	than	we	treat	strangers?	Several	studies	on	the	topic	of	bystanding	among	youth	have	found	that	young	people	say	they	are	less	likely	to	intervene	if	the	perpetrators	and/or	targets	are	not	their	friends	(e.g.,	Ferrans,	Selman,	&	Feigenberg,	2012;	Forsberg,	Thornberg,	&	Samuelsson,	2013;	Noonan	&	Charles,	2009).	Some	work	in	the	SDT	paradigm	has	recognized	this	phenomenon,	treating	relational	partiality	either	as	compatible	with	the	moral	domain,	as	it	exemplifies	the	sense	of	care	that	is	a	necessary	foundation	for	concerns	about	welfare	and	fairness	among	all	people	(Killen	&	Turiel,	2010),	or	as	a	prioritization	of	interpersonal	goals	above	moral	ones	in	certain	contexts	(Smetana,	Killen,	&	Turiel,	1991).	Still,	how	can	we	reconcile	preferential	treatment	by	relationship	with	the	SDT	conception	of	morality,	which	is	supposed	to	be	universal	and	obligatory,	not	contingent	on	context?		When	people	judge	transgressions	differently	depending	on	the	relationship	between	the	parties	involved	(e.g.,	Haidt	&	Baron,	1996),	can	it	be	completely	explained	by	coordinations	between	morality,	convention,	personal	choice,	and	prudence?	Or	could	this	imply	a	potential	“relational	domain”	operating	alongside,	but	differentiated	from,	the	other	domains?	To	provide	insight	into	these	questions,	this	study	analyses	mentions	of	relational	justifications	both	independent	from	and	in	conjunction	with	SDT	domain	justifications.	
Critical	moral	social	engagement.	Despite	its	universality	and	importance,	socio-moral	reasoning	is	of	limited	usefulness	if	we	are	not	able,	or	not	inclined,	to	deeply	engage	with	others	and	do	our	best	to	understand	their	perspectives,	such	as	their	beliefs	about	how	the	world	works	or	their	views	of	the	consequences	that	our	actions	may	have	for	them;	without	such	understanding,	even	well-intentioned	decisions	may	do	more	harm	
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than	good.	Additionally,	as	valuable	as	social-emotional	competencies	are,	they	often	focus	only	on	immediate	interpersonal	situations	and	do	not	address	broader	moral	principles	or	structural	concerns,	such	as	historical	and	societal-level	power	relations.		How	do	we	move	beyond	ourselves	and	our	own	limited	points	of	view,	beyond	adapting	to	the	world	as	it	is,	and	towards	transforming	the	world	into	a	better,	more	moral	one?		The	concept	of	moral	critical	social	engagement	includes	the	inclination	and	skills	to	understand	issues	at	the	systems	level,	responsively	engage	with	others,	and	work	towards	collaborative	progress	(Ilten-Gee	&	Nucci,	2018).	In	other	words,	this	type	of	engagement	promotes	understanding	social	behaviors	as	part	of	a	multi-level	web	of	causes	and	effects	(intrapersonal,	interpersonal,	societal,	and	global).	It	encourages	us	to	recognize	and	question	systems	of	power	that	undergird	all	social	interactions,	and	empowers	us	to	imagine	a	situation	different	than	what	currently	exists.	In	Nucci’s	(2018)	model,	critical	moral	social	engagement	is	the	“extra”	component,	not	included	in	most	character	frameworks,	which	combines	and	builds	on	the	other	components	in	order	to	transcend	the	limits	of	one’s	individual	life,	circumstances,	and	perspective	and	work	towards	a	more	fully-functioning	morality.	Though	direct	examination	of	this	type	of	engagement	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	dissertation	project,	it	should	be	kept	in	mind	as	a	vital	component	of	the	character	model	and,	ideally,	an	underlying	goal	of	all	educational	efforts	(including	moral	education,	SEL,	and	anti-bullying).			 Relationship	with	context.	A	central	feature	of	Nucci’s	(2019)	model	of	character	is	that	it	conceptualizes	character	not	as	a	collection	of	static	traits,	but	as	a	system	that	is	continually	interacting	with	context	in	a	bidirectional	way.	“Context”	is	conceptualized	here	as	a	broad,	multi-level	construct,	including	personal	aspects	(e.g.,	personal	experiences,	beliefs,	demographic	factors,	etc.),	social	aspects	(e.g.,	family	and	peer	relationships,	group	memberships,	etc.),	and	societal	aspects	(e.g.,	social	structures	in	which	the	individual	is	embedded,	cultural	factors,	circumstances	of	history,	etc.).	The	model’s	view	of	character	takes	into	account	the	interpenetration	of	individual	and	context,	both	the	role	of	personal-social-societal	context	in	shaping	individual	expressions	of	character	(judgments,	intentions,	and	behaviors)	and	the	role	of	the	moral	functioning	of	the	individual	in	shaping	their	personal-social-societal	context.	In	this	sense,	Nucci’s	model	is	well-suited	to	include	potential	contextual	influences	on	socio-moral	reasoning,	social-emotional	skills,	moral	functioning,	and	the	relationships	among	them.	Though	it	would	be	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	include	all	potential	contextual	factors	in	any	one	study,	a	given	study	can	provide	a	limited	“snapshot”	of	how	certain	factors	may	be	associated	with	differences	in	reasoning	and	behavioral	decisions	(Nucci,	2019).	In	that	vein,	as	detailed	below,	this	study	includes	gender	(an	often-salient	element	of	personal-social	context)	and	perceived	prevalence	of	bullying	(one	specific	aspect	of	the	school	social	context)	as	potentially	relevant	contextual	factors.			
1.4	Response	to	Bullying	as	an	Opportunity	for	Moral	Functioning	
	 As	mentioned,	peer	bullying	is	one	prevalent	example	of	apparent	asynchrony	between	moral	judgments	and	actions.	Bullying	is	defined	as	interpersonal	behavior	that	is	intended	to	cause	harm	to	the	target	and	involves	an	imbalance	of	power	between	the	perpetrator(s)	and	victim(s)	(such	as	through	number,	social	status,	physical	strength,	etc.);	though	a	recurring	pattern	of	behavior	is	also	often	included	as	a	defining	feature	of	
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bullying,	there	is	some	disagreement	on	this	point,	and	not	all	research	on	bullying	explicitly	includes	repetition	as	a	necessary	factor	(Menesini	&	Salmivalli,	2017).	Bullying	can	take	many	different	forms,	both	direct	(e.g.,	physical	or	verbal	aggression)	and	indirect	(e.g.,	social	exclusion,	spreading	rumors,	etc.),	and	can	aim	to	cause	a	variety	of	harms	(such	as	physical/material	harm,	psychological/emotional	harm,	and/or	social/reputational	harm).	Though	the	vast	majority	of	young	people	judge	such	behavior	as	wrong	when	asked	(Gini	et	al.,	2008;	Thornberg,	2014),	meta-analyses	show	that	about	35%	of	adolescents	report	having	perpetrated	some	form	of	“traditional”	(as	opposed	to	cyber)	bullying	behavior	towards	peers	(Modecki	et	al.,	2014).	Though	findings	vary,	studies	indicate	that	even	larger	percentages	of	children	and,	especially,	adolescents	have	acted	as	bystanders,	witnessing	bullying	passively	and	failing	to	intervene	to	stop	it	(see	Trach	et	al.,	2010).	For	theoretical	and	practical	purposes,	it	would	be	useful	to	understand	more	about	the	socio-moral	reasoning	processes,	social-emotional	competencies,	and	personal	and	contextual	factors	that	may	play	into	adolescents’	decisions	about	how	to	respond	to	peer	bullying.	In	the	following	sections,	I	will	review	research	on	how	each	of	the	factors	of	interest	in	this	study	(socio-moral	reasoning,	social-emotional	competence,	gender,	age,	and	perceived	prevalence	of	bullying)	may	relate	to	how	young	people	choose	to	respond	when	they	witness	bullying.	
Socio-moral	reasoning	and	response	to	bullying.	While	several	studies	in	the	SDT	framework	have	examined	connections	between	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning	and	intended	actions	in	social	situations,	relatively	few	have	investigated	such	relationships	in	the	context	of	bullying	among	adolescents.	In	one	study	that	focused	on	sexual	and	gender-based	harassment	(e.g.,	calling	peers	pejorative	names	based	on	gender	or	sexuality,	teasing	or	excluding	peers	due	to	gender	or	sexual	orientation,	or	sexually	objectifying	peers)	Peter,	Tasker,	and	Horn	(2016)	found	that	adolescents	ranging	in	age	from	12-18	who	believed	that	such	behaviors	cause	emotional	harm	(i.e.,	that	they	are	transgressions	in	the	moral	domain)	were	significantly	less	likely	to	report	having	perpetrated	thirteen	of	the	fifteen	listed	behaviors.	Mediation	analyses	showed	that	perceptions	of	harm	fully	or	partially	mediated	the	negative	relationship	between	perceived	wrongness	(i.e.,	to	what	extent	participants	believed	the	behavior	to	be	“wrong”)	and	reported	perpetration	for	10	of	the	15	actions;	in	other	words,	the	perception	of	moral	harm	was	able	to	explain	to	a	great	extent	why	knowing	that	a	behavior	was	“wrong”	led	to	less	perpetration.	On	the	other	hand,	the	adolescents’	knowledge	of	school	policies	against	such	behaviors	(i.e.,	knowledge	that	they	are	transgressions	in	the	conventional	domain)	was	mostly	unrelated	to	reported	perpetration,	showing	significant	associations	(all	negative)	with	only	three	behaviors.	Moreover,	when	policy	beliefs	were	examined	as	a	potential	mediator	between	perceived	wrongness	and	reported	perpetration,	existence	of	policies	against	the	behavior	were	associated	with	perceived	wrongness	for	only	one	behavior,	and	in	no	cases	were	policy	beliefs	significantly	related	to	reported	perpetration.	These	results	imply	that,	although	adolescents	are	aware	of	social	conventions,	they	do	not	play	as	significant	a	role	in	judgments	and	behavioral	decisions	as	moral	concerns	do.	Further	research	is	needed	to	understand	if	these	patterns	hold	in	contexts	other	than	sexual	or	gender-based	bullying,	as	well	as	how	other	factors	may	interact	with	moral	vs.	conventional	reasoning	to	predict	not	only	perpetration,	but	also	bystander	responses.	In	this	study,	I	look	for	relations	between	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning	and	intended	bystander	response	in	a	situation	of	bullying	based	on	another	potentially	
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marginalized	aspect	of	identity	(i.e.,	perceived	foreign	origin).		
Social-emotional	competence	and	response	to	bullying.	In	contrast	to	research	on	socio-moral	reasoning	(i.e.,	SDT),	which	rarely	directly	addresses	social-emotional	competence,	research	on	bullying	often	incorporates	social-emotional	competencies,	both	self-regarding	and	other-regarding.		While	a	large	amount	of	research—which	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	review—has	examined	disparities	in	social-emotional	competencies	between	children	and	adolescents	who	perpetrate	and/or	are	victimized	by	bullying	vs.	those	who	do	neither,	it	is	less	clearly	understood	whether	social-emotional	distinctions	exist	between	those	who	passively	observe	when	bullying	occurs	(i.e.,	bystanders)	and	those	who	intervene	to	stop	bullying	or	protect	targets	(i.e.,	defenders).	For	instance,	some	evidence	indicates	that	bystanders	and	defenders	tend	to	show	similar	levels	of	many	social-cognitive	and	social-emotional	abilities—such	as	social	information	processing,	theory	of	mind,	empathy,	and	even	moral	competence	(defined	as	understanding	of	moral	emotions	and	tendency	to	morally	disengage;	Gini,	2006)—but	differences	in	other	areas,	such	as	self-efficacy	and	problem-solving	strategies	(Gini,	Albiero,	Benelli,	&	Altoe,	2008;	Pozzoli	&	Gini,	2013).	Such	results	imply	that	bystanders	and	defenders	may	not	be	very	different	in	how	they	think	or	feel	when	they	witness	bullying,	but	may	be	more	different	in	their	abilities	to	convert	their	feelings	and	judgments	into	action.	Other	studies,	though,	have	shown	that	higher	levels	of	empathy	are	associated	with	a	greater	inclination	to	intervene	in	support	or	defense	of	targets	of	bullying	(Abbott	&	Cameron,	2014).	More	research	is	needed	to	clarify	how	specific	social-emotional	competencies	may	relate	to	adolescents’	propensity	to	intervene	as	opposed	to	bystand.	To	that	end,	this	study	looks	at	social	perspective-taking	competence—a	construct	similar	to	theory	of	mind	and	empathy,	which,	as	described	above,	have	shown	varying	associations	with	bystanding	vs.	defending	in	different	studies—and	how	it	may	relate	to	intended	response	to	witnessed	bullying.	
Gender	and	response	to	bullying.	Previous	literature	indicates	that	bullying	attitudes	and	behavior	often	differ	on	average	by	gender,	in	that	girls	tend	to	be	less	accepting	of	bullying	in	general	and	more	likely	to	take	positive	action	to	help	targets	(e.g.,	Trach	et	al.,	2010).	However,	not	much	is	known	about	whether	gender	seems	to	exert	influence	on	judgments	or	on	the	relationship	between	judgments	and	intended	action.	Because	of	these	existing	findings	and	unanswered	questions,	gender	is	included	as	a	focal	variable	in	this	study.	
Age	and	response	to	bullying.	In	general,	children	seem	to	become	more	accepting	of	bullying	as	they	grow	up,	at	least	through	middle	school,	though	this	trend	may	reverse	in	high	school	(Menesini	&	Salmivalli,	2017;	Trach	et	al.,	2010).	More	specifically	for	this	study,	some	evidence	indicates	that	motivation	to	intervene	in	bias-based	bullying	against	out-group	members	may	decrease	with	age	(from	age	8-10	to	age	13-15),	possibly	due	to	increased	identification	with	the	norms	of	one’s	ingroup	(Palmer,	Rutland,	&	Cameron,	2015).	Due	to	the	potential	effects	of	age	differences	among	adolescents	on	both	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning	(as	previously	described)	and	action	choices	in	response	to	bullying,	age	is	also	included	as	a	focal	variable	in	this	study.	
Perceived	prevalence	of	bullying	and	response	to	bullying.	The	social	norms	that	students	perceive	can	exert	a	powerful	influence	on	behavior.	If	students	perceive	a	high	prevalence	of	bullying	incidents	at	their	school,	they	might	be	inclined	to	view	bullying	in	a	more	conventional	manner,	in	that	it	might	seem	to	be	a	way	of	behaving	that	is	to	some	degree	endorsed	or	accepted	by	members	of	the	school	community;	this	could	lead	
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such	students	to	be	less	inclined	to	intervene.	Indeed,	studies	have	shown	that	students	are	likely	to	act	in	line	with	“descriptive	norms,”	or	their	perceptions	of	how	common	bystanding	vs.	defending	are	among	their	classmates	(Pozzoli,	Gini,	&	Vieno,	2012).	But	does	higher	perceived	bullying	prevalence	lead	students	to	infer	that	bullying	is	not	actually	harmful	(an	informational	assumption),	or	might	it	make	students	feel	that	intervening	is	futile,	even	when	they	believe	the	situation	to	be	causing	harm?	Or	might	repeatedly	witnessing	bullying	lead	to	desensitization,	i.e.,	not	caring	about	it	as	much?		Research	on	cyberbullying	has	shown	that	more	frequent	exposure	to	cyberbullying	as	a	bystander	seems	to	lead	to	desensitization	(i.e.,	reduced	empathic	responsiveness;	Pabian,	Vandebosch,	Poels,	Van	Cleemput,	&	Bastiaensens,	2016),	but	more	research	is	needed,	including	with	different	types	of	bullying,	to	gain	insight	into	this	possible	contextual	effect	and	the	reasoning	behind	it.	Thus,	this	study	includes	perceived	prevalence	of	bullying	at	one’s	own	school	as	a	contextual	variable	with	the	potential	to	relate	to	reasoning	and	action	choices.	
	
1.5	Research	Questions	
	 Drawing	on	this	background,	the	three	main	research	questions	and	associated	hypotheses	for	this	dissertation	are	as	follows	(note	that	each	question	is	addressed	in	more	technical	detail	in	Chapter	2):		
Research	Question	1:	Relation	of	action	choices	to	socio-moral	reasoning	and	
personal/contextual	factors.	How	does	adolescent	students’	socio-moral	reasoning	about	a	hypothetical	bullying	situation	relate	to	their	choice	of	action	(from	a	set	of	options)	to	take	in	response	to	the	situation?	In	addition,	how	do	factors	outside	the	character	system—both	personal	(age	and	gender)	and	social-contextual	(perceived	bullying	prevalence	at	their	school)—relate	to	adolescents’	intended	action	choices	in	response	to	witnessing	bullying	and/or	to	the	relationship	between	their	socio-moral	reasoning	and	action	choices?		
Hypotheses	for	RQ1.	Based	on	principles	of	SDT	as	well	as	previous	research	findings	(e.g.,	Peter	et	al.,	2016),	I	hypothesized	that	students	who	gave	more	weight	to	the	moral	aspect	of	bullying	(specifically,	the	harm	it	can	cause)	would	be	more	approving	of,	and	likely	to	choose,	direct	intervention	to	stop	it.	On	the	other	hand,	I	hypothesized	that	students	who	gave	more	weight	to	the	conventional	aspect	of	bullying	(specifically,	bullying	as	being	against	the	rules)	would	be	more	approving	of	and	likely	to	choose	indirect	intervention	(telling	a	teacher)	or	bystanding	(witnessing	without	intervening).	Furthermore,	again	drawing	from	existing	findings	(e.g.,	Pabian	et	al.,	2010;	Trach	et	al.	2010).	I	expected	that	males	and	students	who	perceived	a	greater	prevalence	of	bullying	at	their	school	would	be	more	likely	to	approve	of	and	choose	bystanding	and/or	joining	in	bullying	perpetration,	as	well	as	less	likely	to	approve	of	or	choose	intervening.	Due	to	the	narrow	age	range	of	the	participants	and	inconclusive	previous	research	findings	(e.g.,	Menesini	&	Salmivalli,	2017;	Palmer	et	al.,	2015),	I	did	not	hypothesize	any	relationship	between	age	and	action	choice.	The	question	of	whether	any	of	the	personal/contextual	factors	(gender,	age,	or	perceived	bullying	prevalence)	might	moderate	the	relationship	between	socio-moral	reasoning	and	action	was	exploratory,	and	thus	I	did	not	formulate	any	specific	hypotheses	with	regards	to	it.	
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Research	Question	2:	Analyses	of	free-response	explanations	of	action	choices	
using	a	social	domain	theory	lens.	When,	after	being	asked	to	choose	an	intended	action	in	response	to	a	hypothetical	witnessed	bullying	incident,	adolescent	students	have	the	chance	to	briefly	explain	the	reasoning	behind	their	choices	in	their	own	written	words,	what	domains	of	reasoning	do	they	use,	and	how	do	their	explanations	relate	to	how	they	think	about	the	potential	actions	they	could	choose?	
Hypotheses	for	RQ2.	I	hypothesized	that	students	overall	would	cite	all	of	the	focal	types	of	considerations,	both	domain-based	(moral,	conventional,	personal,	prudential)	and	not	(relational,	emotional);	however,	because	of	the	brevity	of	the	responses,	I	predicted	that	most	individual	students	would	only	cite	one	or	two	considerations	per	response.	I	predicted	that	students	would	tend	to	cite	domains	that	theoretically	related	(based	on	SDT)	to	their	evaluations	of	the	intended	action	choices,	e.g.,	that	students	who	approved	of	direct	intervention	would	be	more	likely	to	cite	moral	considerations,	that	students	who	approved	of	indirect	intervention	would	be	more	likely	to	cite	conventional	and	possibly	prudential	considerations,	and	that	students	who	approved	of	bystanding	or	perpetrating	would	be	more	likely	to	cite	prudential,	personal,	and	possibly	conventional	considerations.	Moreover,	I	expected	the	relationships	between	personal/contextual	factors	and	considerations	cited	to	mirror	these	patterns,	e.g.,	that	boys	and	students	who	perceived	greater	bullying	prevalence—whom	I	expected	to	be	more	inclined	to	bystand—to	correspondingly	be	more	likely	to	cite	prudential	and	personal	considerations	(and	less	likely	to	cite	moral	ones).		
Research	Question	3:	Relation	of	social	perspective-taking	competence	to	
socio-moral	reasoning	and	action	choices.	How	does	adolescents’	social	perspective-taking	competence	relate	to	their	socio-moral	reasoning	about	the	bullying	situation,	and	how	does	social	perspective-taking	competence	relate	to	intended	action	choices	when	considered	together	with	socio-moral	reasoning?		
Hypotheses	for	RQ3.	Building	from	the	assumptions	of	SDT	and	Nucci’s	character	model,	I	hypothesized	that	students	who	were	more	likely	to	prioritize	moral	reasoning	would	also	be	better	at	coordinating	others’	perspectives	with	their	own.	I	also	hypothesized	that	students	who	showed	greater	perspective-taking	competence	would	be	more	likely	to	intend	to	intervene,	especially	directly,	vs.	bystand	or	perpetrate	bullying	(based	on	similar	results,	e.g.,	Abbott	and	Cameron,	2014).	Finally,	with	regards	to	the	exploratory	question	of	whether	social	perspective-taking	competence	might	mediate	the	relationship	between	endorsement	of	moral	domain	reasoning	and	response	to	bullying	(such	that	students	who	were	more	likely	to	consider	the	moral	implications	of	bullying	would	also	be	more	able	and	inclined	to	take	others’	perspectives	into	account	when	deciding	what	to	do,	which	in	turn	would	make	them	more	likely	to	intervene	and	less	likely	to	bystand	or	perpetrate),		I	did	not	have	any	specific	hypotheses.	
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Chapter	2:	Methods	
2.1	Data	Source	This	dissertation	is	a	secondary	analysis	of	data	from	the	National	Professional	Development	and	Evaluation	Project	(NPDEP;	Barr	et	al.,	2015).	The	NPDEP	project	was	designed	and	led	by	researchers	from	Facing	History	and	Ourselves	(“Facing	History”),	a	nonprofit	educational	organization,	along	with	university-	and	agency-based	research	collaborators.	Facing	History	was	founded	in	1976	and	now	has	offices	in	nine	locations	in	the	US,	Canada,	and	the	UK	(Facing	History	and	Ourselves,	2019a),	as	well	as	partnerships	with	schools	in	134	countries	around	the	world	(Facing	History	and	Ourselves,	2019b).	It	creates,	distributes,	and	provides	professional	development	around	high	school	humanities	curriculum	materials	that	now	reach	over	70,000	teachers	and	millions	of	students	worldwide	every	year	(Facing	History	and	Ourselves,	2017).	Through	these	efforts,	Facing	History	endeavors	to	help	secondary	educators	teach	history	through	a	lens	of	“educating	for	democracy,”	and	focuses	on	building	students’	capacities	to	understand	racism,	bigotry,	and	genocide	in	the	past	and	combat	them	in	the	future.	The	overall	goal	is	to	empower	students	to	apply	the	lessons	of	history	to	the	present	and	become	more	thoughtful	and	engaged	citizens,	or,	in	other	words,	to	help	students	“make	the	essential	connection	between	history	and	the	moral	choices	they	confront	in	their	own	lives”	(Facing	History	and	Ourselves,	2019a).			
2.2	Recruitment	and	Data	Collection		
	 The	project	for	which	these	data	were	collected,	the	National	Professional	Development	and	Evaluation	Project	(NPDEP),	was	designed	as	a	randomized	controlled	experimental	study	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	a	Facing	History	professional	development	intervention.	The	Facing	History	evaluation	director	and	team	designed	the	study	project,	including	the	selection	and/or	development	of	measures,	in	collaboration	with	independent	academic	researchers	based	at	Harvard	University	and	Eastern	Michigan	University.	Facing	History	regional	staff	members	and	staff	of	Abt	Associates,	Inc.,	an	independent	global	research	agency,	worked	together	to	recruit	participants.	To	reduce	self-selection	biases,	only	schools	and	teachers	who	had	never	been	exposed	to	or	sought	out	Facing	History	trainings	or	resources	were	eligible	to	participate	in	the	study.	The	research	agency	conducted	all	of	the	data	collection	and	initial	data	processing	in	order	to	maintain	independence	and	ensure	objectivity	to	the	greatest	degree	possible.	Informed	consent	was	obtained	at	all	levels,	i.e.,	from	districts,	principals,	teachers,	parents,	and	students	(Barr	&	Facing	History	and	Ourselves,	2010).	All	study	procedures	were	approved	by	institutional	review	boards	at	both	Harvard	University	and	Abt	Associates.	The	overall	NPDEP	study,	at	baseline,	included	data	from	1402	students	and	97	of	their	teachers,	drawn	from	61	schools	in	eight	regions	across	the	United	States	(Chicago,	Cleveland,	Denver,	Los	Angeles,	Memphis/Nashville,	New	England,	New	York/New	Jersey,	and	the	San	Francisco	Bay	Area).	The	vast	majority	(89.20%)	of	the	participating	schools	
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were	public;	of	these,	78.14%	(69.70%	of	total)	were	regular	public	schools,	while	the	rest	were	charter,	magnet,	or	other/alternative	schools	(21.86%	of	public	schools,	19.50%	of	total).	Of	the	10.80%	of	participating	schools	that	were	private,	92.09%	(9.95%	of	total)	were	religious,	with	the	remaining	few	being	nonsectarian	(7.91%	of	private	schools,	0.85%	of	total).		In	the	interest	of	allowing	for	longitudinal	follow-up,	only	students	in	the	ninth	and	tenth	grades	and	their	teachers	were	eligible	for	participation	in	the	study.	Participants	were	randomly	assigned	by	school	within	each	region	either	to:	(1)	receive	the	Facing	History	professional	development	intervention	in	the	first	year	of	the	study,	or	(2)	serve	as	a	control	group	in	the	first	year	and	then	receive	the	intervention	in	the	second	year.	The	overall	study	was	conducted	between	2007	and	2009,	with	baseline	data	collected	from	teachers	in	spring	2007	and	follow-up	data	collected	from	teachers	and	students	in	spring	2008	(at	the	end	of	Year	1,	the	school	year	in	which	the	first-year	intervention	group	received	the	intervention)	and	spring	2009	(after	Year	2,	when	the	first-year	control	group	received	the	intervention).	Participants	at	each	time	point	filled	out	packets	of	written	surveys.			
2.3	The	Current	Study:	Sample/Participants	
		 For	the	purposes	of	this	dissertation,	I	did	not	seek	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	the	Facing	History	program,	and	thus	did	not	directly	compare	responses	between	the	intervention	and	control	groups	(see	Barr	et	al.,	2015,	for	such	comparisons).	Instead,	I	aimed	to	examine	relationships	between	different	variables	assessed	across	all	participants,	with	the	goal	of	better	understanding	the	psychological	processes	occurring	in	students’	minds,	regardless	of	condition.	For	the	analyses	based	on	numerical	rating	data,	I	used	data	from	all	student	participants	in	the	NPDEP	project	at	Year	1.	As	mentioned	above,	this	total	dataset	included	data	from	1402	students	at	61	schools	across	eight	regions	of	the	United	States.	Table	1,	below,	summarizes	the	sociodemographic	characteristics	of	the	student	participants	in	the	spring	of	Year	1.			Table	1	
Student	Sociodemographic	Information	Variable	 Count	(%)	or	mean	(SD)	Gender						Male						Female	
	593	(42.3%)	809	(57.7%)	Grade	level						9						10	
	464	(33.1%)	938	(66.9%)	Mean	age	in	years	 15.85	(0.65)	
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Race/ethnicity						Black						Hispanic						Asian						White						Other						Mixed	(2	or	more	selected)	
	177	(12.9%)	450	(32.8%)	159	(11.6%)	428	(31.2%)	38	(2.8%)	108	(7.9%)	Home	language						English						Other	language	
	966	(70.7%)	401	(29.3%)	Mean	parental	education	levela	 2.81	(1.23)	Intervention	group						Facing	History						Control	
	587	(45.6%)	700	(54.4%)	
Note.	Total	sample	N	=	1402.	Counts	(and	percentages)	of	each	category	are	listed	for	categorical	variables,	while	means	(and	standard	deviations)	are	listed	for	numerical	variables.	Due	to	missing	values,	some	counts	do	not	add	up	to	the	total	sample	size.	a	This	variable	represents	the	mean	of	the	highest	levels	of	education	reached	by	each	parent,	which	were	each	indicated	ordinally	as:	1	=	didn’t	finish	high	school;	2	=	finished	high	school;	3	=	attended	some	college;	4	=	finished	college;	5	=	more	than	college.			 As	shown	in	Table	1,	slightly	more	than	half	of	student	participants	indicated	that	they	were	female,	with	the	rest	indicating	male.	About	one	third	of	participants	were	in	the	ninth	grade	during	Year	1	(the	2007-2008	school	year),	when	the	data	were	collected,	while	the	remaining	two	thirds	were	in	the	tenth	grade	that	year.	The	mean	age	of	participants	at	the	time	of	data	collection	was	15.85	years,	with	a	standard	deviation	of	0.65	years;	the	minimum	age	was	13.42	years	and	the	maximum	was	18.67	years.	With	regards	to	race/ethnicity,	participants	were	presented	with	various	categories	(Black,	Hispanic,	Asian,	Native	American,	White,	Other)	and	asked	to	check	all	that	apply.	Dummy	variables	were	created	to	indicate	the	race/ethnicity	of	participants	who	selected	only	one	category,	while	those	who	selected	two	or	more	categories	were	combined	into	a	“Mixed”	category.	Only	two	participants	selected	Native	American	as	their	sole	race/ethnicity,	so,	to	avoid	small	cell	size	concerns,	these	two	were	recoded	into	the	“Other”	category.	The	majority	(over	70%)	of	students	reported	speaking	English	as	their	first	language,	and	the	average	highest	level	of	educational	attainment	by	participants’	parents	fell	between	“finished	high	school”	and	“attended	some	college.”	Each	of	these	sociodemographic	variables	had	a	missing	data	rate	of	less	than	5%.	Finally,	intervention	group	was	also	included	as	a	control	variable,	with	1	=	in	Facing	History	intervention	group	in	year	1,	and	0	=	in	control	group	in	year	1;	slightly	less	than	half	of	the	total	sample	was	in	the	intervention	group.	
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For	analyses	involving	free-response	textual	data,	a	subset	of	the	NPDEP	dataset	was	used	that	included	all	student	participants	at	Year	1	who	provided	responses	to	the	free-response	item	of	interest	(see	Measures,	below).	This	subsample	contained	data	from	574	students,	representing	34	schools	in	all	eight	regions.	Because	this	subsample	was	not	randomly	determined,	but	rather	consisted	of	those	who	chose	to	complete	the	free-response	question,	chi-square	tests	(for	categorical	variables)	and	independent	samples	t-tests	(for	numerical	variables)	were	conducted	to	determine	whether	demographic	variables	differed	significantly	between	the	participants	in	the	subsample	and	the	rest	of	the	participants.	While	the	gender	distribution	and	combined	parental	education	level	in	the	subsample	were	statistically	the	same	as	in	the	rest	of	the	sample,	students	in	the	subsample	were	significantly	younger	and	more	likely	to	be	in	Grade	9	compared	to	students	not	in	the	subsample.	They	were	also	significantly	more	likely	to	be	White	or	Black,	less	likely	to	be	Hispanic	or	Asian,	and	more	likely	to	speak	English	as	their	first	language.	These	differences	should	be	considered	in	the	interpretation	of	results	from	the	subsample	as	compared	with	those	from	the	full	sample.		
2.4	The	Current	Study:	Measures	In	spring	2008,	students	participating	in	the	NPDEP	filled	out	two	packets	of	written	surveys,	including	demographic	items	as	well	as	self-report	measures	of	historical	understanding,	civic	attitudes	and	behaviors,	and	ethical	and	social-emotional	reasoning.	This	last	category	comprises	the	two	main	scales	of	interest	for	this	dissertation	study:	the	adapted	Relationship	Questionnaire	and	the	Choices	in	Context	Measure,	both	described	below.	
2.4.1	Adapted	Relationship	Questionnaire.	The	adapted	Relationship	Questionnaire,	or	RelQ-A	(adapted	by	the	NPDEP	study	designers	from	Schultz,	Selman,	&	LaRusso,	2003,	and	Selman,	2003)	is	a	measure	designed	to	assess	social-emotional	competence	through	responses	to	hypothetical	social	scenarios.	Specifically,	the	original	RelQ	is	based	on	Selman’s	developmental	theory	of	social	perspective	coordination.	This	theory,	which	grew	out	of	Selman’s	early	work	with	Kohlberg,	posits	that,	as	children	mature,	they	become	increasingly	capable	of	understanding	the	perspectives	of	others	and	balancing	these	with	their	own	perspectives.	Development	represents	a	shift	in	perspective-taking	coordination	through	four	levels:	egocentric	(lack	of	differentiation	between	one’s	own	perspective	and	others’),	one-way	(recognition	that	others’	perspectives	may	be	different	than	one’s	own,	but	lack	of	consideration	of	both	simultaneously	in	making	decisions),	reciprocal	(understanding	of	how	one’s	own	perspective/needs	may	appear	to	others),	and	mutual	(coordination	of	one’s	own	perspective	with	those	of	others	in	resolving	situations)	(Selman,	2003).	This	progression	has	been	empirically	shown	to	generally	correlate	with	age,	while	also	being	sensitive	to	certain	contextual	factors	(e.g.,	maltreatment	by	parents;	Burack	et	al.,	2006).	The	original	RelQ	was	developed	for	students	in	grades	4-12	and	has	been	validated	as	reliable	(i.e.,	acceptable	test-retest	reliability)	and	internally	consistent	(i.e.,	acceptable	Cronbach’s	
alpha),	overall,	by	empirical	studies	with	diverse	samples	of	youth	(Schultz	et	al.,	2003;	LaRusso	&	Selman,	2011).	For	the	NPDEP	project,	the	RelQ	was	chosen	as	a	measure	of	social-emotional	competence,	and	the	original	version	was	adapted	to	focus	mostly	on	school-based	social	
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situations	with	peers	rather	than	home/family-based	situations;	the	scenarios	in	the	RelQ-A	were	also	intended	to	address	areas	of	social-emotional	competence	relevant	to	the	goals	of	Facing	History,	including	social	awareness	(i.e.,	paying	attention	to	and	showing	concern	for	others),	perspective-taking,	and	conflict	resolution	skills	(Barr	et	al.,	2015).	The	NPDEP	research	was	the	first	time	that	this	specific	adapted	version	of	the	measure	(i.e.,	the	RelQ-A)	had	been	used	(D.	Barr,	personal	communication,	April	2,	2019),	and	though	it	is	based	on	a	validated	measure,	the	adapted	version	of	the	scale	has	not	yet	undergone	any	validity	testing	or	other	measurement	work.		Like	the	original	RelQ,	the	RelQ-A	presents	hypothetical	scenarios	centering	on	interpersonal	issues	requiring	social	perspective	coordination,	each	of	which	is	followed	by	items	asking	participants	to	rate	the	adequacy	of	four	different	possible	responses	(intended	to	correspond	to	the	four	levels	of	social	perspective	coordination	described	above)	and	then	to	choose	the	one	response	of	the	four	they	consider	to	be	“best.”	The	RelQ-A	that	the	participants	completed	had	ten	scenarios,	but	the	NPDEP	researchers	excluded	one	of	them	from	analysis	because	it	was	deemed	to	be	too	ambiguous.	For	each	of	the	remaining	nine	scenarios,	the	NPDEP	researchers	assigned	1-4	points	to	the	rating	of	each	response	choice	and	1-4	points	for	the	“best	choice,”	depending	on	alignment	with	the	four	levels	of	social	perspective	coordination	(with	higher	scores	indicating	higher	levels	of	perspective	coordination).	The	nine	scenarios	correspond	to	three	subscales—
Interpersonal	Understanding,	Interpersonal	Management,	and	Personal	Meaning—which	have	also	been	reported	in	other	studies	using	the	RelQ	(e.g.,	Schultz	et	al.,	2003).		For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	I	chose	to	only	use	the	Interpersonal	Management	(IM)	subscale,	as	the	questions	and	response	options	within	it	most	clearly	differentiate	between	a	tendency	to	focus	on	one’s	own	perspective	and	goals	vs.	a	tendency	to	take	others’	perspectives	into	account	when	making	social	decisions,	and	thus	it	provides	the	clearest	measure	of	perspective-taking	competence.	(See	Appendix	A	for	the	three	scenarios	and	accompanying	questions	in	the	RelQ-A	IM	subscale.)	For	example,	in	one	scenario,	an	athletic	girl	tries	out	for	a	boys’	sports	team	but	is	not	selected;	lower-level	responses	include	ignoring	the	situation	or	focusing	on	her	own	view	of	how	she	performed	in	the	tryouts,	while	higher-level	responses	include	acknowledging	the	coach’s	distinct	perspective	and	trying	to	explain	her	perspective	to	him.	Though	such	scenarios	and	the	provided	response	options	have	limitations,	they	also	tap	into	both	perspective-taking	abilty	and	related	problem-solving	skills,	which	have	been	implicated	in	existing	research	as	potentially	relevant	to	bystander	responses	(e.g.,	Pozzoli	&	Gini,	2013).	Furthermore,	the	items	in	the	IM	subscale	seem	more	cohesive	with	each	other	as	compared	with	items	in	other	subscales,	and	indeed,	the	IM	subscale	of	the	original	RelQ	shows	the	highest	internal	consistency	of	all	the	subscales	(Schultz	et	al.,	2003).	In	this	study,	the	Cronbach’s	alpha	for	the	IM	subscale	(including	both	the	scores	for	the	individual	response	ratings	and	the	“best	choice”	scores,	15	items	total)	was	.67.	Though	this	value	is	slightly	below	the	oft-cited	threshold	of	adequate	internal	consistency	(i.e.,	an	alpha	of	.70	or	greater,	which	Nunnally	[1978,	as	cited	in	Lance,	Butts,	&	Michels,	2006]	suggested	as	adequate	for	early	stages	of	research	with	an	instrument),	meaning	that	caution	should	be	taken	when	interpreting	results	of	analyses	using	this	subscale,	it	is	the	highest	alpha	among	the	subscales	in	this	study,	and	is	very	similar	to	IM	subscale	alphas	reported	in	previous	research	(e.g.,	.68	in	Schultz	et	al,	2003).		
2.4.2	Choices	in	Context	Measure.		The	Choices	in	Context	Measure	(CICM)	is	an	
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exploratory	ethical	reasoning	scale	designed	for	the	NPDEP	project	(Selman,	Barr,	Feigenberg,	&	Facing	History	and	Ourselves,	2007),	modeled	after	the	format	of	the	RelQ.	In	this	measure,	participants	were	presented	with	four	hypothetical	ethically-relevant	situations,	intended	to	be	similar	to	situations	that	students	might	actually	face	in	their	everyday	school	lives,	and	then	asked	to	respond	to	questions	about	them,	including	multiple-choice,	Likert-type	ratings,	and	free-response	questions.		This	dissertation	study	used	the	responses	from	only	one	of	the	hypothetical	situations	in	the	CICM,	Situation	A	(see	Appendix	B	for	the	entire	set	of	questions	pertaining	to	CICM	Situation	A).	This	situation	was	chosen	because	it	was	the	only	one	that	both	elicited	responses	regarding	individual	socio-moral	reasoning	and	behavior	in	a	situation	with	clear	potential	for	moral	relevance—witnessing	bullying—and	provided	reasoning	justification	choices	that	align	with	SDT	domains	and	thus	allow	for	interpretation	using	an	SDT	framework.	Situation	A	described	the	following	episode	of	identity-based	bullying:	
A	student	sees	a	group	of	his	friends	teasing	a	boy	whose	family	recently	arrived	in	the	
U.S.	from	another	country.	They	are	making	fun	of	the	way	he	speaks	and	telling	him	
he	should	move	back	to	his	own	country.	The	student	who	sees	this	wonders	what	to	
do.	He	decides	not	to	say	anything.	Instead,	he	walks	away	from	the	group.	Following	the	presentation	of	the	situation,	participants	were	first	asked	(question	A1)	to	what	extent	they	agree	that	walking	away	is	the	best	thing	for	the	protagonist	to	do	(four	choices	from	“strongly	disagree”	to	“strongly	agree”).	Then,	participants	were	asked	(question	A2)	to	rate,	on	a	Likert-type	scale	from	1	=	“very	bad”	to	4	=	“very	good,”	several	potential	reasons	for	why	the	protagonist	should	have	intervened	instead	of	walking	away;	thus,	A2	tapped	into	participants’	socio-moral	reasoning.	Two	of	the	reasoning	justifications	given	to	be	rated	fell	clearly	within,	respectively,	the	moral	domain	(“Teasing	is	hurting	the	new	boy,”	A2a)	and	the	conventional	domain	(“There	is	a	school	rule	against	this	behavior,”	A2b),	while	the	other	two	justifications	focused	on	group	processes	and	relationships	that	are	not	directly	relevant	to	SDT.	(Because	only	two	of	the	reasoning	justifications	are	of	interest	here,	the	next	question,	A3,	which	asked	participants	to	choose	which	of	the	four	justifications	is	best,	was	not	included	in	this	study.)	As	a	context	question,	participants	were	also	asked	(question	A4)	how	often	this	kind	of	bullying	happens	in	their	school,	with	four	choices	progressing	from	“very	rarely”	to	“very	often.”		Next,	participants	were	asked	(question	A5)	to	rate,	again	from	1	=	“very	bad”	to	4	=	“very	good,”	different	actions	that	they	could	take	if	they	were	to	witness	a	situation	like	this	in	their	school.	The	intended	action	choices	included	options	to	intervene	indirectly	(“Tell	a	teacher	what	was	going	on,”	A5a),	intervene	directly	(“Tell	the	students	to	stop	being	such	jerks,”	A5c),	bystand	(“Stay	out	of	it,”	A5b),	or	perpetrate	(“Go	over	and	join	in	making	fun	of	the	new	boy,”	A5d).	Lastly,	participants	were	asked	to	select	(question	A6)	which	action	among	these	four	choices	they	would	be	most	likely	to	take	if	they	were	to	witness	the	situation,	and	then	were	asked	to	explain	(question	A7)	why	they	chose	the	action	they	did	in	A6.	(Though	the	explanation	question	was	not	numbered	on	the	survey,	it	is	referred	to	here	as	A7,	since	it	followed	question	A6.)	A7	was	a	free	response	item,	giving	participants	the	chance	to	briefly	explain	their	reasoning	in	their	own	words.	Only	three	lines	were	provided	to	write	on	in	response	to	question	A7,	limiting	participants	to	concise	answers.		
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2.5	Analytic	Strategies	and	Hypotheses	
	 This	section	contains	a	more	detailed	list	of	the	sub-questions	for	analysis	under	each	research	question,	along	with	the	strategies	used	for	analysis	and	the	hypothesized	results	for	each	sub-question.	In	general,	SPSS	version	25	was	used	for	all	quantitative	statistical	analyses.		
Research	question	1:	Relation	of	action	choices	to	socio-moral	reasoning	and	
personal/contextual	factors.	This	first	main	research	question—of	how	adolescents’	socio-moral	reasoning	and	selected	personal/contextual	factors	(age,	gender,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence)	might	relate	to	their	intended	action	choices	in	response	to	witnessed	bullying—was	investigated	using	the	specific	sub-questions	below.	
RQ1a:	Prediction	of	action	choice	endorsement	by	socio-moral	reasoning.	How	do	endorsement	ratings	of	moral	vs.	conventional	reasoning	justifications	(A2)	relate	to	endorsement	of	each	action	choice	(A5)?		
RQ1b:	Prediction	of	action	choice	endorsement	by	personal/contextual	factors.	Are	younger	students	vs.	older	students	(age),	male	vs.	female	students	(gender),	or	students	who	perceive	more	vs.	less	bullying	as	occurring	at	their	own	school	(A4)	more	or	less	likely	to	endorse	each	action	choice	(A5)?		To	address	the	two	sub-questions	above,	I	conducted	multilevel	linear	regression	modeling,	with	students	nested	in	schools,	to	predict	endorsement	of	each	action	choice	(a	numerical	rating).	First,	I	fit	each	regression	model	with	only	the	socio-moral	reasoning	items	(A2)	as	predictors,	plus	control	variables.	Next,	I	fit	a	model	with	age,	gender,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	as	predictors,	along	with	control	variables.	Finally,	I	included	all	of	the	above	predictors	in	one	model.	As	shown	in	Figure	1,	below,	I	hypothesized	that	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	would	positively	relate	to	ratings	of	direct	intervention	and	negatively	relate	to	ratings	of	bystanding	and	perpetration.	In	contrast,	I	hypothesized	that	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	would	positively	relate	to	ratings	of	indirect	intervention,	and	possibly	bystanding,	and	negatively	relate	to	ratings	of	perpetration.			
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Figure	1.	Hypothesis	diagrams	for	RQ1a,	relations	between	socio-moral	reasoning	and	action	choices.	Blue	dotted	arrows	indicate	hypothesized	positive	relationships,	red	dashed	arrows	indicate	hypothesized	negative	relationships,	and	gray	solid	arrows	indicate	either	hypothesized	nonsignificant	relationships	or	no	specific	hypotheses.			 As	shown	in	Figure	2,	below,	based	on	existing	findings,	I	did	not	make	any	specific	hypotheses	about	the	relationship	of	age	with	action	choices;	however,	I	did	hypothesize	that	males	would	tend	to	rate	bystanding	and	perpetrating	more	highly,	and	intervening	less	highly,	than	females	would,	and	that	students	who	perceived	more	bullying	at	their	school	would	be	less	likely	to	endorse	either	type	of	intervention	and	more	likely	to	endorse	bystanding	(and	potentially	perpetration).		Figure	2	
Hypothesis	Diagrams	for	RQ1b,	Relations	Between	Personal/Contextual	Factors	and	Action	Choices													
Figure	2.	Hypothesis	diagrams	for	RQ1b,	relations	between	personal/contextual	factors	and	action	choices.	Blue	dotted	arrows	indicate	hypothesized	positive	relationships,	red	dashed	arrows	indicate	hypothesized	negative	relationships,	and	gray	solid	arrows	indicate	either	hypothesized	nonsignificant	relationships	or	no	specific	hypotheses.		
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RQ1c:	Moderation.	Do	any	of	the	personal/contextual	factors	(gender,	age,	or	perceived	bullying	prevalence)	moderate	the	relationship	between	socio-moral	reasoning	(A2)	and	rating	of	each	action	choice	(A5)?	To	address	this	sub-question,	I	added	interaction	terms	to	the	overall	model	described	above	(with	action	choice	ratings	predicted	by	reasoning	and	other	factors	and	control	variables).	Specifically,	I	added	terms	for	interactions	between	each	type	of	reasoning	endorsement	(moral	and	conventional)	and	each	factor,	making	for	six	total	interaction	terms.	Figure	3	below	is	a	simplified	illustration	of	the	tested	relationships.	Due	to	the	exploratory	nature	of	this	question,	I	did	not	formulate	any	definite	hypotheses.	
	
	
		
	
	
	
	
Figure	3.	Conceptual	diagrams	of	potential	moderation.	
RQ1d:	Selection	of	“best”	choice.	How	do	endorsement	ratings	(A2)	of	moral	vs.	conventional	reasoning,	as	well	as	the	focal	personal/contextual	factors	(age,	gender,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence),	relate	to	likelihood	of	selecting	each	action	choice	as	the	“best”	or	most	likely	choice	(A6)?		
	To	address	this	sub-question,	I	used	logistic	regression	modeling	to	predict	selection	of	each	action	choice,	operationalized	as	a	series	of	binary	outcomes	(e.g.,	whether	or	not	each	choice	is	selected	as	the	most	likely	action).	The	same	predictors	were	used	as	in	RQ1a	(linear	regression),	and	I	did	not	expect	significant	differences	in	the	pattern	of	results	between	the	two	types	of	outcome	measurement	(action	choice	endorsement,	using	linear	regression,	and	action	choice	selection,	using	logistic	regression).	Therefore,	the	same	hypothesis	diagrams	in	Figures	1	and	2	applied	to	this	sub-question	as	well.	
Research	question	2:	Analyses	of	free-response	explanations	of	action	choices	
using	a	social	domain	theory	lens.	For	this	second	major	research	question,	which	concerned	students’	free-response	answers	to	why	they	selected	the	intended	action	choice	they	did,	I	was	guided	by	the	sub-questions	below.	
RQ2a:	Domain-based	considerations.	Which	SDT	domain(s)	(moral,	conventional,	personal,	and	prudential)	were	cited	in	free	responses	explaining	action	choices	(A7),	and	
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how	often?	What	proportion	of	responses	could	be	coded	with	at	least	one	SDT	domain?		Did	references	to	different	domains	of	reasoning	tend	to	co-occur	within	responses?		
RQ2b:	Relational	and	emotional	considerations.	To	what	extent	do	free	responses	elicit	codes	for	relational	and	emotion-based	reasoning?	Do	these	types	of	reasoning	tend	to	co-occur	with	reasoning	in	certain	SDT	domain(s)?		Because	the	answers	to	question	A7,	which	asked	students	to	explain	why	they	chose	the	action	they	did,	were	free	responses,	I	approached	the	above	sub-questions	with	a	deductive	coding	strategy	drawn	from	qualitative	research	methodology	(Miles,	Huberman,	&	Saldaña,	2014).	Because	the	responses	were	brief,	each	participant	had	only	one	response	(if	they	had	a	response	at	all),	and	deductive	coding	with	pre-determined	categories	was	employed,	I	used	an	Excel	spreadsheet	to	record	the	codes,	with	each	response	(row)	receiving	a	0	or	1	for	each	code	(column).	This	allowed	for	simplicity	of	coding	and	ease	of	analysis.		To	code	the	data	from	the	free-response	question	(A7),	I	went	through	three	rounds	of	deductive	coding.	Details	of	the	coding	guidelines	that	I	used	can	be	found	in	Appendix	C.	In	the	first	round,	I	marked	each	response	as	codable	(1)	or	uncodable	(0;	indicating	that	the	response	was	either	missing	or	illegible,	nonsensical,	or	otherwise	seemingly	irrelevant	to	the	question	asked).		In	the	second	round,	I	coded	all	of	the	codable	responses	deductively	by	SDT	domain	(moral,	conventional,	personal,	prudential),	recording	whether	each	domain	was	(1)	or	was	not	(0)	cited	in	each	response.	(I	also	included	a	“vague/no	domain”	category,	to	be	indicated	if	the	response	could	not	be	clearly	categorized	as	falling	into	any	of	the	four	SDT	domains.)	This	strategy	allowed	me	to	capture	how	many	domains,	as	well	as	which	domains,	were	cited	in	each	response,	as	opposed	to	trying	to	choose	a	single	dominant	domain.	All	cited	domains	were	assumed	to	have	the	same	weight,	as	there	was	no	reliable	way	to	assess	from	these	brief	responses	any	differential	weighting	of	different	considerations.		At	first,	I	had	considered	doing	a	second	round	of	deductive	coding	to	add	sub-codes	under	each	domain	representing	accepted	considerations	within	SDT	that	define	each	domain,	based	on	the	coding	manual	developed	by	Killen	(2014);	for	example,	under	the	moral	domain,	deductive	sub-codes	could	include	physical	harm,	psychological	harm,	and	fairness/equality/rights.	However,	since	my	research	questions	only	used	broad	domain	classifications,	not	sub-domain	distinctions,	I	did	not	code	beyond	the	top-level	domain	codes.	In	the	third	round,	I	went	through	all	of	the	codable	responses	again	to	determine	whether	each	response	cited	relational	considerations	(references	to	the	respondent’s	own	relationship,	or	lack	thereof,	with	the	bullies,	target,	or	community	as	a	factor	in	deciding	how	to	respond)	and/or	emotional	considerations	(references	to	the	role/influence	of	the	respondent’s	own	emotions	in	influencing	their	action	choice).	The	presence	or	absence	of	these	considerations	(0	or	1	for	each)	was	coded	independently	of	the	SDT	coding	in	round	two,	as	the	objective	was	to	explore	patterns	in	how	these	considerations	might	overlap,	or	not,	with	SDT	domains.	At	this	point,	a	second	coder,	blind	to	the	study	hypotheses,	was	enlisted	to	provide	reliability	coding	for	a	portion	of	the	sample	of	responses.	Both	I	and	the	second	coder	were	blind	to	the	other	(numerical)	responses	of	the	participants,	with	the	exception	of	their	selection	of	action	choice	in	A6,	to	which	the	free-response	question	directly	referred.		
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When	all	rounds	of	coding,	including	reliability	coding,	were	complete,	I	tabulated	the	codes	individually	and	in	combination	to	both	determine	how	often	each	code	occurred	in	total	and	examine	patterns	in	terms	of	which	codes	tended	to	occur	together,	if	any.	While	I	did	expect	each	of	the	six	focal	categories	of	consideration	to	appear	in	students’	responses,	I	did	not	have	specific	hypotheses	about	which	ones	would	appear	more	often.	I	did	hypothesize	that	most	responses,	due	to	their	brief	nature,	would	contain	only	one	or	two	considerations.		
RQ2c.	Relations	between	considerations	cited	and	other	study	variables.	Do	the	domain(s)	cited	in	free	responses	(coded	from	A7)	correspond	to	endorsement	of	domains	in	reasoning	justifications	(measured	quantitatively	in	A2)?	How	does	the	socio-moral	reasoning	in	the	free	responses	(i.e.,	which	domains	are	cited	in	A7)	relate	to	endorsement	and	prioritization	of	action	choices	(A5	&	A6)?		To	address	the	sub-question	above,	I	used	the	codes	to	relate	the	content	of	the	free	responses	to	the	other	data	from	the	CICM	and	certain	demographic	variables.	I	used	t-tests	to	compare	the	means	of	study	variables	of	interest—namely,	endorsement	of	moral	and	conventional	reasoning	(A2)	and	endorsement	of	each	action	choice	(A5),	as	well	as	age—between	participants	who	cited	a	given	category	in	the	free	response	(A7)	and	those	who	did	not.	In	parallel,	I	used	chi-square	tests	of	independence	to	determine	whether	categorical	variables	of	interest—gender	and	selection	of	each	action	choice	as	“best”	(A6)—were	significantly	associated	with	whether	each	category	of	consideration	was	cited.		I	hypothesized	that	citing	a	given	domain	(moral	and/or	conventional)	in	A7	would	relate	positively	with	its	endorsement	in	A2,	but	that	students	would	also	mention	the	other	domains	(personal	and/or	prudential)	in	A7,	not	necessarily	related	to	their	responses	in	A2.	My	hypotheses	for	the	relations	between	moral/conventional	reasoning	(as	cited	in	A7)	and	action	choices	(both	endorsement	and	choice	as	“best”)	were	the	same	as	my	hypotheses	for	RQ1a;	additionally,	I	hypothesized,	as	shown	below,	that	citation	of	personal	reasoning	would	relate	positively	with	bystanding,	and	that	citation	of	prudential	reasoning	would	relate	positively	to	bystanding	and	negatively	to	direct	intervention.	I	also	included	relational	and	emotional	considerations,	though	I	did	not	formulate	specific	hypotheses	for	how	citations	of	these	considerations	would	relate	to	other	variables.				
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Figure	4.	Additional	hypothesis	diagrams	for	RQ2c,	relations	between	personal/prudential	reasoning	and	action	choices.	Blue	dotted	arrows	indicate	hypothesized	positive	relationships,	red	dashed	arrows	indicate	hypothesized	negative	relationships,	and	gray	solid	arrows	indicate	either	hypothesized	nonsignificant	relationships	or	no	specific	hypotheses.		
Research	question	3:	Relation	of	social	perspective-taking	competence	to	
moral	reasoning	and	action	choices.	I	addressed	the	third	and	final	research	question,	about	social	perspective-taking	competence—operationalized	here	as	the	Interpersonal	Management	subscale	(SPT-IM)	of	the	RelQ-A—and	its	relations	to	both	moral	reasoning	and	intended	action	choice	outcomes	with	the	following	sub-questions.	
RQ3a:	Prediction	of	social	perspective-taking	competence.	How	does	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a),	along	with	other	covariates,	relate	to	perspective-taking	score	(SPT-IM)?	
RQ3b:	Mediation.	Does	social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	significantly	mediate	the	hypothesized	relationships	between	moral	reasoning	endorsement	(A2a)	and	endorsement	of	each	action	choice?	For	this	third	research	question,	I	calculated	the	score	for	the	IM	subscale	(SPT-IM)	of	the	social	perspective-taking	measure	(RelQ-A)	following	the	scoring	guidelines	used	by	the	designers	of	the	RelQ-A.	Under	these	guidelines,	responses	that	showed	greater	ability	and	propensity	to	take	others’	perspectives	into	account	along	with	one’s	own	when	making	decisions	were	considered	more	mature	and	received	higher	scores.			To	address	sub-question	RQ3a,	I	used	multilevel	linear	regression,	as	in	RQ1a/b,	to	examine	the	relationship	between	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	and	social-perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM).	Next,	to	address	RQ3b,	I	used	the	PROCESS	Macro	for	SPSS,	v3	(Hayes,	2017),	to	conduct	mediation	analysis	with	moral	reasoning	endorsement	(A2a)	as	the	independent	variable	(along	with	other	covariates),	social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	as	the	mediator,	and	endorsement	of	each	action	choice	as	dependent	variables.	The	PROCESS	macro	is	a	regression-based	tool	that	uses	bootstrapping	to	determine	the	significance	of	indirect	effects,	which	many	scholars	consider	superior	to	mediation	models	based	on	simple	regression,	particularly	because	bootstrapping	has	greater	power	and	does	not	assume	normality	of	the	data		(Hayes,	2009);	however,	the	same	cautions	that	apply	to	all	non-experimental	mediation	analyses—particularly,	the	possibility	of	bias	produced	by	unobserved	variables	that	could	be	influencing	both	the	independent	and	mediating	variables	and	thus	causing	their	error	terms	to	covary—also	apply	to	bootstrapping	analyses	(Bullock,	Green,	&	Ha,	2010).	Nevertheless,	to	aid	in	visualization	of	the	tested	relationships,	Figure	5	(below)	illustrates	a	simplified	version	of	the	proposed	mediation	model.	(Note	that	this	diagram	represents	all	the	action	choice	ratings	as	collapsed	into	one	box,	whereas,	in	actuality,	separate	analyses	were	conducted	for	each	action	choice	rating.)				
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Figure	5.	Conceptual	diagram	of	potential	mediation.	Blue	dotted	arrow	represents	hypothesized	positive	relationship.		 I	hypothesized	that	moral	reasoning	endorsement	would	have	a	positive	direct	relationship	with	SPT-IM	score.	Furthermore,	I	hypothesized	that	that	SPT-IM	would	at	least	partially	mediate	the	relationship	between	moral	reasoning	and	each	action	score	(i.e.,	that	each	model	would	show	significant	indirect	effects).		
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Chapter	3:	Results	
3.1	Preliminary	and	Descriptive	Analyses		 The	total	original	sample	size	of	1402	participants	was	slightly	reduced	for	each	analysis	due	to	missing	data	on	the	variables	in	question.	The	first	packet	of	surveys	that	students	filled	out	in	the	spring	of	Year	1	included	the	sociodemographic	items	and	the	Choices	in	Context	Measure	(CICM),	while	the	adapted	Relationship	Questionnaire	(RelQ-A)	was	included	in	the	second	packet.	The	rate	of	missing	data	did	not	exceed	5%	on	any	of	the	sociodemographic	or	CICM	items	of	interest	for	the	study.	The	items	from	the	RelQ-A	showed	slightly	higher	rates	of	missing	data—likely	because	they	were	in	the	second	packet,	which	some	participants	might	not	have	completed—but	the	IM	subscale	(SPT-IM)	still	had	a	missing	rate	of	less	than	10%.			 The	distributions	of	response	selections	for	each	of	the	items	of	interest	from	the	CICM—both	frequency	and	valid	percentage	(i.e.,	percentage	of	non-missing	responses)—are	shown	in	Table	2,	below.	The	most	notable	patterns	relate	to	the	idea	of	“joining	in”	(perpetrating)	as	a	response	to	witnessing	bullying.	Student	participants	overwhelmingly	tended	to	rate	this	as	a	“very	bad”	choice,	and,	correspondingly,	very	few	selected	it	as	the	“best”	action	choice.	For	the	other	major	study	variable	(not	shown	in	the	table),	SPT-IM,	scores	on	the	composite	subscale	measure	were	approximately	normally	distributed,	with	a	minimum	of	1.67,	maximum	of	4.00,	mean	of	3.22,	and	standard	deviation	of	.35.			Table	2	
Distribution	of	Responses	on	CICM	Items	of	Interest	
Variables	 1	 2	 3	 4	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)a	 226	(16.7%)	 222	(16.4%)	 558	(41.2%)	 349	(25.8%)	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)a	 91	(6.8%)	 369	(27.4%)	 626	(46.5%)	 260	(19.3%)	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)b	 210	(15.5%)	 610	(45.1%)	 419	(31.0%)	 113	(8.4%)	Rating	of	indirect	intervention	(A5a)a	 120	(8.9%)	 305	(22.7%)	 678	(50.4%)	 242	(18.0%)	Rating	of	bystanding	(A5b)a	 255	(19.0%)	 578	(43.0%)	 374	(27.8%)	 136	(10.1%)	Rating	of	direct	intervention	(A5c)a	 54	(4.0%)	 187	(13.9%)	 671	(49.9%)	 434	(32.2%)	Rating	of	perpetrating	(A5d)a	 1125	(83.4%)	 178	(13.2%)	 29	(2.1%)	 17	(1.3%)	Action	choice	selection	(A6)c	 306	(22.8%)	 327	(24.3%)	 677	(48.3%)	 34	(2.5%)	
Note.	Figures	in	parentheses	indicate	valid	percentages,	i.e.,	percentage	of	non-missing	responses	to	each	question.	
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a	For	reasoning	endorsements	(A2a,	A2b)	and	action	choice	ratings	(A5a,	A5b,	A5c,	A5d),	1	=	very	bad,	2	=	bad,	3	=	good,	4	=	very	good.	b	For	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4),	i.e.,	how	often	this	kind	of	bullying	happens	at	your	school,	1	=	very	rarely,	2	=	rarely,	3	=	often,	4	=	very	often.	c	For	action	choice	selection	(A6),	1	indicates	the	selection	of	action	choice	a	(indirect	intervention)	as	the	“best”/most	likely	to	take,	2	indicates	the	selection	of	b	(bystanding),	3	indicates	the	selection	of	c	(direct	intervention),	and	4	indicates	the	selection	of	d	(perpetrating).				 Due	to	the	clustered	nature	of	the	data,	with	individual	students	(level	1)	nested	into	schools	(level	2),	intraclass	correlations	(ICCs)	were	calculated	for	each	study	variable	from	the	CICM	and	RelQ.	The	choice	to	cluster	students	by	school	only,	not	by	classroom/teacher	in	addition	or	instead,	was	made	because	the	intervention	was	randomized	by	school,	variables	of	interest	evoked	school-level	factors	(e.g.,	perceived	bullying	prevalence	“at	your	school”	in	A4),	and	the	majority	of	schools	had	only	a	single	participating	classroom/teacher,	which	led	to	redundancy	errors	when	attempting	three-level	models	for	some	variables.	All	of	the	items	had	low	ICCs	(<.08)	except	for	the	item	asking	about	perceived	prevalence	of	bullying	at	school	(A4).	This	makes	sense,	as	this	particular	item	tapped	into	perceptions	of	a	shared	environment	rather	than	individual	judgments	and	thoughts.	This	one	item,	A4,	had	an	ICC	of	.128,	meaning	that	12.8%	of	the	variance	in	responses	could	be	attributed	to	differences	between	school	contexts	(level	2)	as	opposed	to	individual	differences	(level	1).	Because	of	this	one	higher	ICC,	multilevel	modeling	was	conducted	in	the	linear	regression	analyses	that	involved	this	variable.			 Bivariate	correlations	were	calculated	between	the	sociodemographic	control	variables	(parental	education	level,	first	language,	race,	and	intervention	group),	the	covariates	of	interest	(gender,	age,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence),	and	the	predictor	and	outcome	variables	from	the	CICM	and	RelQ-A.	Spearman	correlations	were	used	due	to	the	ordinal	or	categorical	nature	of	many	of	the	variables.	Statistical	significance	was	determined	as	a	two-tailed	p	value	of	less	than	.05;	only	significant	results	are	described	here.		 With	regards	to	the	relationships	among	the	demographic	variables	and	covariates,	several	significant	correlations	were	evident.	Reporting	English	as	one’s	first	language	was	positively	associated	with	parental	education	level	and	with	selecting	Black,	White,	or	two	or	more	races,	while	negatively	associated	with	selecting	Hispanic	or	Asian.	Additionally,	parental	education	level	was	correlated	positively	with	selecting	White	or	two	or	more	races	and	negatively	with	selecting	Hispanic.	Students	in	the	Facing	History	intervention	group	were	more	likely	to	be	female	and	younger	than	the	students	in	the	control	group.	Age	was	not	significantly	related	to	any	of	the	other	control	variables	with	the	exception	of	a	negative	association	with	parental	education.	Male	gender	was	negatively	associated	with	selecting	Black,	while	positively	associated	with	selecting	White	and	with	speaking	English	as	a	first	language.	Perceived	prevalence	of	bullying	at	school	was	also	positively	correlated	with	selecting	White	and	with	speaking	English	as	a	first	language,	and	negatively	correlated	with	selecting	Hispanic.		Correlations	between	the	major	predictor	and	outcome	variables	are	shown	in	Table	3.	For	the	most	part,	relationships	among	these	variables	were	in	the	hypothesized	directions.	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	in	the	CICM	bullying	scenario	correlated	negatively	with	ratings	of	bystanding	and	perpetrating	as	action	choices	in	response	to	
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witnessing	bullying	and	positively	with	rating	of	direct	intervention	as	an	action	choice.	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning,	on	the	other	hand,	was	only	significantly	correlated	with	rating	of	indirect	intervention	(positively).	Ratings	of	the	two	positive	action	choices	(i.e.,	direct	and	indirect	intervention)	were	positively	correlated	with	each	other	and	negatively	correlated	with	ratings	of	the	two	negative	action	choices	(bystanding	and	perpetrating,	which	also	correlated	positively	with	each	other).	Social	perspective-taking,	as	measured	by	the	IM	subscale	of	the	RelQ-A,	was	positively	correlated	with	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	and	with	both	of	the	positive	action	choice	ratings,	as	well	as	negatively	correlated	with	the	negative	action	choice	ratings.	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	showed	an	almost	opposite	pattern,	correlating	negatively	with	the	positive	action	choices	and	positively	with	the	negative	action	choices.	Male	participants	showed	the	same	pattern	of	correlations	as	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(namely,	being	male	was	associated	negatively	with	the	positive	action	choices	and	positively	with	the	negative	action	choices);	furthermore,	male	gender	correlated	negatively	with	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	and	social	perspective-taking.	Age	did	not	show	significant	correlations	with	any	major	variables.		Table	3	
Correlations	Among	Major	Variables	
Variables	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	1.	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(CICM	A2a)	 --	 .03	 .03	 -.13	***	 .15	***	 -.11	***	 .21	***	 -.12	***	 -.02	 -.04	2.	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(CICM	A2b)	 .03	 --	 .23	***	 .01	 .05	 -.05	 .04	 -.04	 .01	 -.01	3.	Rating	of	indirect	intervention	(CICM	A5a)	 .03	 .23	***	 --	 -.25	***	 .13	***	 -.24	***	 .19	***	 -.23	***	 -.01	 -.10	***	4.	Rating	of	bystanding	(CICM	A5b)	 -.13	***	 .01	 -.25	***	 --	 -.27	***	 .22	***	 -.22	***	 .11	***	 .02	 .13	***	5.	Rating	of	direct	intervention	(CICM	A5c)	 .15	***	 .05	 .13	***	 -.26	***	 --	 -.14	***	 .10	***	 -.11	***	 -.03	 -.10	***	6.	Rating	of	perpetrating	(CICM	A5d)	 -.11	***	 -.05	 -.24	***	 .22	***	 -.14	***	 --	 -.27	***	 .22	***	 -.02	 .10	***	7.	Interpersonal	Management	subscale	(RelQ-IM)	 .21	***	 .04	 .19	***	 -.22	***	 .10	***	 -.27	***	 --	 -.23	***	 -.00	 -.06	*	8.	Gender	(male)	 -.12	***	 -.04	 -.23	***	 .11	***	 -.11	***	 .22	***	 -.23	***	 --	 .05	 .02	9.	Age	in	years	 -.02	 .01	 -.01	 .02	 -.03	 -.02	 <.01	 .05	 --	 -.01	
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10.	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(CICM	A4)	 -.04	 -.01	 -.10	***	 .13	***	 -.10	***	 .10	***	 -.06	*	 .02	 -.01	 --	*p	<	.05,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed	Spearman	correlations)			 To	determine	whether	there	were	systematic	differences	in	the	responses	of	the	subsample	of	participants	(n	=	574)	who	chose	to	provide	explanations	for	their	action	choices	(A7)	vs.	the	remainder	of	the	participants	(i.e.,	those	who	did	not	provide	textual	responses),	independent	samples	t-tests	were	conducted	on	the	mean	values	of	the	study	variables	for	both	groups.	Though	the	subsample	did	significantly	differ	on	several	demographic	variables	from	those	not	in	the	subsample,	as	described	in	the	Sample/Participants	section	earlier,	they	did	not	differ	significantly	on	any	of	the	study	variables	from	the	CICM	or	the	RelQ-A,	with	one	exception.	Participants	in	the	subsample	perceived	that	bullying	of	the	type	described	in	the	CICM	situation	was	going	on	significantly	more	often	at	their	school	(A4),	as	compared	with	participants	not	in	the	subsample.	This	difference,	in	addition	to	the	demographic	differences,	should	be	taken	into	consideration	in	the	interpretation	of	the	results	of	analyses	using	the	subsample.		
	
3.2	RQ	1:	Prediction	of	Action	Choices	by	Socio-moral	Reasoning	and	
Personal/Contextual	Factors	
	
	 To	further	explore	the	relationships	between	participants’	socio-moral	reasoning,	personal/contextual	factors	(gender,	age,	perceived	bullying	prevalence),	and	intended	action	choices	in	response	to	hypothetical	witnessed	bullying,	linear	and	logistic	regression	analyses	were	conducted	using	the	provided	numerical	rating	data.			 Linear	regression	analyses.	Guided	by	the	research	hypotheses,	multilevel	linear	regression	analyses	were	conducted	employing	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(not	intervening	in	the	bullying	situation	is	bad	because	the	target	is	being	hurt)	and	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(not	intervening	is	bad	because	bullying	is	against	the	rules)	to	predict	participants’	ratings	of	the	adequacy	of	each	action	choice.	Multilevel	modeling	with	restricted	maximum	likelihood	estimation	was	used	to	account	for	the	hierarchical	structure	of	the	data,	with	students	(level	1)	nested	in	schools	(level	2).	All	of	the	predictors	and	covariates	were	individual	student-level	variables	and	thus	were	included	as	level	1	fixed	effects,	with	random	intercepts	by	school.		Analyses	were	conducted	separately	for	each	outcome	(i.e.,	rating	of	each	action	choice).	For	each	of	the	four	action	choice	ratings,	Model	1	contained	the	focal	SDT	predictor	variables	(endorsement	of	moral	and	conventional	reasoning)	only	and	Model	2	added	control	variables	(parental	education,	first	language,	race/ethnicity,	intervention	group).	Next,	in	Model	3,	the	focal	personal/contextual	factors	(gender,	age,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence)	were	used	as	sole	predictors,	and	the	same	control	variables	as	in	Model	2	were	added	to	these	predictors	in	Model	4.	Model	5	contained	all	of	the	predictors	and	covariates	(SDT	reasoning	items,	personal/contextual	factors,	and	control	variables).	Lastly,	to	examine	potential	moderating	effects	of	the	personal/contextual	factors	on	the	relationship	between	socio-moral	reasoning	and	action	choices,	six	interaction	terms	
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(between	both	moral	and	conventional	reasoning	and	each	of	the	three	factors)	were	added	in	Model	6.			 Models	1	and	2:	Prediction	by	socio-moral	reasoning	endorsement.	As	shown	in	Table	4,	when	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	and	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	were	the	only	predictors,	moral	reasoning	was	significantly	positively	related	to	ratings	of	the	choice	to	intervene	directly	and	significantly	negatively	related	to	ratings	of	bystanding	and	perpetrating	as	action	choices.	In	other	words,	when	students	agreed	more	strongly	with	the	idea	that	the	bullying	was	wrong	because	it	was	hurting	the	target	(i.e.,	moral	reasoning),	they	were	more	approving	of	the	choice	to	tell	the	bullies	to	stop,	and	less	approving	of	the	choices	to	stay	out	of	it	or	join	in	the	bullying.	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning,	on	the	other	hand,	was	significantly	positively	related	to	ratings	of	the	choice	to	intervene	indirectly,	meaning	that	students	who	gave	more	weight	to	the	idea	that	bullying	was	wrong	because	it	was	against	the	rules	were	more	approving	of	the	choice	to	tell	a	teacher	about	the	situation.		Table	4	
Multilevel	Linear	Regression	Model	1:	Prediction	of	Action	Choice	Ratings	by	Socio-moral	Reasoning	
Endorsement	
Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 df	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Intervene	indirectly	(A5a)	 Intercept	 2.16***	 .10	 1000	 20.99	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.003	 .02	 1322.75	 -.15	 .88	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .23***	 .03	 1322.47	 8.51	 <.001	Bystand	(A5b)	 Intercept	 2.52***	 .11	 1051.50	 23.18	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.10***	 .02	 1284.19	 -4.08	 <.001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .01	 .03	 1311.57	 .43	 .67	Intervene	directly	(A5c)	 Intercept	 2.75***	 .09	 1103.09	 29.04	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .09***	 .02	 1284.17	 4.21	 <.001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .04	 .03	 1309.56	 1.52	 .13	Intercept	 1.37***	 .07	 1105.21	 20.69	 <.001	
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Perpetrate	(A5d)	 Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.03*	 .01	 1319.14	 -2.33	 .02	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 -.02	 .02	 1325.31	 -1.32	 .19	*p	<	.05,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)	
	Table	5	
Multilevel	Linear	Regression	Model	2:	Prediction	of	Action	Choice	Ratings	by	Socio-moral	Reasoning	
Endorsement	with	Control	Variables	
	 Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 df	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Intervene	indirectly	(A5a)	 Intercept	 2.10***	 .19	 1065.79	 11.42	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.01	 .02	 1178.00	 -.10	 .92	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .21***	 .03	 1176.46	 7.91	 <.001	Parental	education	level	 .03	 .02	 1050.37	 1.32	 .19	First	language	is	English	 -.15*	 .07	 1177.81	 -2.27	 .02	Race/ethnicitya							Black						Hispanic						Asian						White						Mixed	(2	or	more)	
	.28	.15	.15	.13	-.03	
	.15	.14	.15	.14	.15	
	1104.01	1176.84	1173.90	1174.22	1168.52	
	1.38	.75	.65	.61	-.42	
	.17	.45	.52	.54	.68	In	intervention	group	 .03	 .07	 51.73	 .48	 .64	Bystand	(A5b)	 Intercept	 2.49***	 .21	 929.77	 12.00	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.09***	 .03	 1118.04	 -3.59	 <.001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .01	 .03	 1166.81	 .45	 .65	Parental	education	level	 -.03	 .03	 638.52	 -1.11	 .27	
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First	language	is	English	 .08	 .07	 1134.03	 1.79	 .24	Race/ethnicitya							Black						Hispanic						Asian						White						Mixed	(2	or	more)	
	.30†	.06	.09	.06	-.06	
	.16	.16	.16	.15	.17	
	833.26	1124.86	1156.80	995.14	1172.18	
	1.79	.40	.53	.37	-.38	
	.07	.69	.60	.71	.71	In	intervention	group	 -.10†	 .06	 25.94	 -1.74	 .09	Intervene	directly	(A5c)	 Intercept	 2.54***	 .18	 1020.79	 13.89	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .10***	 .02	 1154.93	 4.32	 <.001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .03	 .03	 1173.86	 1.26	 .21	Parental	education	level	 .04	 .02	 812.63	 1.59	 .11	First	language	is	English	 .11†	 .06	 1162.18	 1.79	 .07	Race/ethnicitya							Black						Hispanic						Asian						White						Mixed	(2	or	more)	
	-.03	.15	.02	-.08	-.02	
	.15	.14	.14	.13	.15	
	971.30	1161.03	1173.20	1095.47	1177.42	
	-.19	1.07	.15	-.61	-.11	
	.85	.28	.88	.54	.91	In	intervention	group	 -.01	 .05	 39.40	 -.21	 .83	Perpetrate	(A5d)	 Intercept	 1.49***	 .13	 1058.40	 11.78	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.03†	 .02	 1173.95	 -1.80	 .07	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 -.02	 .02	 1180.43	 -1.33	 .18	Parental	education	level	 -.03	 .02	 933.69	 -1.60	 .11	First	language	is	English	 .05	 .04	 1177.36	 -1.25	 .21	Race/ethnicitya		 	 	 	 	 	
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					Black						Hispanic						Asian						White						Mixed	(2	or	more)	
-.06	-.06	-.12	-.15	-.07	
.10	.09	.10	.09	.10	
1046.15	1178.28	1180.94	1147.79	1179.64	
-.62	-.60	-1.24	-1.60	-.70	
.54	.55	.21	.11	.49	In	intervention	group	 .00	 .04	 45.51	 .09	 .93	aRace/ethnicity	coded	as	a	series	of	dummy	variables,	with	“Other”	used	as	the	reference	group.	†p	<	.10,	*p	<	.05,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)		 When	control	variables	were	added,	as	shown	in	Table	5,	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	remained	a	positive	predictor	of	ratings	for	indirect	intervention,	and	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	still	positively	predicted	ratings	of	direct	intervention	and	negatively	predicted	ratings	of	bystanding.	The	negative	relationship	between	moral	reasoning	and	perpetrating	was	reduced	to	marginal	significance,	however.			 Models	3	and	4:	Prediction	by	personal/contextual	factors.	For	the	next	set	of	models,	the	same	procedure	was	followed,	except	with	gender,	age	in	years,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence	as	predictors	in	place	of	moral	and	conventional	reasoning.			 Results	are	shown	in	Table	6.	As	compared	with	female	participants,	male	participants	gave	significantly	lower	ratings	to	the	positive	action	choices	(direct	and	indirect	intervention)	and	significantly	higher	ratings	to	the	negative	action	choices	(bystanding	and	perpetrating).	Student	participants	who	perceived	bullying	as	happening	more	often	at	their	own	schools	showed	this	same	pattern	of	inclination	towards	negative	action	choices	and	away	from	positive	ones.	Age	did	not	significantly	predict	any	of	the	action	choice	rating	outcomes.		Table	6	
Multilevel	Linear	Regression	Model	3:	Prediction	of	Action	Choice	Ratings	by	Personal/Contextual	
Factors	
Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 df	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Intervene	indirectly	(A5a)	 Intercept	 2.53***	 .60	 693.69	 4.21	 <.001	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.38***	 .05	 1303.37	 -8.29	 <.001	Age	in	years	 .04	 .04	 672.74	 1.03	 .30	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.08**	 .03	 1258.83	 -2.96	 .003	Bystand	(A5b)	 Intercept	 1.28*	 .63	 509.38	 2.02	 .04	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .19***	 .05	 1272.72	 3.86	 <.001	
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Age	in	years	 .04	 .04	 485.47	 .98	 .33	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .13***	 .03	 1191.66	 4.55	 <.001	Intervene	directly	(A5c)	 Intercept	 3.58***	 .54	 393.63	 6.69	 <.001	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.19***	 .04	 1208.22	 -4.36	 <.001	Age	in	years	 -.01	 .03	 368.37	 -.37	 .71	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.09**	 .03	 1089.90	 -3.4	 .001	Perpetrate	(A5d)	 Intercept	 1.08**	 .38	 728.36	 2.87	 .004	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .22***	 .03	 1304.36	 7.56	 <.001	Age	in	years	 -.01	 .02	 706.48	 -.36	 .72	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .07***	 .02	 1260.71	 4.16	 <.001	*p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)	
	Table	7	
Multilevel	Linear	Regression	Model	4:		Prediction	of	Action	Choice	Ratings	by	Personal/Contextual	
Factors	with	Control	Variables	
	 Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 df	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Intervene	indirectly	(A5a)	 Intercept	 2.49***	 .67	 633.28	 3.75	 <.001	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.35***	 .05	 1162.92	 -7.31	 <.001	Age	in	years	 .04	 .04	 598.30	 1.00	 .33	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.08**	 .03	 1132.88	 -2.86	 .004	Parental	education	level	 .03	 .02	 997.76	 1.31	 .19	First	language	is	English	 -.18**	 .07	 1165.32	 -2.69	 .007	Race/ethnicitya							Black						Hispanic	
	.18	.06	
	.16	.14	
	1061.92	1165.93	
	1.14	.38	
	.26	.70	
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					Asian						White						Mixed	(2	or	more)	
.07	.07	-.11	
.15	.14	.16	
1165.04	1150.23	1161.91	
.46	.48	-.66	
.65	.63	.51	In	intervention	group	 .01	 .07	 49.91	 .14	 .89	Bystand	(A5b)	 Intercept	 1.35*	 .66	 238.67	 2.03	 .04	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .21***	 .05	 1004.82	 4.01	 <.001	Age	in	years	 .03	 .04	 201.43	 .73	 .47	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .16***	 .03	 923.24	 5.23	 <.001	Parental	education	level	 -.03	 .02	 583.43	 -1.15	 .25	First	language	is	English	 .05	 .07	 1092.07	 .65	 .51	Race/ethnicitya							Black						Hispanic						Asian						White						Mixed	(2	or	more)	
	.40*	.13	.17	.06	-.02	
	.16	.16	.16	.15	.17	
	795.20	1095.36	1129.14	929.11	1150.62	
	2.48	.84	1.03	.41	-.13	
	.01	.40	.30	.69	.90	In	intervention	group	 -.11†	 .05	 27.54	 -2.05	 .05	Intervene	directly	(A5c)	 Intercept	 3.24***	 .61	 371.91	 5.35	 <.001	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.19***	 .05	 1101.28	 -4.07	 <.001	Age	in	years	 -.001	 .04	 318.26	 -.02	 .98	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.08**	 .03	 1031.41	 -2.85	 .005	Parental	education	level	 .04†	 .02	 769.14	 1.72	 .09	First	language	is	English	 .11†	 .06	 1135.77	 1.74	 .08	Race/ethnicitya							Black						Hispanic						Asian	
	-.13	.06	-.06	
	.15	.14	.15	
	937.98	1141.96	1155.05	
	-.86	.42	-.43	
	.39	.68	.67	
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					White						Mixed	(2	or	more)	 -.12	-.08	 .14	.15	 1050.26	1161.77	 -.88	-.50	 .38	.62	In	intervention	group	 -.003	 .05	 41.41	 -.05	 .96	Perpetrate	(A5d)	 Intercept	 1.42**	 .41	 470.25	 3.47	 .001	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .23***	 .03	 1136.77	 7.43	 <.001	Age	in	years	 -.02	 .02	 408.50	 -.91	 .36	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .08***	 .02	 1079.01	 4.14	 <.001	Parental	education	level	 -.03*	 .01	 879.86	 -2.07	 .04	First	language	is	English	 .03	 .04	 1156.46	 .65	 .52	Race/ethnicitya							Black						Hispanic						Asian						White						Mixed	(2	or	more)	
	.01	-.02	-.08	-.12	-.04	
	.10	.09	.10	.09	.10	
	1006.77	1161.70	1166.55	1107/08	1168.95	
	.14	-.17	-.83	-1.32	-.43	
	.89	.86	.41	.19	.67	In	intervention	group	 .004	 .04	 46.80	 .10	 .92	aRace/ethnicity	coded	as	a	series	of	dummy	variables,	with	“Other”	used	as	the	reference	group.	†p	<	.10,	*p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)	When	the	same	set	of	control	variables	was	added	as	in	Model	2,	the	results	did	not	change,	as	shown	in	Table	7.	Both	being	male	and	perceiving	more	frequent	bullying	at	school	continued	to	negatively	predict	positive	action	choice	ratings	and	positively	predict	negative	action	choice	ratings.		
Model	5:	Prediction	by	both	socio-moral	reasoning	endorsement	and	
personal/contextual	factors.	For	this	set	of	full	models	predicting	each	action	choice	rating,	all	major	predictors	were	entered	together—including	moral	and	conventional	reasoning	endorsements,	gender,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence—but	excluding	age,	since	it	did	not	prove	to	be	significant	in	any	of	the	preceding	models.	Of	the	control	variables,	only	those	which	showed	a	significant	effect	in	at	least	one	the	previous	models	(Models	2	and/or	4)	were	included	in	Model	5.			Table	8	
Multilevel	Linear	Regression	Model	5:	Prediction	of	Action	Choice	Ratings	by	Socio-moral	Reasoning	
Endorsement,	Personal/Contextual	Factors,	and	Significant	Control	Variables	
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Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 df	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Intervene	indirectly	(A5a)	 Intercept	 2.65***	 .13	 1013.59	 20.72	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.02	 .02	 1304.46	 -1.11	 .27	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .22***	 .03	 1305.90	 8.35	 <.001	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.38***	 .05	 1302.93	 -8.38	 <.001	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.08**	 .03	 1259.65	 -2.98	 .003	First	language	is	English	 -.08	 .05	 795.32	 -1.52	 .13	Bystand	(A5b)	 Intercept	 2.05***	 .13	 1000.33	 15.69	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.08**	 .02	 1216.51	 -3.35	 .001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .01	 .03	 1265.80	 .36	 .72	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .20***	 .05	 1138.17	 4.04	 <.001	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .13***	 .03	 977.13	 4.55	 <.001	Race/ethnicity	=	Black	 .28***	 .07	 247.06	 3.81	 <.001	Intervene	directly	(A5c)	 Intercept	 3.08***	 .12	 1095.52	 26.74	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .07***	 .02	 1248.75	 3.55	 <.001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .04	 .03	 1280.34	 1.46	 .14	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.18***	 .04	 1217.93	 -4.16	 <.001	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.09***	 .03	 1077.94	 -3.53	 <.001	Perpetrate	(A5d)	 Intercept	 1.16***	 .09	 909.21	 13.51	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.02	 .01	 1278.35	 -1.49	 .14	
  38 
Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 -.02	 .02	 1275.96	 -1.06	 .29	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .21***	 .03	 1260.92	 7.32	 <.001	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .07***	 .02	 1195.75	 3.80	 <.001	Parental	education	level	 -.03*	 .01	 404.35	 -2.38	 .02	*p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)	As	shown	in	Table	8,	the	patterns	of	significance	in	Model	5	did	not	change	from	those	in	Models	2	and	4,	for	the	most	part.	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	still	positively	predicted	direct	intervention	ratings	and	negatively	predicted	bystanding	(though	the	negative	relationship	with	perpetrating	was	reduced	to	nonsignificance);	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	still	only	predicted	indirect	intervention	(positively);	and	both	male	gender	and	greater	perception	of	bullying	at	school	positively	predicted	ratings	of	negative	action	choices	and	negatively	predicted	ratings	of	positive	action	choices.	The	control	variable	effects	that	remained	significant	in	this	model	included	that	selecting	Black	(vs.	all	other	race/ethnicity	categories)	related	positively	to	ratings	of	bystanding	and	that	parental	education	level	related	negatively	to	ratings	of	perpetrating.	
Model	6:	Adding	interaction	terms.	To	test	for	any	interaction	effects	between	the	reasoning	variables	and	the	personal/contextual	factors	in	the	prediction	of	action	choice	ratings—or,	in	other	words,	to	determine	if	one	or	more	of	the	factors	functioned	as	moderators	of	the	relationship	between	reasoning	and	action	choices—interaction	terms	were	added	to	Model	5.		More	specifically,	the	significant	predictors	from	Model	5	for	each	outcome	(action	choice	rating)	were	retained,	and	four	interaction	terms	were	added	to	each	analysis:	gender	(Male)	x	moral	reasoning	endorsement	(A2a),	gender	(Male)	x	conventional	reasoning	endorsement	(A2b),	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	x	moral	reasoning	endorsement	(A2a),	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	x	conventional	reasoning	endorsement	(A2b).	Interaction	terms	were	not	created	for	age,	as,	again,	it	did	not	show	any	significant	relationships	in	any	of	the	preceding	analyses.		None	of	the	interaction	terms	for	any	of	the	outcomes	turned	out	to	be	significant,	except	for	one:	in	the	prediction	of	ratings	for	perpetrating	as	an	action	choice	(A5d),	the	interaction	between	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	was	significant	at	the	.05	level.	The	results	for	the	analysis	for	ratings	of	perpetrating	as	an	action	choice	are	shown	in	Table	9	below.		Table	9	
Multilevel	Linear	Regression	Model	6:	Addition	of	Interaction	Terms	(Perpetration	Outcome	Only)	
	 Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 df	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Intercept	 .89***	 .19	 1264.32	 4.57	 <.001	
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Perpetrate	(A5d)																				 	
Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.04	 .04	 1277.92	 -.81	 .42	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .09†	 .05	 1277.96	 1.75	 .08	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .19	 .13	 1275.09	 1.44	 .15	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .19*	 .07	 1274.19	 2.59	 .01	Parental	education	level	 -.03*	 .01	 397.03	 -2.35	 .02	Male*A2a	 .03	 .03	 1277.13	 .89	 .37	Male*A2b	 -.01	 .03	 1273.88	 -.42	 .67	A4*A2a	 .001	 .02	 1277.99	 .07	 .95	A4*A2b	 -.04*	 .02	 1273.67	 -2.20	 .03	
†p	<	.10,	*p	<	.05,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)		 The	negative	value	of	the	coefficient	of	the	significant	interaction	term	(A4*A2b)	indicates	that	perceived	frequency	of	bullying	changed	the	relationship	between	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	and	rating	of	perpetration	as	an	action	choice.	Another	way	to	say	this	is	that	the	slope	of	the	relationship	between	conventional	reasoning	endorsement	and	rating	of	perpetration	changed	at	different	levels	of	perceived	bullying	prevalence.	Participants	who	perceived	smaller	amounts	of	bullying	going	on	at	their	schools	tended	to	be	increasingly	approving	of	perpetration	the	more	they	endorsed	conventional	reasoning,	whereas	participants	who	perceived	a	lot	of	bullying	going	on	tended	to	select	lower	ratings	of	perpetration	as	an	action	choice	the	more	they	endorsed	conventional	reasoning.	A	different	way	to	express	this	result	would	be	that,	when	participants	did	not	consider	the	conventional	reason	to	be	a	good	explanation	for	why	bullying	is	bad,	the	amount	of	bullying	they	perceived	made	a	difference	in	their	approval	of	joining	in	the	bullying	(with	more	perceived	bullying	associated	with	greater	approval),	but	when	they	did	consider	the	conventional	reason	to	be	a	good	one,	the	amount	of	perceived	bullying	did	not	make	as	much	difference	to	their	approval	of	joining	in.	Figure	1	illustrates	this	change	in	slopes	of	the	relationship	between	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(SitA2b)	and	predicted	values	of	the	rating	of	perpetration	(A5d)	at	different	levels	of	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(SitA4).	
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Figure	6.	Moderation	effect	of	perceived	bullying	prevalence	on	relationship	between	conventional	reasoning	and	rating	of	perpetration.		
Logistic	regression	analyses.	To	gain	a	slightly	different	perspective	into	students’	decision-making	around	the	hypothetical	bullying	situation,	logistic	regression	analyses	were	conducted	to	examine	the	effects	of	the	major	study	variables	(moral	and	conventional	reasoning,	gender,	age,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence)	on	the	likelihood	of	a	participant	selecting	each	action	choice	as	the	“best”	choice,	i.e.,	the	one	they	would	be	most	likely	to	take	if	they	were	in	the	situation	themselves.			Table	10	
Logistic	Regression:	Prediction	of	Selection	of	Each	Action	Choice	as	“Best”	Choice	
Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	(B)	 SE	 Wald	 Sig.	(p)	 Exp(B)	Intervene	indirectly	chosen	as	best	(A6a)	
Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.24***	 .07	 13.60	 <.001	 .79	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .35***	 .08	 17.18	 <.001	 1.41	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.63***	 .14	 19.40	 <.001	 .53	Age	in	years	 .12	 .10	 1.39	 .24	 1.13	
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Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.28**	 .08	 11.74	 .001	 .75	Constant	 -2.57	 1.69	 2.32	 .13	 .08	Bystand	chosen	as	best	(A6b)	 Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.12†	 .07	 3.18	 .07	 .89	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 -.04	 .08	 .22	 .64	 .96	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .58***	 .13	 18.89	 <.001	 1.78	Age	in	years	 .02	 .10	 .03	 .88	 1.02	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .27**	 .08	 11.49	 .001	 1.31	Constant	 -1.88	 1.63	 1.33	 .25	 .15	Intervene	directly	chosen	as	best	(A6c)	
Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .25***	 .06	 19.46	 <.001	 1.29	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 -.21**	 .07	 9.16	 .002	 .81	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.14	 .12	 1.38	 .24	 .87	Age	in	years	 -.14	 .09	 2.48	 .12	 .87	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.07	 .07	 .95	 .33	 .94	Constant	 2.28	 1.42	 2.57	 .11	 9.73	Perpetrate	chosen	as	best	(A6d)	 Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .08	 .19	 .17	 .68	 1.08	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 -.13	 .22	 .36	 .55	 .88	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 1.37***	 .42	 10.79	 .001	 3.93	Age	in	years	 .31	 .27	 1.30	 .26	 1.37	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .64**	 .22	 8.71	 .003	 1.89	Constant	 -10.92*	 4.47	 5.97	 .02	 <.001	†p	<	.10,	*p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)	
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	 The	results	of	the	logistic	regressions,	as	shown	in	Table	10	above,	are	similar	to	the	analogous	results	from	the	linear	regression	analyses	with	the	action	choice	ratings,	but	with	a	few	differences.	For	indirect	intervention	as	the	outcome	choice	(A5a),	the	overall	model	was	significant,	χ2(5)	=	61.15,	p	<	.001.	The	model	explained	7.0%	(Nagelkerke	R2)	of	the	variance	in	choosing	indirect	intervention	and	correctly	classified	76.6%	of	cases.	The	likelihood	of	choosing	indirect	intervention	as	the	best	choice	was	significantly	positively	associated	with	greater	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	and	negatively	associated	with	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning,	as	well	as	with	male	gender	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence.	Choosing	direct	intervention	(A5c)	as	best	showed	an	opposite	pattern	in	terms	of	socio-moral	reasoning,	with	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	predicting	higher	odds	and	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	predicting	lower	odds	of	this	choice,	but	gender	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence	were	not	significant	predictors.	The	overall	model	with	direct	intervention	as	the	outcome	was	significant,	χ2(5)	=	33.92,	p	<	.001.	The	model	explained	3.7%	(Nagelkerke	R2)	of	the	variance	in	choosing	the	option	to	directly	intervene	and	correctly	classified	58.1%	of	cases.			Interestingly,	in	the	logistic	regression	analyses,	neither	of	the	reasoning	variables	were	significantly	related	to	the	likelihood	of	choosing	either	negative	action	(bystanding	or	joining	in)	as	the	best	choice,	but	both	male	participants	and	those	who	perceived	more	bullying	at	school	had	significantly	higher	odds	of	selecting	both	of	the	negative	action	choices	as	what	they	would	most	likely	do.	The	model	for	choosing	bystanding	(A5b)	was	significant,	χ2(5)	=	37.30,	p	<	.001.	The	model	explained	4.3%	(Nagelkerke	R2)	of	the	variance	in	choosing	bystanding	and	correctly	classified	75.9%	of	cases.	For	the	outcome	of	perpetration,	the	model	was	also	significant,	χ2(5)	=	24.55,	p	<	.001.	The	model	explained	9.1%	(Nagelkerke	R2)	of	the	variance	in	choosing	to	join	in	and	correctly	classified	97.5%	of	cases.	 	
3.3	RQ	2:	Analyses	of	Free-Response	Explanations	of	Action	Choices	Using	a	Social	
Domain	Theory	Lens	
		 The	aim	of	the	second	research	question	of	this	study	was	to	explore	the	free-response	textual	explanations	that	a	subset	of	participants	(n	=	574,	or	40.94%	of	the	total	sample	size)	provided	when	given	the	opportunity	to	describe	why	they	chose	whichever	action	choice	they	selected	as	the	one	they	would	most	likely	take	if	they	were	to	witness	the	bullying	situation	themselves.	This	open-ended	question	(“Please	explain	why”)	was	asked	at	the	end	of	the	CICM-Situation	A	survey,	with	a	few	lines	provided	for	participants	to	write	a	brief	response	if	they	chose.		 Of	the	574	textual	responses,	the	minimum	response	length	was	7	characters	(“Because”),	the	maximum	length	was	275	characters	(“I	know	what	it	is	like	to	be	teased.	I'm	afraid	to	be	teased	again	or	for	people	dislike	me.		It	all	depends	on	the	situation	though.	If	the	kid	was	my	friend	I	would	help	him.	It	is	hard	to	stand	up	for	someone	that	isn't	your	friend,	even	if	it	is	the	right	thing	to	do.”),	and	the	mean	length	was	87	characters	(e.g.,	“I	would	go	and	tell	the	other	student	to	stop	because	that	is	not	right	for	the	new	kid,”	along	with	several	others)	with	a	standard	deviation	of	40	characters.		
Coding	for	considerations.	Following	the	analysis	plan,	the	textual	data	from	the	free-response	question	was	subjected	to	three	rounds	of	coding.	In	the	first	round,	none	of	the	responses	were	marked	as	uncodable,	confirming	that	the	subset	contained	only	
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participants	who	did	provide	responses	to	the	question	(A7).	In	the	second	round,	responses	were	coded	for	the	presence	or	absence	of	considerations	relating	to	each	of	the	four	SDT	domains:	moral,	conventional,	personal,	and	prudential.	In	the	third	round,	responses	were	coded	for	the	presence	or	absence	of	relational	and	emotional	considerations.	(See	Appendix	C	for	the	details	of	the	coding	guidelines	that	were	employed.)		
Interrater	reliability.	After	finalizing	the	coding	guidelines,	I	trained	a	second	coder,	who	then	coded	approximately	21%	of	the	responses	(n	=	115)	in	order	to	determine	the	interrater	reliability	of	the	coding	system.	I	compared	the	second	coder’s	codes	to	my	own	codes	for	those	115	responses	using	Cohen’s	kappa	statistic,	obtaining	a	value	of	κ	=	.87.	A	Cohen’s	kappa	value	of	at	least	.80	is	considered	a	standard	indicating	good	interrater	reliability	(Hallgren,	2012).	To	resolve	coding	disagreements	where	our	codes	differed	from	each	other,	the	second	coder	and	I	discussed	and	decided	together	on	the	final	code(s)	to	be	recorded	for	the	responses	in	question.			 Frequencies	of	considerations	cited.	In	total,	moral	considerations	were	cited	228	times	(meaning	that	moral	reasons	were	cited	in	39.6%	of	responses),	conventional	considerations	were	cited	91	times	(in	15.8%	of	responses),	personal	considerations	were	cited	103	times	(in	17.9%	of	responses),	and	prudential	considerations	were	cited	121	times	(in	21.0%	of	responses).	Besides	the	SDT	domains,	relational	considerations	were	cited	37	times	(in	6.4%	of	responses)	and	emotional	considerations	were	cited	20	times	(in	3.5%	of	responses).		These	frequencies	add	up	to	more	than	574	due	to	the	fact	that	some	participants	cited	considerations	from	more	than	a	single	category	in	their	responses.	Specifically,	487	responses	(84.8%)	contained	considerations	from	only	one	SDT	domain	and	28	(4.9%)	contained	considerations	from	two	SDT	domains,	plus	59	responses	(10.3%)	that	cited	no	SDT	domains.	With	the	relational	and	emotional	considerations	included,	474	responses	(82.6%)	referred	to	one	category	of	consideration	total,	60	responses	(10.5%)	referred	to	two	categories,	2	responses	(0.3%)	referred	to	three	categories,	and	38	responses	(6.6%)	did	not	contain	any	of	the	focal	categories	of	consideration.	Spearman	correlations	revealed	that	both	the	number	of	domains	cited	(rho	=	.18,	p	<	.001)	and	the	number	of	total	categories	cited	(rho	=	.28,	p	<	.001)	were	significantly	correlated	with	response	length.	Additionally,	though	speaking	English	as	a	first	language	was	not	significantly	associated		with	response	length	or	number	of	total	categories	cited,	it	was	actually	negatively	correlated	with	number	of	SDT	domains	cited	(rho	=	-.09,	p	=	.03).	Table	11	displays	how	many	responses	cited	each	consideration	alone	as	well	as	in	combination	with	each	other	consideration.		Table	11	
Counts	and	Percentages	of	Responses	Citing	Each	Consideration	Alone	and	in	Each	Combination	Consideration	 Moral	 Conventional	 Personal	 Prudential	 Relational	 Emotional	Moral	 193	(84.65%)	 10							(10.99%)	 6		(5.83%)	 7	(5.79%)	 6	(16.22%)	 6	(30%)	
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Conventional	 10	(4.39%)	 73		(80.22%)	 0	(0%)	 4	(3.31%)	 4	(10.81%)	 0	(0%)	Personal	 6		(2.63%)	 0		(0%)	 83	(80.58%)	 1	(0.83%)	 8	(21.62%)	 5	(25%)	Prudential	 7		(3.07%)	 4	(4.40%)	 1	(0.97%)	 102	(84.30%)	 5	(13.51%)	 2	(10%)	Relational	 6	(2.63%)	 4	(4.40%)	 8	(7.77%)	 5	(4.13%)	 12	(32.43%)	 2	(10%)	Emotional	 6	(2.63%)	 0	(0%)	 5	(4.85%)	 2	(1.65%)	 2	(5.41%)	 5	(25%)	Total	 228	 91	 103	 121	 37	 20	
Note:	The	percentages	in	parentheses	represent	the	percentage	of	the	total	number	of	citations	for	the	consideration	(by	column)	that	were	cited	in	each	combination.	The	numbers	on	the	diagonal	represent	how	many	responses,	out	of	all	the	responses	that	cited	a	consideration,	cited	only	that	one	consideration.			 The	moral	domain	was	the	domain	invoked	most	frequently,	followed	by	prudential,	personal,	and	then	conventional,	with	relational	and	emotional	considerations	mentioned	much	less	frequently.	It	is	also	apparent	from	Table	11	that	the	vast	majority	of	the	citations	for	each	domain-related	consideration	were	solitary	citations	(all	>	80%).	In	other	words,	most	of	the	time,	participants	only	cited	one	SDT	domain	in	their	brief	free-response	explanations.	Relational	and	emotional	considerations,	on	the	other	hand,	were	less	often	cited	as	the	sole	consideration;	they	appeared	more	often	alongside	other	considerations.	
Examples	of	each	code	and	combination.	This	section	provides	examples	of	student	responses	that	were	coded	with	each	different	consideration,	alone	and	in	each	combination.	Responses	that	were	coded	as	only	containing	considerations	from	only	one	SDT	domain	will	be	discussed	first,	followed	by	examples	of	responses	that	cited	various	combinations	of	domain-based	considerations.	Lastly,	examples	of	the	two	non-SDT	categories	of	consideration,	relational	and	emotional,	will	be	presented.		Responses	that	referred	to	concerns	about	harm	and	welfare—physical	and/or	psychological—of	the	target	or	others	(not	the	participant	themselves),	or	to	fairness/justice,	rights,	etc.	were	coded	as	containing	a	moral	consideration.	Examples	of		responses	containing	moral	considerations	included,	“It's	not	fair	that	the	new	kid	is	being	made	fun	of,”	“Teasing	turns	school	into	a	horrible	place	for	them,	and	no	one	deserves	that,”		and	“I	would	tell	the	kids	that	it	is	not	nice	to	make	fun	of	it	and	it	really	is	hurting	the	kid's	feelings.”	Several	participants	used	language	that	was	somewhat	vague,	but	that	clearly	referred	to	a	sense	of	universal,	inherent	rightness	vs.	wrongness—and	thus	to	the	moral	domain—such	as,	“Because	I	think	that	it's	wrong	to	make	fun	of	someone	just	because	of	the	way	they	look	or	because	of	where	they	are	from,”	or	“I	would	do	this	because	it	is	not	cool	to	make	fun	of	someone	and	where	they	are	from.”	(Though	the	word	“cool”	could	refer	to	social	approval,	which	would	potentially	be	in	the	conventional	
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domain,	some	responses	that	used	“not	cool”	clearly	seemed	to	mean	it	in	the	sense	of	“not	OK”	in	a	moral	way.)	Another	subtype	of	consideration	coded	as	moral	could	be	referred	to	as	empathy-based	reasoning,	in	that	participants	extended	their	own	feelings	to	those	of	others	as	equal	human	beings.	These	Golden	Rule-following	participants	stated	that	they,	or	the	bullies,	would	not	like	to	be	treated	the	way	the	target	was	treated,	and	therefore	it	was	wrong	to	treat	someone	like	that,	such	as,	“Because	it	isn't	right	to	judge	anyone	you	don't	know	and	if	it	was	you,	you	wouldn't	like	to	be	treated	that	way,”	or	“I	don't	like	being	teased	and	so	I	imagine	the	boy	doesn't	either	so	I'd	try	and	stop	it.”	A	final	example	that	contains	at	least	two	different	types	of	moral	consideration	was,	“Why,	because	they	are	making	the	boy	feel	bad.	And	with	me	having	family	that	came	to	the	US	recently	they	shouldn't	deserve	to	be	treated	like	that”	(referring	to	both	psychological	harm	and	empathy-based	reasoning).	Responses	were	coded	as	containing	a	conventional	consideration	if	they	referred	to	the	structure	and/or	function	of	social	groups,	the	social	role	or	authority	of	certain	figures,	external	rules	or	punishments	intended	to	maintain	order,	and	other	such	concerns.	Representative	examples	included	the	following:	“The	teacher	has	more	authority,	and	he	or	she	would	know	how	to	solve	this	problem,”	“Because	hopefully	they	[teachers]	tell	the	kids	who	are	doing	the	bullying	to	stop	and	punish	them	somehow,”	and	“I	would	tell	them	[the	perpetrators]	to	stop	and	warn	them	if	they	don't	I	would	go	to	a	teacher.	Usually	if	they	will	get	in	trouble,	they	will	stop.”	Like	these	examples,	most	responses	coded	as	conventional	talked	about	teachers	as	knowing	what	to	do	and	being	more	able	to	handle	the	situation	due	to	their	social	role	and	power.	A	few	other	responses	contained	a	different	type	of	conventional	consideration,	in	which	students	seemed	concerned	with	a	social	convention	that	it	is	not	desirable	to	be	a	tattletale	or	snitch,	i.e.,	someone	who	tells	an	authority	figure	about	a	peer’s	wrongdoing.	Two	examples	of	this	were,	“because	someone	should	tell	them	that	and	not	‘tattle’	on	them”	(explaining	why	it	would	be	best	to	confront	the	bullies)	and	“So	the	teacher	can	solve	it	and	let	the	student	get	away	from	it	so	the	other	students	wouldn't	think	he	or	she	snitch”	(explaining	why	it	would	be	best	to	tell	a	teacher).	Responses	that	referenced	issues	of	individuality,	personal	preference,	and	privacy—issues	that,	participants	seemed	to	feel,	should	not	be	governed	by	either	moral	or	social-conventional	rules—were	coded	as	containing	considerations	from	the	personal	domain.	Many	examples	in	this	category	involved	participants	stating	that	the	situation	was	none	of	their	business	and/or	implying	that	becoming	involved	should	be	a	matter	of	personal	choice	(i.e.,	not	a	moral	or	social	obligation),	such	as,	“Because	I	don't	like	getting	in	people's	business,”	“I'm	not	generally	one	to	meddle	in	what	someone	else	is	doing.	I	like	to	mind	my	own	business,”	and	“Because	I	don't	like	getting	into	drama.”	Others	referred	to	their	own	personal	qualities	as	justifications	for	their	choice	of	action,	such	as,	“I'm	a	shy	person	and	I	don't	like	to	get	into	situations	that	don't	involve	me.	I	usually	just	move	on,”	“Because	I’m	outspoken	like	that,”	or	“I'm	a	very	confrontational	person.	If	someone	has	a	problem,	say	it	to	my	face.”		The	prudential	domain	category	included	references	to	the	participant’s	own	safety/welfare	or	other	practical	concerns	(for	the	participant	themselves).	Most	of	the	participants	whose	responses	contained	prudential	considerations	appeared	to	be	worried	about	getting	teased,	hurt,	or	in	trouble	if	they	were	to	intervene,	e.g.,	“Because	sometimes	when	you	get	involved	you	could	get	hurt	yourself,”	“I	would	stay	out	of	it	because	the	
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students	doing	the	teasing	would	most	likely	start	to	tease	me	instead,”	“By	staying	out	of	the	situation,	I	avoid	making	enemies	with	the	students	and	keep	them	from	focusing	their	negativity	towards	me	in	retaliation,”	or,	simply,	“I	don’t	want	to	get	in	trouble.”	A	few	other	responses	seemed	to	focus	less	on	personal	safety	and	more	on	practicality,	in	terms	of	the	probable	effects	of	potential	efforts	they	could	make,	such	as,	“It	[confronting	them]	is	the	easiest	way	and	it	will	probably	work	better	than	telling	the	teacher	on	them,”	or,	on	the	more	cynical	side,	“I	chose	b	[to	stay	out	of	it],	because	most	of	the	time	and	in	reality	you	can't	save	everyone.”	Even	with	such	short	responses,	a	number	of	participants	cited	considerations	from	more	than	one	SDT	domain.	For	instance,	the	following	response	cited	considerations	relating	to	both	punishment	(conventional)	and	the	psychological	welfare	of	the	target	(moral):	“If	I	tell	a	teacher	about	what's	going	on,	the	boys	will	be	disciplined,	and	hopefully	the	new	boy	would	feel	comfortable	enough	and	not	keep	to	himself	anymore.”	An	example	response	that	cited	both	moral	(referring	to	harm)	and	personal	(referring	to	personal	preference)	considerations	was,	“I	do	not	like	getting	in	other	people's	problems.	I	would	only	help	if	it	was	hurting	someone	physically.”	A	sample	response	combining	moral	and	prudential	concerns	was,	“I	would	not	want	to	get	myself	in	the	situation	and	get	hurt,	but	I	wouldn't	want	him	to	get	hurt	either,	so	I'd	tell	a	teacher.”	No	responses	were	coded	as	containing	both	conventional	and	personal	considerations,	but	one	that	was	coded	as	both	conventional	and	prudential	was,	“It	should	be	taken	into	adult	hands	and	others	may	not	want	to	put	themselves	in	risk,”	as	it	referred	to	both	the	conventional	role	of	adults	and	the	safety	concerns	of	witnesses	like	the	participant.	Finally,	only	one	response	seemed	to	clearly	cite	both	personal	and	prudential	concerns,	namely,	“I	normally	don't	like	bullying	people	and	I	prefer	to	stay	out	so	that	they	won't	try	to	bully	me.”	In	addition	to	voicing	concern	for	their	own	safety,	this	participant	argued	against	bullying	not	because	it	is	harmful	or	against	social	rules,	but	because	they	“normally	don’t	like”	to	do	it.		One	of	the	two	non-SDT	categories	that	was	coded	for	was	relational	considerations,	when	participants	referred	to	their	relationships	(or	lack	thereof)	with	the	target	and/or	bullies	as	an	action	choice	justification	in	itself,	separate	from	any	moral,	conventional,	personal,	or	prudential	concerns.	Though	the	majority	of	relational	considerations	were	cited	together	with	SDT	considerations,	sometimes	they	were	cited	alone	without	explicit	reference	to	any	of	the	domains,	as	in,	“If	I	know	the	kids	bullying	the	boy	I	would	say	something	but	otherwise	I	wouldn't,”	or	“	I	would	just	leave	it	alone	cause	it	aint	me	or	my	friend	or	family.”	These	and	several	other	responses	coded	as	containing	relational	considerations	appeared	to	indicate	that	the	participant	would	act	differently	depending	on	whether	they	had	an	interpersonal	relationship	with	the	involved	parties	or	not,	implying	that	different	standards	would	apply.	There	were	also	a	few	responses	that	cited	both	relational	and	other	considerations.	“Why	would	I	take	precautions	if	I	didn't	know	him?	Why	should	I	get	involved	and	create	enemies”	and	“Because	I	don't	want	the	people	teasing	the	boy	to	start	tease	me.	If	they	were	my	friends,	though,	I	would	stick	up	for	the	other	kid”	both	combined	relational	and	prudential,	though	the	first	example	referenced	relation	to	the	target,	while	the	second	example	referenced	relation	to	the	perpetrators.	An	example	of	the	combination	of	relational	and	personal	(referring	to	personal	choice/discretion)	was,	“Because	I	don't	want	to	get	involved	with	it.	I	probably	don't	even	know	the	student	who's	being	teased.	If	it	was	one	of	my	friends,	then	I	would	stand	up	for	them.”	One	response	that	was	coded	as	both	relational	and	conventional	was	the	following:	
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“Sometimes	depending	on	who	the	person	is	I	will	help	out	but	most	of	the	time	not	worry	because	some	students	need	it”;	though	the	referent	of	“it”	was	not	clear,	this	response	was	coded	as	containing	a	conventional	consideration	because	the	idea	seemed	to	be	that	some	students	“need”	either	help	(possibly	due	to	power	differentials)	or	teasing	(possibly	in	order	to	fit	in),	both	of	which	have	to	with	the	functioning	of	the	social	system	of	the	school.	Lastly,	an	example	of	the	combination	of	relational	and	moral	was,	“I	picked	[direct	intervention]	because	if	they	are	your	real	friends	they	should	respect	that	you	are	standing	up	for	another	person.”	In	addition	to	the	relational	consideration,	this	response	was	coded	as	citing	a	moral	consideration	because	it	referred	to	a	sense	of	being	owed	respect,	particularly	for	trying	to	protect	another	person.			The	final	category	of	interest	was	emotional	considerations,	conceptualized	as	occurring	when	participants	mentioned	their	own	emotional	reactions,	or	those	of	generic	others,	as	reasons	in	themselves	to	explain	their	intended	action	choice.	The	emotional	category	was	the	least-cited	overall	of	the	six	categories	of	interest,	and	three	quarters	of	all	coded	emotional	considerations	were	cited	alongside	other	categories	of	consideration,	making	this	the	category	least	often	cited	alone.	The	handful	of	responses	that	cited	emotional	considerations	alone	included,	“The	teasing	of	the	boy	would	make	me	mad	and	I'd	go	over	and	tell	them	that,“	“Even	though	its	not	the	best	choice,	I	would	be	scared	to	do	anything	about	it,”	and	“I	would	want	to	say	something	but	I	wouldn't	be	brave	enough	to	say	anything.”	Responses	citing	both	emotional	and	other	considerations	included:	“Unfortunately,	I	probably	would	be	too	scared	to	interfere,	unless	I	knew	the	people	who	were	picking	on”	(emotional	and	relational);	“Well	I	would	say	that	I	believe	in	human	rights,	but	I	might	not	have	the	courage	to	help.	Fear	can	often	be	a	big	factor”	(emotional	and	moral);	“I	can't	stand	jerks	so	I	would	tell	them	to	stop.	It	really	frustrates	me	when	people	are	rude”	(emotional	and	personal);	and	“Because	it	would	make	me	feel	bad	probably	for	a	long	time	if	I	never	said	anything”	(emotional	and	prudential,	referring	to	the	participant’s	own	emotional	well-being).			 Considerations	cited	by	action	choice	selected.	To	get	an	idea	of	how	the	considerations	cited	by	participants	in	their	free-response	explanations	(A7)	related	to	their	answers	to	the	previous	question	that	set	up	the	explanation—namely,	the	question	asking	them	to	choose	which	one	of	the	four	provided	action	choices	they	would	be	most	likely	to	take	(A6)—whether	participants	cited	each	consideration	was	cross-tabulated	by	which	action	choice	was	selected.	Table	12	below	shows	how	many	participants	cited	each	consideration	by	which	action	choice	they	selected.		Table	12	
Number	and	Percentage	of	Participants	Who	Cited	Each	Consideration,	by	Action	Choice	Selected	Action	choice	selected	 Moral	cited	 Convention-al	cited	 Personal	cited	 Prudential	cited	 Relational	cited	 Emotional	cited	 Total	Indirect	intervention	(A6a)	 38	(29.23%)	 65	(50.00%)	 4	(3.08%)	 33	(25.38%)	 2		(1.54%)	 1		(0.77%)	 130	
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Bystanding	(A6b)	 8	(5.26%)	 2						(1.22%)	 66	(43.42%)	 71	(46.71%)	 13	(8.55%)	 5		(3.29%)	 152	Direct	intervention	(A6c)	 180	(63.83%)	 21				(7.45%)	 29	(10.28%)	 16	(5.67%)	 21	(7.45%)	 14	(4.96%)	 282	Perpetrating	(A6d)	 2	(20%)	 3	(30%)	 4	(40%)	 1	(10%)	 1	(10%)	 0	(0%)	 10	
Note:	Some	participants	cited	more	than	one	consideration;	here,	each	consideration	cited	is	counted	separately.	Percentages	in	parentheses	represent	the	percentage	who	cited	each	consideration	out	of	the	total	number	of	participants	who	selected	that	action	choice.		 	Looking	at	Table	12,	it	can	be	seen	that	participants	who	selected	indirect	intervention	as	their	most	likely	action	cited	conventional	considerations	most	often,	about	half	the	time,	followed	by	moral	and	prudential	considerations.	Participants	who	chose	bystanding	mostly	cited	personal	and/or	prudential	considerations,	while	the	majority	of	those	who	chose	direct	intervention	cited	moral	considerations.	Few	participants,	especially	out	of	the	subsample	who	provided	free	response	explanations,	selected	perpetrating,	but	of	those	who	did	(n	=	10),	the	largest	number	of	considerations	cited	were	personal,	followed	by	conventional.	
Relations	of	considerations	cited	to	means/categories	of	major	study	
variables.	A	series	of	independent	samples	t-tests	were	conducted	to	compare	mean	numerical	ratings	on	certain	variables	of	interest	between	participants	who	cited	each	category	in	their	free-response	explanation	(A7)	and	those	who	did	not	cite	the	category.	For	each	category	of	consideration	(moral,	conventional,	personal,	prudential,	relational,	emotional),	the	variables	compared	using	t-tests	included	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a),	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b),	age,	perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4),	rating	of	indirect	intervention	(A5a),	rating	of	bystanding	(A5b),	rating	of	direct	intervention	(A5c),	and	rating	of	perpetration	(A5d).	Table	13	presents	only	the	statistically	significant	(or	marginal)	results	for	each	consideration,	each	of	which	indicates	that	there	was	a	significant	difference	in	the	mean	of	the	variable	between	those	who	cited	a	given	consideration	in	their	response	and	those	who	did	not.		In	addition,	chi-square	tests	of	independence	were	conducted	to	determine	whether	there	was	a	significant	relationship	between	whether	a	category	of	consideration	was	cited	and	categorical	variables	of	interest,	including	gender,	whether	indirect	intervention	was	chosen	(as	the	“best,”	i.e.,	most	likely,	choice	they	would	take;	A6a),	whether	bystanding	was	chosen	(A6b),	whether	direct	intervention	was	chosen	(A6c),	and	whether	perpetrating	was	chosen	(A6d).	In	Table	14,	statistically	significant	(or	marginal)	results	for	each	consideration	are	presented,	each	of	which	provides	evidence	of	an	association	between	the	categorical	variable	and	whether	a	given	consideration	was	cited	or	not.			Table	13	t-tests	for	Differences	in	Means	of	Study	Variables	by	Whether	Each	Consideration	Was	Cited	in	Free-
Response	Explanation	
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Consideration		 Variable	 t	 df	 Sig.	(p)	 Mean	diff.	 SE	diff.	 ga	Moral	 Age	in	years	 -2.44*	 566	 .02	 -.14	 .06	 .21	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -2.02*	 566	 .04	 -.14	 .07	 .18	Rating	of	bystanding	(A5b)	 -5.95***	 486.21	 <.001	 -.45	 .08	 .51	Rating	of	direct	intervention	(A5c)	 7.19***	 566	 <.001	 .48	 .07	 .61	Conventional	 Conven.	reasoning	endorsement	(A2b)	 2.20*	 136.12	 .03	 .20	 .09	 .24		 Rating	of	indirect	intervention	(A5a)	 5.63***	 149.91	 <.001	 .46	 .08	 .55		 Rating	of	bystanding	(A5b)	 -2.49*	 137.69	 .01	 -.24	 .10	 .26		 Rating	of	direct	intervention	(A5c)	 -1.85†	 566	 .06	 -.17	 .09	 .21	Personal	 Rating	of	indirect	intervention	(A5a)	 -3.91***	 141.90	 <.001	 -.37	 .10	 .45		 Rating	of	bystanding	(A5b)	 5.39***	 569	 <.001	 .52	 .10	 .58		 Rating	of	direct	intervention	(A5c)	 -4.05***	 566	 <.001	 -.35	 .09	 .44		 Rating	of	perpetrating	(A5d)	 3.23**	 118.06	 .002	 .24	 .07	 .20	Prudential	 Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 2.72**	 566	 .007	 .22	 .08	 .28		 Rating	of	bystanding	(A5b)	 4.25***	 569	 <.001	 .39	 .09	 .43		 Rating	of	direct	intervention	(A5c)	 -5.16***	 566	 <.001	 -.42	 .08	 .53	Relational	 Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 2.00†	 42.78	 .05	 .31	 .15	 .30	
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Emotional	 Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 2.06†	 21.40	 .05	 .38	 .18	 .36	Age	in	years	 1.82†	 566	 .07	 .28	 .15	 .42	
Note:	Levene’s	test	for	equality	of	variances	was	used	to	determine	whether	equal	variances	could	be	assumed	between	the	two	means	for	each	variable.	If	equal	variances	could	not	be	assumed	(as	indicated	by	a	low	p	value	of	Levene’s	test),	Welch	t	Test	statistics	are	reported.	a	Hedges’	g	is	a	measure	of	effect	size	similar	to	Cohen’s	d,	but	corrected	for	when	sample	sizes	differ	between	groups;	a	general	rule	of	thumb	is	that	.2	is	considered	small	in	magnitude,	.5	is	medium,	and	.8	is	large	(Cohen,	1988).	†p	<	.10,	*p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)		Table	14	
Chi-Square	Tests	of	Independence	Between	Categorical	Study	Variables	and	Whether	Each	
Consideration	Was	Cited	in	Free-Response	Explanation	Consideration		 Variable	 df	 N	 χ2 Sig.	(p)	 Greatera	 φb Moral	 Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 1	 574	 6.10*	 .01	 0	 .10		 Indirect	intervention	chosen	(A6a;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 7.73**	 .005	 0	 .12		 Bystanding	chosen	(A6b;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 102.53***	 <.001	 0	 .42		 Direct	intervention	chosen	(A6c;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 134.57***	 <.001	 1	 .48	Conventional	 Indirect	intervention	chosen	(A6a;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 146.89***	 <.001	 1	 .51		 Bystanding	chosen	(A6b)	 1	 574	 32.76***	 <.001	 0	 .24		 Direct	intervention	chosen	(A6c;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 29.39***	 <.001	 0	 .23	Personal	 Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 1	 574	 3.12†	 .08	 1	 .07	Indirect	intervention	chosen	(A6a;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 25.23***	 <.001	 0	 .21	Bystanding	chosen	(A6b)	 1	 574	 91.14***	 <.001	 1	 .40	Direct	intervention	chosen	(A6c;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 22.09***	 <.001	 0	 .20	Prudential	 Bystanding	chosen	(A6b;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 81.64***	 <.001	 1	 .38	
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	 Direct	intervention	chosen	(A6c;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 79.09***	 <.001	 0	 .37	Relational		 Indirect	intervention	chosen	(A6a;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 6.71*	 .01	 0	 .11	Emotional	 Indirect	intervention	chosen	(A6a;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 3.68†	 .06	 0	 .08		 Direct	intervention	chosen	(A6c;	1	=	yes,	0	=	no)	 1	 574	 3.61†	 .06	 1	 .08	
a	This	column	indicates	at	which	value	of	the	categorical	variable	(1	or	0)	the	proportion	who	cited	the	consideration	was	significantly	greater,	as	determined	from	crosstabulation	tables.		 b	φ	(phi)	is	a	measure	of	effect	size	for	chi-square	tests,	for	which,	generally,	.1	is	considered	a	small	effect	size,	.3	is	medium,	and	.5	is	large	(Cohen,	1988).		†p	<	.10,	*p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)			 Participants	who	cited	moral	considerations	in	their	explanations,	as	compared	to	those	who	did	not,	were	younger,	more	likely	to	be	female,	and	perceived	less	bullying	at	their	school.	They	did	not	differ	in	reasoning	endorsement,	but	rated	direct	intervention	more	highly	and	rated	indirect	intervention	and	bystanding	less	highly;	correspondingly,	they	were	more	likely	to	choose	direct	intervention	as	their	most	likely	action	choice,	and	less	likely	to	choose	indirect	intervention	or	bystanding.		Participants	who	cited	conventional	considerations	scored	higher	on	conventional	reasoning	endorsement	compared	to	those	who	did	not.	They	also	rated	indirect	intervention	as	better	and	both	direct	intervention	(marginally)	and	bystanding	as	worse.	In	parallel	to	this,	they	were	more	likely	to	choose	indirect	intervention	and	less	likely	to	choose	either	bystanding	or	direct	intervention.		 Participants	who	cited	personal	considerations	were	(marginally)	more	often	male,	and	tended	to	rate	both	positive	action	choices	less	highly	and	both	negative	action	choices	more	highly;	likewise,	they	more	often	chose	bystanding	and	less	often	chose	direct	or	indirect	intervention.		 Compared	to	others,	participants	who	cited	prudential	considerations	perceived	greater	prevalence	of	bullying	at	their	schools.	They	were	more	approving	of	bystanding	and	were	more	likely	to	choose	it;	on	the	other	hand,	they	were	less	approving	of	direct	intervention	and	less	likely	to	select	it	as	their	“best”	action	choice.		 If	participants	cited	relational	considerations,	they	tended	to	score	marginally	higher	on	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	and	were	significantly	less	likely	to	select	the	action	choice	of	indirect	intervention.		Finally,	participants	who	mentioned	emotional	considerations,	compared	to	those	who	did	not,	were	marginally	older,	marginally	more	endorsing	of	moral	reasoning,	and	marginally	more	likely	to	choose	direct	intervention,	as	well	as	marginally	less	likely	to	choose	indirect	intervention.		
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3.4	RQ	3:	Relation	of	Social	Perspective-Taking	Competence	to	Socio-moral	
Reasoning	and	Action	Choices	
		 The	third	research	question	involved	the	relationships	between	participants’	social	perspective-taking	(SPT)	competence—as	measured	by	the	Interpersonal	Management	subscale	of	the	RelQ-A	(SPT-IM)—and	their	moral	reasoning	and	action	choices	expressed	in	response	to	the	hypothetical	bullying	situation.	First,	multilevel	linear	regression	was	conducted	to	determine	which	variables	were	significant	predictors	of	SPT-IM	score.	Then,	to	test	for	mediation,	regression-based	mediation	analyses	were	conducted	with	the	PROCESS	macro	for	SPSS,	v.	3.3	(Hayes,	2017),	which	uses	bootstrapping	to	determine	the	significance	of	indirect	effects.	
Prediction	of	SPT-IM	score.	Before	testing	the	direct	and	indirect	effects	of	the	predictor	and	covariates	on	the	ultimate	outcome	variable	(action	choice	ratings,	in	this	case),	mediation	analyses	must	first	test	the	effects	of	the	predictor	and	covariates	on	the	mediator	variable	(SPT-IM	score,	in	this	case)	as	the	intermediate	outcome.	The	PROCESS		macro	does	include	this	step	in	each	analysis,	but	in	order	to	use	multilevel	modeling	(to	account	for	the	clustering	of	students	in	schools)	and	to	see	which	covariates	show	significant	relationships	with	SPT-IM	score	and	should	be	included	the	mediation	model,	a	separate	multilevel	linear	regression	model	was	run	first.	This	model	included	all	the	major	variables	as	predictors	(moral	reasoning	endorsement,	conventional	reasoning	endorsement,	gender,	age,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence),	plus	all	the	sociodemographic	control	variables	(parental	education	level,	first	language,	race/ethnicity	dummy	variables,	and	intervention	condition).	Results	are	shown	below	in	Table	15.		Table	15	
Multilevel	Linear	Regression:	Prediction	of	SPT-IM	Score	by	Socio-moral	Reasoning,	
Personal/Contextual	Factors,	and	Control	Variables	
	 Outcome	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 df	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	
Intercept	 2.83***	 .28	 709.93	 10.04	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .05***	 .01	 1157.75	 5.37	 <.001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .01	 .01	 1157.35	 1.26	 .21	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.17***	 .02	 1157.88	 -8.25	 <.001	Age	in	years	 .01	 .02	 630.14	 .81	 .42	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.01	 .01	 1136.88	 -.78	 .44	Parental	education	level	 .02*	 .01	 1033.55	 2.09	 .04	
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First	language	is	English	 .02	 .03	 1158.00	 .82	 .41	Race/ethnicitya							Black						Hispanic						Asian						White						Mixed	(2	or	more)	
	-.03	.04	.06	.01	-.05	
	.07	.06	.06	.06	.07	
	1085.59	1157.21	1153.99	1150.72	1149.42	
	-.39	.74	.98	.12	-.74	
	.69	.46	.33	.91	.46	In	intervention	group	 -.02	 .03	 46.88	 -.81	 .42	aRace/ethnicity	coded	as	a	series	of	dummy	variables,	with	“Other”	used	as	the	reference	group.	*p	<	.05,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)	
Prediction	of	each	action	choice	rating,	mediated	by	SPT-IM	score.	Using	the	PROCESS	macro,	the	mediation	analyses	tested	for	direct	effects	of	moral	reasoning	(and	covariates)	on	ratings	of	each	action	choice	as	well	as	indirect	effects	of	moral	reasoning	on	ratings	of	each	action	choice,	mediated	through	social	perspective-taking	competence.	In	addition	to	the	focal	independent	variable	(endorsement	of	moral	reasoning),	mediator	(SPT-IM	score),	and	dependent	variables	(action	choice	ratings),	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	and	the	factors	that	proved	to	be	significant	in	previous	analyses—gender,	perceived	bullying	prevalence,	and	parental	education	level—were	included	as	covariates.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	results	of	the	intermediate	regression	step	included	in	PROCESS,	with	SPT-IM	score	as	the	dependent	variable,	closely	echoed	the	results	from	the	multilevel	regression	above;	in	fact,	though	the	coefficients	were	slightly	different—and	varied	slightly	between	analyses,	due	to	the	bootstrapping	procedure	that	PROCESS	employs—all	of	the	signs	(positive	vs.	negative)	and	significance	levels	of	the	coefficients	were	the	same	between	the	multilevel	linear	regression	and	the	regression	within	PROCESS.	Results	for	each	of	the	four	full	mediation	analyses	conducted	using	the	PROCESS	macro,	one	with	each	action	choice	rating	as	a	dependent	variable	in	turn,	are	displayed	in	Table	16.		Table	16	
Mediation	Effect	of	Social	Perspective-Taking	Competence	(SPT-IM)	on	the	Relationships	between	
Moral	Reasoning	and	Each	Action	Choice	Rating	
	 Dependent	Variable:	Rating	of	Indirect	Intervention	(A5a)	Direct	effects		 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Constant	 1.52***	 .25	 6.08	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.06**	 .02	 -2.54	 .01	
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Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .20***	 .03	 7.24	 <.001	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.33***	 .05	 -6.91	 <.001	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.09***	 .03	 -3.28	 <.001	Parental	education	level	 .003	 .02	 .15	 .88	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 .37***	 .07	 5.43	 <.001	Indirect	effects	 Parameter	 Effect	 SE	 LLCIa	 ULCIb	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 .02	 .006	 .010	 .032	Dependent	Variable:	Rating	of	Bystanding	(A5b)	Direct	effects		 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Constant	 3.13***	 .28	 11.33	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 -.06*	 .03	 -2.37	 .02	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .03	 .03	 1.00	 .32	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .13*	 .05	 2.46	 .01	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .15*	 .03	 4.94	 <.001	Parental	education	level	 -.01	 .02	 -.39	 .70	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 -.35***	 .08	 -4.65	 <.001	Indirect	effects	 Parameter	 Effect	 SE	 LLCIa	 ULCIb	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 -.02	 .006	 -.031	 -.009	Dependent	Variable:	Rating	of	Direct	Intervention	(A5c)	Direct	effects	 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Constant	 2.64***	 .25	 10.76	 <.001	
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Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .08***	 .02	 3.42	 <.001	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 .02	 .03	 .84	 .40	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 -.15**	 .05	 -3.19	 .002	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 -.08**	 .03	 -3.06	 .002	Parental	education	level	 .01	 .02	 .53	 .59	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 .13*	 .07	 2.04	 .04	Indirect	effects	 Parameter	 Effect	 SE	 LLCIa	 ULCIb	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 .01	 .004	 -.0002	 .016	Dependent	Variable:	Rating	of	Perpetration	(A5d)	Direct	effects		 Parameter	 Coeff.	 SE	 t	 Sig.	(p)	Constant	 2.20***	 .16	 13.75	 <.001	Endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	(A2a)	 .001	 .01	 .05	 .96	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	(A2b)	 -.008	 .02	 -.46	 .65	Gender	(1	=	male,	0	=	female)	 .16***	 .03	 5.35	 <.001	Perceived	bullying	prevalence	(A4)	 .06***	 .02	 3.57	 <.001	Parental	education	level	 -.04**	 .01	 -3.05	 .002	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 -.33***	 .04	 -7.60	 <.001	Indirect	effects	 Parameter	 Effect	 SE	 LLCIa	 ULCIb	Social	perspective-taking	competence	(SPT-IM)	 -.02	 .005	 -.028	 -.010	aLLCI	=	lower	limit	of	95%	confidence	interval;	bULCI	=	upper	limit	of	95%	confidence	interval		*p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***p	<	.001	(two-tailed)		
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For	the	first	mediation	analysis,	with	ratings	of	indirect	intervention	(A5a)	as	the	dependent	variable,	the	overall	model	was	significant,	F(6,	1170)	=	29.16,	p	<	.001,	and	explained	about	13%	of	the	variance	in	the	rating	of	indirect	intervention	as	an	action	choice.	In	this	model,	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning,	along	with	being	male	and	perceiving	more	bullying	happening	at	school,	were	related	to	significantly	lower	ratings	of	indirect	intervention	as	an	action	choice.	Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	was	related	to	significantly	higher	ratings,	and	parental	education	level	did	not	have	a	significant	direct	effect.	SPT-IM	score	showed	a	positive	direct	effect	on	ratings	of	indirect	intervention	as	well	as	a	significant	positive	indirect	effect	(between	moral	reasoning	and	action	choice),	as	indicated	by	the	95%	confidence	interval	that	did	not	include	zero;	this	indicates	that	the	effect	of	moral	reasoning	on	indirect	intervention	rating	was	significantly	mediated	by	social	perspective-taking	competence.		 The	second	mediation	analysis	used	ratings	of	bystanding	(A5b)	as	the	action	choice	dependent	variable.	The	total	model	was	significant,	F(6,1171)	=	12.94,	p	<	.001,	and	explained	about	6%	of	variance	in	ratings	of	bystanding.	Male	participants	and	those	who	perceived	greater	bullying	prevalence	tended	to	rate	bystanding	significantly	higher,	while	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	and	SPT-IM	score	were	associated	with	lower	ratings	of	bystanding.	Neither	conventional	reasoning	endorsement	nor	parental	education	level	had	a	significant	direct	effect.	The	indirect	effect	of	moral	reasoning	on	bystanding	through	SPT-IM	score	was	significant	(negative),	meaning	that	social	perspective-taking	competence	significantly	mediated	the	negative	relationship	of	moral	reasoning	to	ratings	of	bystanding.			 The	dependent	variable	for	the	third	model	was	ratings	of	direct	intervention	as	an	action	choice	(A5c).	The	model	was	significant,	F(6,	1171)	=	8.18,	and	explained	about	4%	of	variance.	In	terms	of	direct	effects	on	ratings	of	direct	intervention,	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning	and	SPT-IM	score	had	significant	positive	effects,	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	and	parental	education	level	had	no	effects,	and	gender	(male)	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence	had	significant	negative	effects.		The	95%	confidence	interval	for	the	indirect	effect	of	moral	reasoning	through	SPT-IM	did	include	zero,	indicating	that	significant	mediation	by	SPT-IM	did	not	occur	in	relation	to	direct	intervention	ratings.		 The	fourth	model,	with	ratings	of	perpetrating	bullying	as	the	action	choice	dependent	variable	(A5d),	was	significant	overall,	F(6,	1173)	=	24.27,	p	<	.001.	This	model	explained	about	11%	of	the	variance	in	ratings	of	perpetrating.	Neither	moral	nor	conventional	reasoning	showed	a	significant	direct	effect	on	this	outcome,	but	males	and	those	who	perceived	more	bullying	at	school	tended	to	rate	perpetrating	more	highly,	while	those	with	higher	SPT-IM	scores	and	more	highly-educated	parents	gave	it	lower	ratings.	There	was	also	a	significant	negative	indirect	effect	of	moral	reasoning	endorsement	through	SPT-IM.	This	significant	indirect	effect,	in	combination	with	the	nonsignificant	direct	effect	of	moral	reasoning,	implies	that	any	effects	of	moral	reasoning	on	ratings	of	perpetrating	were	at	least	partially	mediated	by	social	perspective-taking	competence.	
	 	
  57 
Chapter	4:	Conclusion	
4.1	Discussion	of	Results		 The	main	conceptual	aim	of	this	dissertation	was	to	explore	the	relationships	among	adolescents’	socio-moral	reasoning,	social	perspective-taking	competence,	and	intended	action	choices.	In	other	words,	the	goal	was	to	understand	more	about	how	young	people	think	about	right	and	wrong,	to	what	extent	they	take	others’	perspectives	into	account,	and	how	such	thought	processes	relate	to	what	they	say	they	would	do	in	a	morally-relevant	situation.	These	relationships	were	investigated	in	the	context	of	a	particular	type	of	situation,	witnessing	the	bullying	of	a	classmate,	that	is	commonly	encountered	by	adolescents	at	school.	Other	potentially	influential	factors	in	this	type	of	situation,	such	as	age,	gender,	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence,	were	included	in	analyses	as	well.	The	overall	theoretical	framework	was	a	model	of	character	as	a	relational	developmental	system,	in	which	socio-moral	reasoning	(as	conceptualized	by	social	domain	theory,	or	SDT)	works	in	concert	with	social-emotional	competencies	to	form	the	character	system,	which	then	interacts	bidirectionally	with	context	to	produce	an	individual’s	moral	functioning	(Nucci,	2019).	The	secondary	aim	of	this	dissertation	was	a	methodological	one.	Socio-moral	cognitive	processes	like	the	focal	concepts	in	this	study—particularly	domain-based	socio-moral	reasoning—are	most	often	researched	using	semi-structured	interviews,	in	which	investigators	can	probe	participants	with	follow-up	questions.	This	method	can	be	prohibitively	difficult	and	time-consuming,	however.	Written	survey-based	measures,	though	necessarily	more	limited	in	several	ways,	are	often	more	feasible	and	scalable.	Thus,	this	study	attempted	to	increase	understanding	of	the	extent	to	which	socio-moral	constructs	can	be	meaningfully	studied	through	survey-based	research,	particularly	among	youth.			 Towards	these	aims,	three	major	research	questions	were	posed.	The	main	results	pertaining	to	each	of	these	questions	are	summarized	and	discussed	below.	
RQ	1:	Prediction	of	action	choices	by	socio-moral	reasoning	and	
personal/contextual	factors.	To	investigate	this	question,	I	conducted	a	series	of	multilevel	linear	regression	models	with	numerical	ratings	of	each	intended	action	choice	as	outcomes,	as	well	as	logistic	regression	models	with	binary	outcome	variables	representing	whether	each	action	choice	was	chosen	as	the	“best”	(or,	more	accurately,	most	likely)	action	to	take.		In	line	with	the	research	hypotheses,	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning—specifically,	the	thought	that	the	bullying	was	causing	harm	to	the	target—was	consistently	positively	related	to	the	choice	to	directly	intervene	to	stop	the	bullying,	while	negatively	related	to	the	choice	to	bystand.	This	finding	persisted	even	when	control	variables	and	covariates	were	added	and	was	the	same	whether	the	outcomes	were	ratings	of	the	adequacy	of	each	action	choice	(linear	regression)	or	a	forced	choice	of	one	“best”	action	(logistic	regression).	Such	results	accord	with	previous	research	on	similar	topics,	such	as	the	finding	by	Peter	et	al	(2016)	that	students	who	viewed	certain	types	of	harassment	as	harmful—i.e.,	as	morally	wrong—were	less	likely	to	report	having	committed	them.	In	this	case,	when	students	agreed	that	the	bullying	was	hurting	the	target	(i.e.,	that	it	was	a	moral	
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issue),	they	seemed	to	take	the	situation	more	seriously—as	would	be	expected	in	SDT—	and	feel	more	of	an	obligation	to	help.		Endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning,	on	the	other	hand,	was	only	consistently	related	to	the	choice	to	intervene	indirectly.	Participants	who	agreed	that	bullying	should	be	stopped	because	it	is	against	the	rules	were	more	approving	of	the	choice	to	tell	a	teacher	about	the	situation.	One	explanation	for	this	finding	might	be	that	if	students	viewed	the	transgression	(bullying)	as	falling	predominantly	in	the	conventional	realm,	they	were	more	inclined	to	respond	to	it	by	involving	an	authority	figure	because	such	authorities	are	often	the	source	and/or	enforcers	of	conventional	rules.	Contrary	to	expectations,	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	was	not	significantly	related	to	either	of	the	negative	action	choices.		With	regards	to	the	non-SDT	factors	that	were	considered,	age	did	not	show	any	significant	relationship	with	action	choices	(likely	because	the	age	range	was	not	large	enough),	but	gender	and	perceived	bullying	prevalence	showed	distinct,	and	parallel,	patterns	of	association	with	participants’	evaluations	and	selections	regarding	the	possible	actions.	In	nearly	every	analysis,	both	male	students	and	students	who	perceived	a	greater	prevalence	of	bullying	at	their	school	were	significantly	less	likely	to	endorse	or	select	the	positive	action	choices	(to	intervene	directly	or	indirectly)	and	significantly	more	likely	to	endorse	or	select	the	negative	ones	(to	bystand	or	perpetrate).	Though	the	analyses	in	this	section	of	the	research	cannot	explain	why	this	might	be	the	case,	the	analyses	for	the	second	research	question	(discussed	below),	dealing	with	the	free-response	explanations,	provide	some	insight.		There	was	also	one	other	intriguing	result	involving	perceived	bullying	prevalence,	namely,	its	significant	interaction	with	endorsement	of	conventional	reasoning	in	the	prediction	of	ratings	of	perpetrating	(joining	in	the	bullying).	When	students	did	not	value	the	idea	that	bullying	should	be	stopped	because	of	rules	against	it	(i.e.,	when	they	gave	lower	ratings	to	conventional	reasoning),	the	amount	of	bullying	they	perceived	at	their	school	made	a	difference	in	their	ratings	of	perpetration	as	an	action	choice.	The	more	bullying	they	perceived	around	them,	the	more	likely	they	were	to	approve	of	joining	in.	This	could	indicate	that	some	students,	because	they	were	more	used	to	witnessing	it,	viewed	bullying	less	as	a	serious	problem	and	more	as	a	norm	of	social	behavior	in	their	school.	These	participants	might	have	been	in	situations	where	rules	against	bullying	either	did	not	exist	or	did	not	matter	(e.g.,	were	not	enforced).	On	the	other	hand,	when	students	rated	conventional	reasoning	highly—as	in,	when	they	agreed	with	the	idea	that	bullying	should	be	stopped	because	it	is	against	the	rules—it	did	not	matter	as	much	how	prevalent	they	perceived	bullying	to	be	at	their	school;	most	of	them	simply	viewed	perpetration	as	a	bad	choice.	Perhaps	their	respect	for	conventional	rules,	or	fear	of	getting	in	trouble	with	authorities,	made	them	more	wary	of	joining	the	rule-flouting	bullies.		As	a	final	note,	though	the	focus	of	this	study	was	not	to	evaluate	results	of	the	Facing	History	intervention	that	was	the	premise	for	the	larger	research	project,	the	study	did	include	data	from	both	an	intervention	group	and	a	control	group,	and	so	intervention	condition	was	included	as	a	control	variable.	This	variable	did	not	show	significant	effects	in	any	analyses,	indicating	that	intervention	condition	did	not	seem	to	change	patterns	of	association	between	the	responses	of	interest.	
RQ	2:	Analyses	of	free-response	explanations	of	action	choices	using	a	social	
domain	theory	lens.	To	explore	the	second	research	question,	involving	students’	brief	
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free-response	explanations	for	their	intended	action	choices,	I	began	by	coding	all	of	the	responses	(from	the	subset	of	participants	who	provided	them)	using	a	domain-based	framework.	I	then	tabulated	the	categories	cited	by	which	action	choice	had	been	selected	and	compared	means	of	study	variables	between	those	who	had	cited	a	given	consideration	and	those	who	had	not.		The	first	finding	was	that	all	the	categories,	particularly	considerations	related	to	the	four	SDT	domains,	were	well-represented	in	terms	of	citations.	Considerations	related	to	the	moral	domain	were	the	most	commonly	cited	by	a	large	margin,	supporting	the	contention	that	students	do	tend	to	view	issues	of	bullying	and	bystander	intervention	as	morally-relevant	issues.	Only	about	10%	of	responses	did	not	refer	to	any	domain-based	considerations,	which	strongly	suggests	that	SDT	was	a	viable	interpretive	framework	even	when	responses	were	limited	to	three	lines	and	questions	were	not	specifically	designed	to	elicit	domain-based	reasoning.	Though	most	domain	considerations	were	cited	alone,	i.e.,	as	the	only	consideration	in	the	response,	the	fact	that	responses	were	so	constrained	in	terms	of	length	limits	the	conclusions	that	can	be	drawn.	Most	students	may	not	have	spontaneously	demonstrated	multi-domain	coordination	simply	because	the	survey	form	suggested	such	brief	responses.	The	non-SDT	categories,	relational	and	emotional	considerations,	were	cited	less	often	overall	than	domain	considerations	and	were	less	likely	to	be	cited	alone,	though	each	was	cited	as	the	sole	consideration	several	times.	When	the	number	of	responses	citing	each	category	of	consideration	was	cross-tabulated	with	which	intended	action	choice	participants	selected	(as	the	one	they	would	be	most	likely	to	take),	similar	patterns	emerged	as	those	found	in	research	question	1.	For	instance,	moral	was	the	most-cited	category	by	those	who	selected	direct	intervention	(64%	of	responses	in	this	group	mentioned	moral	considerations),	while	half	of	those	who	selected	indirect	intervention	cited	conventional	reasoning.	The	content	of	these	responses	showed	that	the	cited	considerations	did	tend	to	correspond	with	the	chosen	mechanism	of	action.	For	instance,	most	of	the	moral	citations	reflected	concerns	with	harm	to	the	target,	fairness,	and	empathy	(similar	in	principle	to	the	Golden	Rule),	while	the	majority	of	conventional	citations	had	to	do	with	the	social	role	and	authority	of	teachers.	The	novel	contribution	of	this	analysis,	as	compared	with	RQ1,	was	that	personal	and	prudential	reasoning	could	be	examined	as	well	due	to	the	open-ended	nature	of	the	question.	In	line	with	study	hypotheses,	most	of	the	students	who	selected	bystanding	cited	personal	(43%)	and	prudential	(47%)	considerations.	Similar	to	what	has	been	found	in	other	studies	of	adolescent	bystanding	behavior	(i.e.,	non-action	in	response	to	witnessing	the	harassment	of	others;	see	Edwards,	Rodenhizer-Stämpfli,	&	Eckstein,	2015),	students	who	selected	bystanding	tended	to	cite	personal	safety	concerns	(prudential)	and	the	belief	that	others’	conflicts	were	“not	their	business”	(personal).		Though	few	students	in	this	subsample	chose	perpetrating	as	the	“best”	choice	in	the	situation,	those	who	did	cited	personal	and	conventional	citations	most	often.	One	particularly	striking	explanation	by	a	student	who	selected	perpetration	stated,	“I	would	make	fun	of	him	we	students	don't	‘bully’	him	-	making	fun	of	[him]	is	the	new	kind	of	respect	we	accept	him.”	This	response	seems	to	indicate	that	this	student	viewed	teasing	not	as	harmful	bullying,	but	as	a	social	convention	that	signifies	respect	and	acceptance.	Other	explanations	for	choosing	to	join	in	on	perpetration	included,	“I	think	if	I	don’t	start	teasing	the	person	they	will	start	with	me”	(coded	as	prudential),	as	well	as	“Because	I	like	to	join	in	because	it	is	a	fun	thing	to	do,”	“I’m	not	a	nice	person,”	and	“That	just	who	I	am”	
  60 
(all	coded	as	personal).	These	types	of	responses	were	rare,	however.	In	fact,	though	it	is	impossible	to	know	for	sure,	a	few	of	the	free-response	explanations	by	students	who	selected	perpetrating	seemed	mismatched	with	that	action	choice	(e.g.,	responses	that	explicitly	referenced	telling	a	teacher	or	telling	the	perpetrators	to	stop),	implying	that	these	students	might	have	chosen	perpetrating	by	accident	or	misunderstood	the	question.	The	largest	number	of	relational	citations	were	found	when	direct	intervention	was	selected,	followed	by	bystanding;	an	examination	of	these	responses	indicates	that	students	who	used	relational	considerations	to	explain	the	choice	to	bystand	were	often	referring	to	relational	concerns	in	the	negative	(e.g.,	if	none	of	the	involved	parties	were	my	friends,	I	would	stay	out	of	it).	Emotional	considerations	were	most	often	cited	to	explain	the	choice	to	directly	intervene,	usually	with	the	sense	that	strong	emotions	would	propel	the	participant	towards	action.	Though	not	conclusive,	this	pattern	suggests	support	for	the	model	proposed	by	Arsenio	and	Lemerise	(2004),	in	which	emotions	play	an	integral	part	in	the	type	of	social	information	processing	that	translates	reasoned	socio-moral	standards	into	action.	Finally,	the	comparison	of	means	of	study	variables	by	whether	each	consideration	was	cited	in	the	free	response	yielded	several	notable	patterns	of	results.	Concordant	with	the	analyses	under	RQ1,	those	who	cited	moral	considerations	were	less	likely	male	and	perceived	less	bullying	at	their	schools;	they	were	also	significantly	younger	(in	one	of	the	few	significant	associations	found	with	age).	They	were	more	apt	to	approve	of	or	choose	direct	intervention	and	less	likely	to	do	the	same	for	bystanding.	Interestingly,	however,	they	did	not	endorse	the	moral	reasoning	justification	significantly	more	than	participants	who	did	not	cite	moral	considerations	in	their	free-response	explanations.	One	speculation	about	this	could	be	that	the	variety	of	moral	considerations	that	students	could	come	up	with	might	be	much	broader	than	the	particular	consideration	in	the	earlier	question	(that	of	bullying	being	hurtful	to	the	target).	When	participants	cited	conventional	considerations,	however,	they	did	tend	to	have	endorsed	the	conventional	justification	(about	bullying	being	against	the	rules)	more	than	others	did.	As	in	previous	analyses,	these	participants	(i.e.,	those	who	cited	conventional	considerations)	were	inclined	towards	indirect	intervention	and	away	from	both	bystanding	and	direct	intervention	as	action	choices.	Also	similar	to	previous	analyses	and	the	study	hypotheses,	those	who	cited	personal	considerations	gave	relatively	higher	ratings	to	the	negative	actions	(bystanding	and	perpetrating)	and	lower	ratings	to	both	types	of	intervention.	Students	who	cited	prudential	concerns	perceived	significantly	higher	levels	of	bullying	at	their	schools,	which	perhaps	desensitized	them	to	the	effects	of	bullying	on	targets	and/or	sensitized	them	to	the	futility	and	potential	dangers	of	intervening;	for	these	or	other	reasons,	they	were	more	likely	to	say	they	would	bystand	and	less	likely	to	say	they	would	directly	intervene.	They	did	not,	however,	significantly	differ	from	others	in	terms	of	socio-moral	reasoning	endorsements.	This	implies	that	contextual	factors,	not	necessarily	differences	in	socio-moral	reasoning,	were	behind	their	propensity	to	bystand.	The	last	two	categories	of	consideration,	relational	and	emotional,	were	both	only	significantly	related	to	a	lower	likelihood	of	choosing	indirect	intervention.	It	is	not	clear	from	these	data	why	this	was	the	case,	but	it	seems	plausible	that	students	for	whom	relational	and	emotional	concerns	were	seemingly	more	salient	(and	therefore	mentioned	in	their	free	responses)	would	find	the	prospect	of	going	and	telling	a	teacher	less	appealing	than	the	other	action	options,	which	were	all	more	focused	on	relating	to	peers	
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in	the	moment.	More	detailed	research,	perhaps	drawing	on	Arsenio	and	Lemerise’s	(2004)	model,	is	needed	to	clarify	these	kinds	of	thought	processes.		
RQ	3:	Relation	of	social	perspective-taking	competence	to	socio-moral	
reasoning	and	action	choices.	To	address	the	third	research	question,	I	first	conducted	a	multilevel	linear	regression	with	social	perspective-taking	competence	(Interpersonal	Management	subscale,	or	SPT-IM)	as	the	outcome,	to	find	out	how	it	related	to	socio-moral	reasoning	and	other	variables.	Then,	I	conducted	a	mediation	analysis	to	test	for	significant	indirect	effects	of	moral	reasoning	on	action	choices	through	SPT-IM.		Despite	the	low	internal	reliability	of	the	subscale	used	to	represent	the	construct,	SPT-IM	was,	as	predicted,	significantly	positively	related	to	endorsement	of	moral	reasoning.	Students	who	appeared	to	care	more	about	the	moral	consequences	of	actions	were	also	more	able	and	inclined	to	integrate	others’	perspectives	with	their	own.	Additionally—and	unsurprisingly,	considering	the	findings	from	the	first	research	question—boys	tended	to	score	lower	on	SDT-IM,	as	did	students	with	less	highly-educated	parents.			In	the	mediation	models,	SPT-IM	was	shown	to	be	positively	related	to	both	of	the	positive	action	choices	(direct	and	indirect	intervention)	and	negatively	to	the	negative	choices	(bystanding	and	perpetration).	As	this	pattern	differed	somewhat	from	how	moral	reasoning	alone	related	to	action	choices,	it	appears	likely	that	SPT-IM	made	unique	contributions	to	action	choice	ratings.	However,	it	may	also	have	served	as	an	intermediate	step,	conceptually,	between	moral	reasoning	and	intended	action,	as	shown	by	the	significant	indirect	effects	found	for	three	of	the	four	outcomes.	Though	the	configuration	tested	here	is	certainly	not	the	only	way	to	arrange	these	variables,	particularly	since	the	data	were	not	time-ordered	or	experimental,	these	results	did	demonstrate	a	strong	set	of	associations	among	them	which	merits	further	investigation.	The	finding	that	moral	reasoning	and	social	perspective-taking	combine	to	some	extent	in	their	association	with	intended	action	lends	support	to	the	model	of	character	as	a	relational	developmental	system	(Nucci,	2019),	in	which	moral	cognition	and	social-emotional	skills	are	both	necessary	for	mature	and	effective	moral	functioning.	
	
4.2	Limitations	and	Future	Research	Directions	
	 The	most	significant	limitation	of	this	dissertation	study,	due	to	the	fact	that	it	was	a	secondary	analysis,	was	the	inability	to	ask	certain	questions	that	would	have	been	of	great	interest	with	regards	to	the	research	questions.	More	specifically,	since	this	study	was	a	secondary	analysis	of	data	from	a	project	that	was	not	designed	with	a	social	domain	theory	(SDT)	framework	in	mind,	the	questions	included	in	the	surveys	did	not	align	perfectly	with	what	would	have	been	ideal	for	an	SDT-based	analysis.	Future	work	should,	for	example,	ask	participants	to	rate	reasoning	options	that	relate	to	all	of	the	domains,	instead	of	only	to	the	moral	and	conventional	domains.	Furthermore,	measurement	work—e.g.,	assessments	of	test-retest	reliability,	dimensionality	(i.e.,	factor	structure),	internal	consistency	of	dimensions,	etc.—should	be	undertaken	in	order	to	more	confidently	use	written	survey	measures	in	SDT	research.		Similarly,	because	of	the	need	to	use	items	that	could	be	linked	to	an	SDT	framework,	only	one	scenario	from	the	CICM,	Situation	A,	was	able	to	be	incorporated	into	this	study.	There	are	likely	many	factors	specific	to	the	particular	type	of	situation	used	in	
  62 
this	one	scenario—namely,	witnessing	verbal	harassment	of	a	new	classmate	who	is	from	another	country—that	would	not	generalize	even	to	other	hypothetical	situations	of	witnessing	bullying,	and	even	less	so	to	other	situations	(hypothetical	or	real)	involving	moral	reasoning,	social	perspective-taking,	and	action.	Moreover,	the	target	in	the	scenario	was	described	as	male	for	all	participants,	and	it	is	unknown	how	gender	dynamics	might	have	affected	participants’	responses.	To	improve	generalizability,	future	studies	in	this	vein	should	utilize	scenarios	based	on	different	types	of	situations	in	which	bullying,	bystanding,	and	other	behaviors	of	interest	tend	to	occur—and	with	different	types	of	targets—and	compare	results	with	those	found	here.		On	the	subject	of	using	hypothetical	scenarios,	another	limitation	of	this	study	was	that	it	only	collected	data	on	intended	or	anticipated	action,	not	actual	action.	Of	course,	it	is	possible	that	certain	adolescents’	actual	behavior	would	align	well	with	their	self-reported	anticipated/intended	action	choices—in	fact,	some	studies	have	found	that	intended	and	actual	actions	with	regards	to	bullying	do	significantly	correspond	(e.g.,	Heirman	&	Walrave,	2012)—but	the	reverse	possibility	is	also	likely.	In	other	words,	what	adolescents	say	they	would	do	in	response	to	morally	relevant	situations	like	witnessing	bullying	might	turn	out	to	be	quite	different	from	what	they	actually	have	done	or	would	do.	Future	studies	should	compare	survey	answers	about	hypothetical	actions	to	actual	actions,	whether	self-reported	(e.g.,	retrospectively)	or	triangulated	from	other	sources	such	as	disciplinary	records,	peer	nominations,	teacher	reports,	direct	observations,	etc.	Because	each	of	these	methods	has	weaknesses,	multi-method	assessment	is	recommended,	as	it	is	in	most	cases	of	social-emotional/moral	functioning	(Humphrey	et	al.,	2011;	McKown,	2015).	Another	potential	option	would	be	to	use	a	simulated/virtual	environment	for	assessment,	such	as	the	Virtual	Environment	for	Social	Information	Processing	(VESIP;	Russo-Ponsaran	et	al.,	2018;	Shapiro,	Accomazzo,	Claassen,	&	Robitaille,	2015).	Such	an	environment	might	feel	more	“real”	than	a	written	hypothetical	scenario,	but	would	still	enable	access	to	the	participant’s	inner	thoughts,	reasoning,	feelings,	etc.,	which	cannot	be	assessed	by	non-self-report	means.		Additionally,	to	strengthen	the	probability	that	studies	focused	on	intended	action	will	correspond	with	future	real-life	action,	future	research	should	consider	including	a	measure	of	self-efficacy,	particularly	self-efficacy	related	to	the	action	in	question.	Previous	research	on	bystander	behavior	among	young	people	has	provided	evidence	that	self-efficacy	(i.e.,	confidence	with	regards	to	intervening)	is	a	key	component	that	functions	alongside	behavioral	intentions	to	produce	intervention	behavior	(McMahon	et	al.,	2015;	Pozzoli	&	Gini,	2013).	In	other	words,	one	of	the	reasons	why	behavioral	intentions	and	behavioral	outcomes	are	not	always	aligned	is	that	young	people	may	not	have	the	self-efficacy,	i.e.,	confidence	in	themselves,	needed	to	motivate	themselves	to	take	the	actions	that	they	intend	to	take.		With	regards	to	the	design	of	the	focal	surveys	themselves,	the	free-response	question	on	the	CICM	(A7)	provided	student	participants	with	very	little	space,	which	limited	their	answers	in	length.	Although	this	probably	helped	make	the	survey	packet	more	time-efficient,	it	would	be	useful	to	see	what	participants	would	write	if	they	were	given	more	space	to	explain	their	decisions	(and	encouraged	to	use	it).	Also,	when	they	were	asked	to	explain	why	they	chose	the	action	choice	they	did,	participants	may	have	been	inspired	or	biased	by	the	options	already	presented	to	them	in	the	same	survey	(namely,	the	four	reasoning	justifications	given	in	question	A2),	and	thus	the	free	
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responses	may	be	different	than	what	they	would	have	been	if	this	type	of	question	had	been	the	only	mode	of	response	(i.e.,	if	participants	had	not	already	been	offered	reasoning	options	to	rate).	Additionally,	perhaps	because	of	time	constraints	or	higher	task	demand,	more	than	half	of	participants	did	not	fill	out	the	free-response	question,	which	does	again	limit	the	generalizability	of	these	results.	Future	research	using	free-response	questions	of	this	nature	might	consider	placing	the	free-response	question	first,	before	asking	the	participants	to	rate	different	(provided)	options	of	responses,	as	well	as	giving	more	space	and	time	in	which	to	answer.	A	further	methodological	issue	arose	with	the	coding	procedure.	When	coding	the	free	responses	(A7),	both	coders	were	blind	to	all	of	the	participants’	other	responses	except	for	their	answers	to	A6,	their	selection	of	a	“best”	action	choice;	this	information	was	included	in	the	coding	process	because	the	free	response	question	(A7)	was	phrased	as	a	request	for	explanation	of	the	choice	selected	in	A6,	so	it	seemed	to	make	sense	to	include	the	two	responses	together.	While	this	may	have	increased	the	interpretability	of	some	of	the	free	responses,	it	may	have	also	introduced	bias	into	the	coding	by	priming	coders	to	interpret	responses	a	certain	way.	The	fact	that	the	second	coder	was	blind	to	the	study	hypotheses	reduces	but	does	not	completely	mitigate	this	concern.	Future	work	should	assess	reliability	of	this	coding	system	with	none	of	the	participants’	other	responses	included	for	context.	Another	concern	with	the	measures	used	here	was	that	the	RelQ-A	was	created	for	this	research	project	as	an	adapted	version	of	an	existing	scale,	meaning	that	this	exact	scale	had	not	been	validated	before,	and	the	results	cannot	be	directly	compared	to	those	of	other	studies.	Furthermore,	the	Interpersonal	Management	subscale	did	not	meet	the	conventional	threshold	for	scale	internal	reliability	(although	it	had	the	highest	reliability	of	all	the	subscales).	Thus,	the	results	involving	scores	on	this	subscale	must	be	taken	with	caution,	as	the	extent	to	which	the	items	actually	tap	into	a	single,	internally	consistent	psychological	construct	may	be	questionable	(i.e.,	one	item	may	not	be	sufficiently	related	to	others,	or	the	subscale	may	actually	be	capturing	a	multidimensional	construct).	Though	the	small	number	of	items	in	the	subscale	likely	lowered	the	alpha	value	(Cortina,	2003),	it	should	be	noted	that	Nunnally	(1978)	originally	suggested	.70	as	an	adequate	alpha	only	for	the	early	stages	of	research	with	an	instrument,	with	alphas	of	at	least	.80	suggested	for	applied	research	(as	cited	in	Lance	et	al.,	2006).	It	would	be	interesting	if	this	scale	(RelQ-A)	and	subscale	(IM)	could	be	refined	in	the	future	such	that	they	would	be	able	to	demonstrate	more	adequate	internal	reliability.	In	the	meantime,	it	would	be	useful	for	future	studies	to	explore	relations	between	socio-moral	reasoning	and	perspective-taking	(and/or	other	social-emotional	skills)	using	other	measures	that	have	been	validated	and	show	more	robust	reliability.	One	option	would	be	to	use	a	measure	of	social	perspective-taking	that	allows	for	separation	of	potentially	different	dimensions,	such	as	the	ability	to	perspective-take	accurately	vs.	the	propensity	to	engage	in	it	(e.g.,	Gehlbach,	2004).		Similar	results	using	such	measures	would	corroborate	both	these	findings	and	the	refinement	and	use	of	the	IM	subscale	in	further	research.	Furthermore,	since	this	study	was	cross-sectional,	with	data	from	students	collected	at	only	one	time	point,	no	claims	about	causality	or	time-ordering	of	psychological	processes	(e.g.,	socio-moral	reasoning	vs.	social	perspective	taking)	can	be	made.	In	terms	of	the	relationship	between	socio-moral	reasoning	and	social	perspective-taking	competence,	it	would	be	interesting	to	conduct	a	longitudinal	study	that	would	allow	for	cross-lagged	relationships	between	the	two.	This	
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would	provide	insight	into	whether	changes	in	one	appear	to	precede	or	follow	changes	in	the	other.		Another	consideration	that	must	be	mentioned	is	that	the	overall	proportion	of	variance	in	intended	action	explained	by	the	variables	included	in	this	study	was	relatively	low	in	all	analyses.	This	indicates	that	there	were	important	factors	influencing	adolescents’	choice	of	intended	action	that	were	not	captured	by	the	variables	in	this	study.	Thus,	future	research	should	attempt	to	account	for	a	greater	share	of	potential	predictors.	In	addition	to	self-efficacy,	as	mentioned	above,	potential	predictors	could	include	teacher-	or	classroom-level	variables,	which	have	been	found	to	be	influential	in	students’	attitudes	towards	bullying	and	intervention	(Pozzoli	et	al,	2012).	In	fact,	the	larger	NPDEP	project	also	included	student-report	scales	measuring	their	perceptions	of	classroom-level	factors	such	as	classroom	climate	and	teacher	practices,	as	well	as	several	teacher-reported	measures,	including	an	assessment	of	their	own	self-efficacy	in	guiding	students’	social	and	ethical	development.	Further	work	with	the	larger	dataset	should	explore	other	variables	such	as	these	in	conjunction	with	the	variables	used	in	this	study.	Such	work	could	provide	a	fuller	picture	of	how	students’	socio-moral	reasoning,	social	perspective-taking	competence,	and	intended	action	in	challenging	situations	at	school	might	relate	to	their	classroom	contexts.	A	related	limitation	is	that	this	study	did	not	analyze	data	clustered	at	the	classroom	level,	only	at	the	school	level;	although	these	levels	were	the	same	for	the	majority	of	schools	(which	had	only	one	participating	classroom/teacher	per	school),	for	schools	that	did	have	more	than	one	participating	classroom,	this	may	have	underestimated	the	contribution	of	classroom-level	factors	to	the	observed	variance,	and	future	work	should	incorporate	both	levels	if	possible.		With	regards	to	the	sample	used	in	this	study	and	the	information	available	about	the	participants,	several	limitations	and	avenues	for	future	research	arise.	For	one,	the	age	range	in	this	study,	of	only	two	school	grades,	was	likely	too	narrow	to	detect	developmental	differences	in	the	target	variables.	Future	studies	should	include	a	broader	age	range	in	order	to	clarify	any	developmental	changes	that	may	occur	in	young	people’s	perceptions	of	bullying,	bystanding,	and	related	socio-moral	cognitions.	Another	issue	is	that	it	was	not	within	the	scope	of	this	study	to	more	deeply	investigate	differences	that	were	found	by	race/ethnicity,	especially	due	to	the	limited	nature	of	the	data	and	inability	to	ask	follow-up	questions.	Future	work	should	both	attempt	to	see	if	the	findings	reported	here	can	be	replicated	and,	if	so,	explore	potential	reasons	for	the	findings,	such	as	discrepant	experiences	with	and/or	perceptions	of	school	discipline	systems.		Additionally,	information	about	the	immigration	status	of	the	students	and/or	their	families	(e.g.,	whether	they	were	born	in	the	United	States)	was	not	collected.	Such	data	might	have	been	particularly	relevant	and	conceptually	interesting	in	this	study,	as	the	subject	matter	of	the	hypothetical	situation	was	bullying	based	on	the	“foreignness”	of	the	target.	Future	research	using	this	type	of	situation	should	consider	attempting	to	obtain	such	data,	while	taking	into	account	that	this	information	can	be	sensitive.	Following	on	that,	and	as	a	final	point,	the	data	used	in	this	study	were	collected	about	a	decade	ago,	and	different	results	might	be	obtained	if	new	data	were	to	be	collected	now.	This	is	especially	possible	due	to	the	current	political	climate	of	the	United	States,	which	unfortunately	seems	to	have	led	to	increased	levels	of	harassment	and	bullying	among	school-aged	students,	particularly	based	on	immigration	status,	foreign	origin,	and	other	aspects	of	perceived	difference	(Huang	&	Cornell,	2019;	Southern	Poverty	Law	Center,	2016).	Though	
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it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	dissertation	to	delve	into	any	of	the	specific	social-historical	circumstances	that	may	have	affected	these	data	at	the	unique	time	they	were	collected,	it	should	be	noted	that,	as	highlighted	in	Nucci’s	(2019)	model,	social/emotional/moral	functioning	always	exists	in	dynamic	relationship	with	context,	which	can	limit	the	generalizability	of	any	given	study.			
4.3	Implications	for	Research	and	Practice	
	
	Several	implications	can	be	drawn	from	the	results	of	this	study	with	regards	to	both	research,	e.g.,	theoretical	implications	for	SDT	and	methodological	implications	for	future	studies	of	these	topics,	and	practice,	e.g.,	potential	practical	applications	for	educators	and	others	engaging	in	efforts	to	combat	bullying	and	promote	bystander	intervention	among	adolescents.		
Theoretical	and	methodological	implications.	In	terms	of	moral	development	theory	(i.e.,	SDT),	the	results	of	this	study	imply	that,	at	least	among	adolescents,	relational	concerns	are	often	salient	and	deserve	further	attention,	especially	when	anticipated	(or	actual)	action—not	only	reasoning—is	involved.	This	study	could	not	provide	the	necessary	evidence	to	claim	that	there	is	or	is	not	a	“relational	domain”	that	is	separate	from	the	other	SDT	domains,	but	the	question	of	how	relational	partiality	might	integrate	into	the	SDT	framework	remains	ambiguous.	This	point	has	been	noted	by	other	recent	research	in	domain	theory,	such	as	Midgette’s	(2019)	study	of	how	parents	and	children	reason	about	division	of	household	tasks,	and	it	should	continue	to	be	addressed	in	future	qualitative	and	quantitative	research	in	various	contexts.		As	for	methodology,	this	study	suggests	that	self-report	survey-based	measures	can	indeed	be	used	to	obtain	meaningful	results	in	an	SDT-based	theoretical	frame,	at	least	with	adolescent	participants,	even	when	the	survey	was	not	specifically	designed	with	SDT	in	mind—though,	of	course,	it	would	be	helpful	for	future	studies	and	measures	to	be	designed	by	social	domain	theorists	as	well.	Another	implication	is	that	different	types	of	questions	(ratings,	multiple	choice,	free	response,	etc.)	may	produce	comparable	results,	but	using	more	than	one	type	is	likely	to	be	most	informative	due	to	the	subtle	differences	in	reasoning	processes	that	may	be	uncovered.	However,	potentially	biasing	factors,	such	as	the	order	of	items,	should	be	taken	into	account.	Specifically,	if	free-response	items	are	to	be	included,	it	might	make	sense	to	place	them	before	questions	that	ask	students	to	rate	or	choose	from	a	provided	set	of	options,	in	order	to	avoid	influencing	students’	“free”	answers.		
Implications	for	educational	settings	and	anti-bullying	efforts.	First	of	all,	it	must	be	acknowledged	again	that	causality	cannot	be	determined	from	the	results	of	this	study,	so	the	following	implications	are	speculative	with	regards	to	directionality.	With	that	caveat,	based	on	the	results	of	this	study,	it	may	be	the	case	that	emphasizing	the	harm	that	bullying	can	do	would	encourage	students	to	intervene.	Other	research	has	shown	that	oftentimes	students	who	have	been	in	bystander	positions	did	not	consider	the	situations	“serious	enough”	to	get	involved	(Ferrans	et	al.,	2012;	Palmer	et	al.,	2015).	This	may	indeed	be	accurate	sometimes—as	in,	it	may	be	true	that	a	situation	simply	involves	teasing	between	friends	and	the	“victim”	does	not	feel	harmed—but	it	seems	likely	that	many	times	there	is	harm	occurring	that	observers/bystanders	may	not	perceive	or	appreciate.	
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In	contrast,	focusing	on	rules	against	bullying,	the	potential	to	get	in	trouble	for	bullying,	etc.	may	be	better	than	nothing,	but	it	also	may	promote	an	inclination	by	students	to	get	teachers	involved	in	bullying	incidents	rather	than	stepping	in	to	try	to	disrupt	the	incidents	directly.	Informing	teachers	is	not	necessarily	a	negative	course	of	action;	in	fact,	it	may	be	one	of	the	more	desirable	and	effective	ones,	especially	if	the	school	social-emotional	climate/context	is	such	that	it	might	be	dangerous	for	students	to	get	directly	involved	(if	there	are	issues	with	gangs,	as	one	example).	However,	in	other	cases,	it	may	be	preferable	to	encourage	students	to	be	“upstanders”	and	intervene	themselves.	For	instance,	in	some	situations,	direct	intervention	by	students	could	halt	the	escalation	of	the	situation	more	quickly	and	prevent	reliance	on	over-burdened	teachers	or	other	staff	to	intervene.	Also,	as	several	participants	in	this	study	stated	in	their	free-response	explanations,	intervening	directly	might	sometimes	be	more	efficacious	because	some	adolescents	would	be	more	likely	to	take	the	judgments	of	peers	into	account	as	compared	to	the	judgments	of	teachers	and	other	adults.	Direct	intervention	by	other	students	could	also	convey	to	the	target	that	they	are	supported—and	to	perpetrating	students,	as	well	as	other	bystanders,	that	certain	kinds	of	behavior	are	socially	unacceptable.	In	this	way,	even	students	who	consider	bullying	and/or	bystanding	a	social	convention	or	norm	could	become	more	responsive	to	anti-bullying	messages.	Finally,	educators	or	others	who	hold	the	goal	of	promoting	bystander	intervention	among	youth	should	be	cognizant	of	the	various	factors	that	may	play	into	students’	decisions	to	intervene	or	not,	particularly	concerns	about	their	own	safety,	physical	or	psychological	(e.g.,	becoming	targets	of	bullying	themselves).	There	may	be	other	influential	factors	as	well,	such	as	students’	feeling	like	their	personal	characteristics	are	not	well-suited	to	intervene	(e.g.,	that	they	are	shy	and	quiet)	or	that	bullying	of	classmates—especially	those	they	don’t	know	well—is	not	their	business	(which	could	be	interpreted	as,	or	related	to,	a	lack	of	empathy).	Social	and	emotional	learning	(SEL),	which	aims	to	strengthen	self-	and	other-oriented	social	and	emotional	skills	in	every	student,	could	be	one	way	to	address	some	of	these	factors	(Divecha	&	Brackett,	2019).	Thus,	the	combination	of	SEL	with	a	domain-based	moral	education	approach	could	be	an	organic	and	holistic	way	to	both	prevent	bullying	and	promote	upstanding.		
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Appendix	A:		
Choices	in	Context	Measure	(CICM),	Situation	A	
	
Situation A   
 
A student sees a group of his friends teasing a boy whose family recently arrived in the U.S. from 
another country. They are making fun of the way he speaks and telling him he should move back to 
his own country. The student who sees this wonders what to do. He decides not to say anything. 
Instead, he walks away from the group. 
 
1. How much do you agree that walking away is the best thing for him to do? (Check only one) 
  Strongly disagree □                Disagree □                  Agree □                   Strongly agree □ 
 
 
2.   Here are some of the reasons other people gave for why they think the boy should not have 
walked away but instead should have told his friends not to disrespect the boy.  How would 
you rate each of the following reasons? 
 
Reasons (Check for each row)     
(You may check the same rating more than once) Very bad Bad Good Very good 
a. Teasing is hurting the new boy. □	 □	 □	 □	
a. There is a school rule against this behavior. □	 □	 □	 □	
a. Saying something now might help other 
students feel that they can speak out in these 
situations. 
□	 □	 □	 □	
a. The new boy should know he is not alone. □	 □	 □	 □	
 
 
3. Which one of these reasons do you think is best? (Check only one):    
  a □                b □                  c □                   d □ 
 
 
4. How often does this kind of bullying happen in your school?  (Check only one) 
  Very rarely □              Rarely □                  Often □            Very often □ 
 
 
5.   If you saw this situation in your school, how would you rate each of the following actions 
you might take? 
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Actions (Check one for each row) 
(You may check the same rating more than once) Very bad Bad Good Very good 
a. Tell a teacher what was going on. □	 □	 □	 □	
a. Just stay out of it. □	 □	 □	 □	
a. Tell the students to stop being such jerks. □	 □	 □	 □	
a. Go over and join in making fun of the new 
boy. □	 □	 □	 □	
 
 
6.  Which one of these four actions (a, b, c, or d) would you be most likely to take?    
  a □                b □                  c □                   d □ 
 
 
      Please explain why:__________________________________________________________ 
      __________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix	B:		
Adapted	Relationship	Questionnaire	(RelQ-A),		
Interpersonal	Management	(IM)	Subscale	
	
 
Note. Only three questions—questions 3, 4, and 7—are shown here because they are the three 
that make up the Interpersonal Management (IM) subscale. 
 
 
The first seven questions below are about situations that happen in schools like yours:  
  
3.    The principal of the school has told the students that this year there are no funds for 
after-school activities such as sports and art. Leticia and a lot of other students in the 
school are upset about losing these activities. They get together to decide what to do.  They 
think of the following ideas: 
Please rate each of these ideas: 
(You may check the same rating more than 
once) 
Very 
Bad Bad Good 
Very 
Good 
a.   begin an awareness campaign to get the 
community to understand how important sports 
and art are for the students 
o o o o 
b.   offer to paint the school building in return for 
money for after-school programs 
o o o o 
c.   tell them they don’t care about kids o o o o 
d.   write the school board and tell them they better 
restore the funds or there will be some very angry 
students 
o o o o 
Now check the one you think is the best choice. 
  a o b o c o d o   
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4.   Amy is very athletic and likes sports.  She particularly likes baseball and decides to 
try out for the school team one spring, even though there are no other girls on the team.  
During the tryouts, some of the boys start insulting her, saying that baseball is for boys 
and that they don’t want her on the team.  Amy tries out anyway, but the next day when 
the coach at school announces who made the team, Amy is not chosen.  Amy could: 
Please rate each of these ideas: 
(You may check the same rating more than 
once) 
Very 
Bad Bad Good 
Very 
Good 
a.   tell the coach “I know I played better than 
some of the boys who made the team.” 
o o o o 
b.   tell the coach she thinks he should realize she 
deserves to be on it 
o o o o 
c.   just don’t think about it o o o o 
d.   go to the coach to hear his reasons for not 
putting her on the team and explain her point of 
view to him 
o o o o 
Now check the one you think is the best choice. 
  ao bo co d o 
 
 
 
7.     Voula, a ninth grade student, wants to go to the high school school dance, but her 
father won’t let her because he thinks she is too young.  She could: 
  
Please rate each of these ideas: 
(You may check the same rating more than 
once) 
Very 
Bad Bad Good 
Very 
Good 
  
a.   refuse to talk to him because he’s stopping 
her from having fun 
o o o o   
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b.   tell him he can’t just keep telling her what to 
do now that she is in ninth grade 
o o o o   
c.   ask him to work with her on an agreement to 
deal with their concerns 
o o o o   
d.   explain to him why she feels she’s 
responsible enough to go to the dance 
o o o o   
Now check the one you think is the best choice. 
  ao bo co do   
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Appendix C:  
Social	Domain	Theory	Coding	Guidelines	
		 1. First	round:	Codability		 a. Codable:	response	seems	to	address	the	question	asked		b. Uncodable:	response	is	missing,	illegible,	nonsensical,	obviously	off-topic,	etc.		 2. Second	round:	SDT	domains		(Note:	Each	category	includes	all	positive	and/or	negative	references	to	the	considerations	within	that	category;	e.g.,	both	“They’re	hurting	him”	and	“They’re	not	really	hurting	him”	would	be	coded	as	SDT-Moral	due	to	the	focus	on	harm	or	lack	thereof.)				 a. Moral	domain:	Reason	addresses	the	inherent	rightness	vs.	wrongness	of	actions;	has	to	do	with	rules	that	are	more	universal.	References	any	of	the	following,	positively	or	negatively:	i. The	welfare/well-being	of	the	victim	or	others,	including	physical	harm	and/or	psychological	harm	(hurt	feelings,	etc.);	this	also	includes	empathy/perspective-taking	[e.g.,	how	would	they	feel	if	it	were	them;	I	wouldn’t	want	that	to	happen	to	me]	ii. Notions	of	justice,	fairness/equality,	or	rights	of	those	involved	in	the	situation	(other	than	the	respondent)		b. Conventional	domain:	Reason	addresses	the	structure	and/or	function	of	groups/society	and	how	to	maintain	them;	has	to	do	with	rules	but	that	could	potentially	be	changed,	based	on	social	consensus,	decisions	of	authority,	etc.	References	any	of	the	following,	positively	or	negatively:	i. External	rules,	dictates	of	authority,	etc.	(as	opposed	to	internal	notions	of	right	vs.	wrong)		ii. Group	functioning	and/or	group	identity	[e.g.,	we’re	not	like	that	at	this	school;	this	is	how	we	do	it]	iii. The	experience,	jurisdiction,	or	social	role(s)	of	authority	figures	(teachers,	etc.)	iv. Punishment/retribution,	especially	as	a	way	to	maintain	order		c. Personal	domain:	Reason	focuses	on	respondent’s	individual	concerns	and	choices;	has	to	do	with	things	that	should	not	be	regulated	by	moral	or	conventional	rules,	but	should	instead	be	under	individual	control.	References	any	of	the	following,	positively	or	negatively:		 i. Personal	autonomy/individuality	[e.g.,	I	am	like	this]	
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ii. Personal	preference/choice	[e.g.,	I	don’t	like	that;	I	don’t	want	to	get	involved]	iii. Privacy	[e.g.,	it’s	not	my	business]		d. Prudential	domain:	Reason	references	respondent’s	own	safety,	welfare,	and/or	practical	concerns	[e.g.,	I	might	get	hurt;	I	might	get	in	trouble;	they	might	turn	on	me;	it	wouldn’t	do	any	good].		e. Vague/no	domain:	Response	cannot	be	clearly	categorized	using	any	of	the	above	SDT	domain(s).			3. Third	round:	Non-SDT	considerations		 a. Emotion:	refers	to	the	role/influence	of	respondent’s	emotions,	or	lack	thereof,	in	motivating	behavior,	either	in	addition	to	or	without	explicit	reference	to	SDT	domain(s)	[e.g.,	I	would	be	too	scared;	it	makes	me	mad]		b. Relation:	Reason	refers	to	relationships	with	others	as	justifications	in	themselves,	either	in	addition	to	or	without	explicit	reference	to	SDT	domain(s);	includes	references	to	respondent’s	positive/present	or	negative/absent	relationship(s)	with	the	victim,	with	the	bullies,	and/or	with	the	larger	community	[e.g.,	I	would	intervene	if	they	were	my	friends]		c. Other:	Reason	concerns	other	consideration(s)	that	seem	important	in	the	response,	but	do	not	fit	into	the	SDT	domains	or	the	relational	or	emotional	categories	above;	such	reasons,	if	any,	will	be	noted	for	possible	future	work	but	not	analyzed	in	this	study.		
 
 
 	
